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I.  INTRODUCTION 
No trip to London would be complete without paying a visit to Madame 
Tussaud’s Wax Museum.  After purchasing tickets, the visitors are ushered into an 
elevator that ascends to the top floor.  There, they are greeted by hundreds of life-like 
reproductions of the famous and the infamous, the celebrated and condemned.  At 
Madame Tussaud’s, history finds itself enveloped in wax.  Descending from the top 
floor, a veritable history lesson enfolds, with the people who defined world history 
enshrined in cold reproduction.  Finally, one arrives at the museum’s basement.  
There, suitably, is the chamber of horrors. 
Entering the chamber of horrors, the squeamish are given fair warning.  And such 
warning is clearly understated.  The chamber is a shrine to the macabre.  Relics from 
the French Revolution spark the imagination–repulsion grows in the pit of the 
stomach when staring at the blade that sliced through Marie Antoinette’s neck.  The 
cold steel of the guillotine is joined by bloody recreations of Jack the Ripper’s 
nightly adventures and Charles Manson’s family outings.  There, among the grizzly 
and the damned, is a reenactment of an execution so influential as to warrant a place 
in horror’s hall of fame.  Thousands of spectators each year watch as the wax 
likeness of Gary Gilmore is shot in the heart. 
In 1978, four shots in Utah were heard “round the world.”  After a decade-long 
silence, Utah ushered in the modern death penalty era by firing squad.  The 
resumption of executions garnered considerable international attention.  Gilmore’s 
execution became a world sideshow attraction, not only for its distinction as the first 
execution in the United States in over a decade, but several other factors also made 
the execution notorious.  Aside from its significance as the first post-Furman 
execution, the method of Gilmore’s death fascinated the world.  Madame Tussaud 
and the world obsessed with Gilmore’s killing because the State of Utah tore into his 
flesh with bullets, spilling his blood on the ground. 
In the history of this nation, the tools placed before the executioner have rarely 
been so uniform.  Due to statutory revision and public outcry, the predominant–
nearly exclusive–manner of killing is that referred to by the condemned as the 
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“ultimate high.”3  Lethal injection has become the modern guillotine, accepted by the 
populace as the “humane” manner by which the State may lawfully extinguish life.  
Today potassium chloride lubricates the death machine.  Despite an increasingly 
successful movement, particularly in the southern “death-belt” states,4 to curtail the 
use of the electric chair and the gas chamber, some states still maintain an alternative 
to lethal injection, though most remain unused.  While not predominant in 
controversy, Utah’s use of the firing squad continues to incite commotion. 
In 1608, the first recorded execution in the American colonies occurred.  George 
Kendall, one of the original councillors of the Virginia colony, became the nation’s 
first firing-squad victim for plotting to betray the colony to Spain.  Since then, 143 
people have been killed by American firing squads.5  Many firing squad executions 
arose during colonial days or during periods of territorial governance.  Currently, 
three States allow for execution by firing squad: Utah,6 Idaho,7 and Oklahoma.8  
Idaho and Oklahoma maintain the firing squad option as an alternative if lethal 
injection were ruled unconstitutional or became impracticable.9  Utah is the only 
State that actively executes by firing squad. 
                                                                
3See JAMES A. INCIARDI, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 503 (3d ed. 1990).  
4Of the 711 executions in the United States between 1976 and 2001, 579 occurred in the 
South.  See Nancy Benac, A Profile of the Nation=s Executed: Poor, White Southern Dropouts, 
HOUSTON CHRONICLE May 8, 2001, at A4.  Of those executed in the South, 246 of the 
executions occurred in Texas.  See id.  In 2001, 79% of all executions occurred in the South.  
See Death Penalty Information Center, available at www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/ 
YearEndReport2001.pdf (last visited Oct. 8, 2003).  
5See M. WATT ESPY AND JOHN ORTIZ SMYKLA, EXECUTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES: 1608-
1987 (1987) (hereinafter “Espy file”).  The Espy file data counts those firing squad executions 
in the Colonies, the territories, and the States.  Since the creation of the Espy file, Utah 
executed John Albert Taylor by firing squad.  There have also been many military firing 
squads in our Nation=s history that are not included in the Espy file data.  For instance, at least 
185 men were executed by firing squad during the Civil War.  
6See UTAH CODE ANN. ' 77-18-5.5 (West 1999).  
7See IDAHO CODE ' 19-2716 (Michie 1982).  
8See OKLA. STAT. ANN. Tit. 22 ' 1014.  Also, any federal death sentence under the Federal 
Death Penalty Act of 1994 could result in an execution by firing squad if prosecuted in a 
jurisdiction allowing for that method.  See Christopher Q. Cutler, Death Resurrected: The 
Reimplementation of the Federal Death Penalty, 23 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1189, 1214 (2000).  
9Idaho law provides that the death penalty will be carried out by lethal injection except in 
any case where the director finds it to be impractical to carry out the punishment of death by 
administration of the required lethal substance or substances for the reason that it is not 
reasonably possible to obtain expert technical assistance, should such be necessary to assure 
the infliction of death without unnecessary suffering, the sentence of death may be carried out 
by firing squad, the number of members of which shall be determined by the director. 
IDAHO CODE ' 19-2716.  In 1980, the American Medical Association affirmed a resolution 
to end physician-aided executions.  Doctors still assist in the execution process.  However, 
Idaho law guards against the functional end of the death penalty due to an inability to receive 
medical assistance for lethal injections.  Oklahoma inflicts lethal injection unless that method 
“is held unconstitutional by an appellate court of competent jurisdiction, then the sentence of 
death shall be carried out by firing squad.”  OKLA. STATE. ANN. tit. 22 ' 1014.  
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Recent years have seen an increased public awareness of capital punishment and 
advanced concern for the administration of death.  The death penalty finds itself 
under attack from all sides—actual innocence, juvenile executions, racial disparity in 
capital sentencing, the execution of the mentally retarded or impaired–all topics 
which grab the headlines and preoccupy the courts.  In some jurisdictions, 
particularly those still using the electric chair, discussion and debate revolves around 
the method by which a State extinguishes a murderer’s life.  For over a century, the 
United States Supreme Court has remained aloof from considering the dignity of a 
particular mode of execution.  Individual states, whether judicially or politically, 
responded to national concern and moved towards more humane methods of death. 
Recent events in Utah highlight the increased national concern over the death 
penalty.  In the summer of 2003, Utah planned to execute two men by firing squad 
on consecutive nights.  Both men had given up their right to judicial review, but 
reinstated their legal proceedings and the State did not kill them.  But news of the 
reactivation of Utah’s firing squad created an intense public maelstrom, with the 
nation’s eyes turned to that violent method of death.  In its wake, the Utah 
Sentencing Commission recently announced that it will support legislation to put an 
end to the firing squad.10 
While outrage boils to the surface when Utah uses its firing squad option, there is 
little substantive legal development concerning the firing squad’s use.11  Few cases 
have challenged the firing squad’s constitutionality.  This article discusses the legal 
and political implications of the firing squad.  Using the Supreme Court’s ever-
developing Eighth Amendment jurisprudence as a guide, this article discusses 
whether the firing squad, both historically and in its present application, passes 
constitutional muster.  Beyond those factors that trigger constitutional protection, 
this article discusses those elements of the firing squad’s use which define society’s 
humanity and demonstrate our dignity.  In the end, those factors are framed and 
fashioned by each individual’s view of decency and dignity. 
II.  HISTORICAL USE OF UTAH’S FIRING SQUAD 
There has been a lot of loose talk about Utah justice.  I don’t know 
whether Utah justice is any different from justice in other places. . . . 
Justice is a complicated maneuver.  It takes a hundred different kinds of 
men doing a hundred different things, and any of them can be wrong.  But 
you can’t throw it out or blow it up because of the chance or error, or even 
because of some particular error.  . . . You have to go ahead and do the 
                                                                
10Stephen Hunt, End to Firing Squads Sought, S.L. TRIB., Aug. 7, 2003, at A1; Jennifer 
Dobner, Firing Squad is Under Fire, DESERET NEWS, Aug. 7, 2003, at B01. 
11The last serious and substantial legal article to deal with the constitutionality of the firing 
squad was published in 1979.  Then, that author focused on the religious implications of 
Utah=s firing squad.  See Martin R. Gardner, Illicit Legislative Motivation as a Sufficient 
Condition for Unconstitutionality Under the Establishment Clause–A Case for Consideration: 
The Utah Firing Squad, 1979 WASH. U. L. Q. 451 (1979).  Other articles have touched on the 
topic, but only in a cursory fashion.  The author hopes that this work will fill a void in legal 
scholarship.  
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best you know how, doing your own part of the job, or there’s no security 
for anyone anywhere.12 
Utah has a vibrant and colorful history.  Utah, truly the “Crossroads of the West,” 
finds itself at the historical intersection of the wild, wild west and the contemporary 
international community.  Utah is perpetually in transition, continually fluctuating 
between an infusion of new ideas, customs, and people, and its rich and entrenched 
pioneer heritage.  The recent Winter Olympic games punctuated Utah’s paradoxical 
hold on the past while it grasps wildly for the future.  Utah’s firing squad is an area 
in which western justice and modern jurisprudence collide, often clashing and 
crashing in their assimilation.   
People like to read about murder.  Something of the “imp of the perverse” draws 
our attention to fictional killers and the stranger-than-fiction reality of true crime.  
This often results in a sensational, almost tabloid, understanding of justice.  
Nevertheless, it is indispensable in any discussion of the firing squad to understand 
its past use, to comprehend its historical effectiveness, and to witness its lamentable 
limitations.  This article will attempt to walk the fine line between the melodramatic 
and the historically necessary in reviewing the century-and-a-half history of the 
firing squad in Utah.  Emphasis will be placed on execution details, not in an effort 
to titillate and tantalize, but because full comprehension of the minutia of an 
execution exposes its constitutionality, or lack thereof.  In attempting to chronicle 
this history, the author asks forgiveness for the recitation of historical details that 
captivate the imagination, but may not contribute to the legal analysis.  History can 
be blindingly captivating.   
A.  The Firing Squad from Wilderness to Statehood 
In 1847, Brigham Young, known as an “American Moses,” led a group of 
religious refugees to an area then governed by Mexico.13  Mob violence and 
governmental apathy drove the Mormons westward, craving the independence the 
frontier afforded.  Fleeing violent religious persecution, the industrious members of 
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints sought solace and solitude in their 
new mountain home.14  Soon after their arrival in the Salt Lake valley, the area 
officially became part of the United States through the Treaty of Guadalupe 
Hidalgo.15  With great ambition, this self-labeled “peculiar people”16 sought to form a 
                                                                
12WALLACE STEGNER, JOE HILL: A BIOGRAPHICAL NOVEL 310 (1950).  
13See generally, LEONARD ARRINGTON, BRIGHAM YOUNG:  AMERICAN MOSES 130-52 
(1986). 
14The Latter-day Saints’ thirst for freedom was best captured by one pioneer, William 
Clayton, who penned the epic hymn memorializing their trek, Come, Come, Ye Saints.  
Clayton wrote: 
We’ll find the place which God for us prepared, 
Far away in the West. 
Where none shall come to hurt or make afraid, 
There the Saints will be blessed. 
HYMNS OF THE CHURCH FOR JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS 30 (1985). 
15See NELS ANDERSON, DESERET SAINTS: THE MORMON FRONTIER IN UTAH 87 (1966).  
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government that, while protecting the independence and self-government of the 
populace, would one day gain admittance as a State. 
Understandably, the extreme isolation of the mostly-homogeneous Latter-day 
Saints in the first years of settling the Salt Lake valley created a political society 
unlike any other in nineteenth-century America.  Church members’ intense devotion 
supported an environment where ecclesiastical influence colored many aspects of 
civil and political life.  Such a religious environment produced laws, traditions, and 
mores differing from the rest of the United States.  An example of this may be found 
in territorial Utah’s first attempt at crafting a capital punishment statute. 
While awaiting the disposition of their first of many applications for statehood, 
citizens of Utah created a legislative body.  Designating their land the State of 
Deseret,17 the legislators began forming law.18  On January 16, 1851, the General 
Assembly of the State of Deseret passed its first statute authorizing capital 
punishment: “Be it further ordained, that when a person shall be found guilty of 
murder . . . and sented [sic] to die, he, she, or they shall suffer death by being shot, 
hung, or beheaded.”19  The putative State of Deseret inserted two uncommon, and 
arguably sanguine, methods of execution: beheading and firing squad.20 
                                                          
16This biblically-based designation separates the righteous from the “world.”  See, e.g., 
Deuteronomy 14:2 (King James Version) (“Thou are a holy people unto the Lord thy God, and 
the Lord hath chosen thee to be a peculiar people unto himself, above all nations that are upon 
the earth.”); 1 Peter 2:9 (King James Version) (“But ye are a chosen generation, a royal 
priesthood, a peculiar people; that ye should shew forth the praises of him who hath called you 
out of darkness into his marvelous light.”).  
17The name “Deseret” comes from a Book of Mormon term for the industrious honeybee.  
See THE BOOK OF MORMON, Book of Ether 2:3.  The envisioned State of Deseret covered a 
great deal of the American West, including portions of Nevada, California, Colorado, Arizona, 
New Mexico, Idaho, and Wyoming.  See JEAN BICKMORE WHITE, CHARTER FOR STATEHOOD: 
THE STORY OF UTAH=S STATE CONSTITUTION, 128 n.17 (1996).  The creation of other territories 
and states slowly whittled away the proposed size of Utah over the years.  
18See JOSEPH FIELDING SMITH, ESSENTIALS IN CHURCH HISTORY 391-93 (1979).  
19CRIMINAL LAWS OF THE STATE OF DESERET, Sec. 10 (1852).  
20Id.  Utah’s controversial use of the firing squad, both throughout history and at the 
present time, is occasionally attributed to a belief in “blood atonement;” that is, some sins are 
so grievous that the actor must begin making his eternal payment for those sins here on earth 
by spilling his blood on the ground.  While some support can be found for the proposition that 
theological doctrine influenced the original enactment of the firing squad, no evidence 
suggests a religious basis for the modern use of the firing squad.  Claims that Utah’s modern 
use of the firing squad is based on blood atonement are often found in sensationalistic writing 
such as Mikal Gilmore’s Shot to the Heart, but occasionally filter into academic writing as 
well.  In the end, the complex historical and theological implications of blood atonement are 
beyond the scope of this article.  Several factors, however, should detract from any continued 
and perfunctory attempt to link the modern firing squad and any blood atonement theory:  (1) 
no man has ever been improperly forced to die by firing squad and religion apparently plays 
no part in the prisoner’s selection of execution method; (2) the Mormon church currently 
disavows any blood atonement theory; (3) blood atonement is nether popularly discussed or 
commonly understood by most Utahns; and (4) there is no evidence that the reintroduction of 
the firing squad after the Supreme Court case of Furman is attributable to theological 
influence.  Importantly, the Utah Sentencing Commission recently sought the Latter-day Saint 
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Utah failed in its petition for statehood and would remain under territorial 
governance for over four decades.21  The use of the firing squad, however, would 
continue throughout Utah’s history.  In 1852, the officially-created territorial 
legislature of Utah enacted a criminal code adopting the provisions enacted by the 
General Assembly of the State of Deseret.22  At the time the legislative body drafted 
that statute, execution by hanging was the preferred method in the United States.  
Utah sporadically hung offenders.  In 1854, the first officially-sanctioned execution 
took place.  Two Native Americans named “Long Hair” and “Antelope,” aggrieved 
for perceived wrongdoings, attacked, killed, mutilated, and scalped two young 
boys.23  With the help of friendly Native Americans, the murderers were 
apprehended.  The first judicially-sanctioned execution in Utah was effectuated by a 
double hanging from the Jordan River Bridge in Salt Lake County.24   
In 1859, the territory of Utah hanged Thomas H. Ferguson, a man who 
“preach[ed] his own funeral sermon.”25  While standing at the gallows, the 
loquacious Ferguson delivered his last words in a speech which accounts chronicle 
as between one and eight hours in length.26  Complaining about the sentencing judge, 
Ferguson said that  
I was tried by the statutes of Utah which gives a man the privilege of 
choosing whether he’ll be hanged, beheaded, or shot.  Was I given the 
                                                          
Church’s opinion of their recent decision to support the elimination of the firing squad.  The 
church’s spokesman delivered the following single-sentence statement:  “The Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-day Saints has no objection to the elimination of the firing squad in Utah.”  
Linda Thompson, Church Not Against a Firing Squad Ban, DESERET NEWS, Sep. 4, 2003, at 
A01; Stephen Hunt, Church Rules on Firing Squad, S. L. TRIB., Sep. 5, 2003, at B1.  Until 
reputable scholarship adequately addresses the issue, attributing the modern use of the firing 
squad to blood atonement is inappropriate. 
21L. KAY GILLESPE, THE UNFORGIVEN: UTAH’S EXECUTED MEN (1997).  For an account of 
Utah=s long transition to statehood, see generally White, supra note 17, at 18-87; J. ALLEN & 
G. LEONARD, THE STORY OF THE LATTER-DAY SAINTS (1992); Anderson, supra note 15, at 83-
139, 307-55; ERNEST H. TAVES, BRIGHAM YOUNG AND THE NEW ZION, 99-131 (1991).  
22On March 6, 1852, the Territory of Utah approved the following two provisions of the 
criminal code: (1) “Murder of the first degree . . . shall be punished with death.”  Sec. 7, 
Criminal Laws of the Territory of Utah; and (2) “. . . said persons shall suffer death by being 
shot, hung, or beheaded as the Court my direct, or the person so condemned shall have his 
option as to the manner of his execution.”  Sec. 175, Criminal Laws of the Territory of Utah.  
See also Gardner, supra note 11, at 451.  
23GILLESPIE, supra note 21, at 35-37. 
24GILLESPIE, supra note 21, at 37.  Gillespie=s work is the most comprehensive and 
detailed work exploring Utah=s capital punishment history.  This article relies heavily on 
Gillespie=s excellent work; the author is greatly in debt to Gillespie=s research.  The author 
encourages any interested in Utah=s death penalty to read Gillespie=s book.  
25Ezra J. Poulson, Utah’s First Hanging, DESERET NEWS MAGAZINE (Aug. 5, 1951).  
Ferguson=s execution is sometimes referred to as Utah=s first hanging. The hanging of Long 
Hair and Antelope, done pursuant to judicial decree, predate that execution.  
26See Harold Schindler, Lengthy Gallows Soliloquy Impedes Swift Justice, S. L. TRIB., 
June 27, 1993, at E1; GILLESPIE, supra note 21, at 37.  
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choice?  No, I was not.  All Judge Sinclair wanted was to hang a man, 
then he was willing to leave the territory.  And he had too much whiskey 
in his head to know that the day he sentenced me to be executed would be 
Sunday.  The people laughed at him, so he had to change the date.27 
Presumably, Ferguson wished to be the first to die by firing squad.  The territory 
hanged him, though he stated “I have a good heart in me.  I never thought I would be 
executed for a crime.”28  Hangings, however, would be infrequent in Utah.  Despite 
its inclusion as a method of execution, Utah never beheaded anyone.29  The firing 
squad would soon prove to be the State’s predominant execution method. 
Whether by choice or by default, the firing squad became the most common 
method of execution in Utah.  In 1861, the State carried out its first firing squad 
execution.  The facts surrounding the underlying murder were not an uncommon 
occurrence in the arid west.  William Cockroft resolved a dispute over irrigation 
water with a shotgun.  The adjudication of Cockroft’s case proceeded quickly, as did 
most early capital cases.  Cockroft committed the murder on July 31, 1861.  A jury 
found him guilty of first degree murder September 13 and the State executed him 
eight days later.  As noted by Gillespie, Cockroft “was executed within the court 
house enclosure ‘to the disappointment of a few hundred persons who were 
anxiously waiting in the street for the prisoner to be brought out and taken to some 
place outside the city, where it was supposed he would be executed in a public 
manner.’”30 
Between Cockroft’s execution in 1861 and Utah becoming a state in 1896, Utah 
executed 11 men.31  A firing squad carried out all but the first three of these 
                                                                
27See Poulson, supra note 25.  Ferguson=s umbrage at being denied the choice of execution 
method defies a newspaper editorial of the nineteenth century.  In 1876, a California 
newspaper examining Utah=s capital punishment laws commented that “in capital convictions 
the culprit has the right to select the manner of the three methods . . . although this favor is 
granted to criminals, they seldom take advantage of the statutory right, because in that solemn 
extremity human nature cares little for such preferences.”  Schindler, supra note 26.  In the 
end, this article will show that some men care a great deal about which method extinguishes 
their life  
28Poulson, supra note 25.  
29Utah dropped beheading as an option in 1888.  See GILLESPIE, supra note 21 at 13; 2 
COMP. L. UTAH § 5131 (1888).  
30GILLESPIE, supra note 21, at 40 (quoting a contemporary newspaper article describing 
Cockroft=s execution). 
31The following men were executed before 1896: 
1. “Long Hair” - hanged for the murder of two young boys in 1854. 
2. “Antelope” - hanged for the murder of two young boys in 1854. 
3. Thomas Ferguson - hanged for the murder of his employer while intoxicated on 
Sept. 17, 1859. 
4. William Cockroft - first individual executed by firing squad for the murder of a man 
over water rights on September 21, 1861. 
5. Jason R. Luce - executed by firing squad for murder on January 12, 1864. 
6. Robert Sutton - executed by firing squad only eight days after committing murder on 
October 10, 1866. 
 
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol50/iss3/3
2002-03] NOTHING LESS THAN THE DIGNITY OF MAN 343 
executions.  During this time period, execution quickly followed the murder.32  The 
executions, for the most part, were carried out in the county of conviction.  Utah’s 
early use of the firing squad, while not strictly governed by administrative regulation 
as in modern time, generally followed a predictable pattern.  One county sheriff’s 
recollection of Robert Sutton’s execution demonstrates an oft-repeated pattern: 
Early in the morning, I pitched a small tent up on the bench, and had five 
men with rifles, four of them loaded with bullets and one loaded with 
powder, neither of the men knew who had the blank gun.  I called out a 
company of calvary to keep back the crowd of people, from all over the 
country.  I set the prisoner on a chair about sixty yards from the mouth of 
the tent and covered his face and opened the front of the tent, and gave the 
word of command, and he was shot dead we had his grave dug and buried 
him right there, and moved the tent and the men that night so that no one 
knew who did the shooting.33 
Of course, each execution was unique.  For instance, Chauncey Millard, the 
youngest man executed in Utah at age eighteen, agreed to sell his corpse to a 
surgeon.  The agreed upon price was a pound of candy.  Millard ate the candy as the 
firing squad shot him dead.34  Another murderer, Frederick Hopt, braved the firing 
                                                          
7. Chauncey W. Millard - the youngest person executed in Utah at age eighteen by 
firing squad for murder on January 29, 1869. 
8. John D. Lee - executed by firing squad for his participation in the Mountain 
Meadows Massacre on March 23, 1877. 
9. Wallace Wilkerson - executed by firing squad for a saloon fight ending in murder on 
May 16, 1879. 
10. Frederick Hopt - executed by firing squad for murdering a sheriff=s son in revenge 
on August 11, 1887. 
11. Enoch Davis - executed by firing squad for murdering his wife and burying her in a 
potato hole on September 14, 1894. 
See GILLESPIE, supra note 21, at 60-147; Jane Ann Walters, A Study of Executions in Utah, 
20-52 (1973); RAY HAUETER, AND MAY GOD HAVE MERCY ON YOU, THE UTAH PEACE 
OFFICER, vol. 58, Issue 4 Winter 1981, available at http:www.upoa.org/archives/ 
HAUETERS/MercyonSoul.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2003).  Prison records also mention the 
execution by firing squad in the Salt Lake County jail yard of an unnamed man in 1862.  See 
James B. Hill, History of the Utah State Prison at 7 (unpublished Master=s Thesis on file with 
Brigham Young University=s Harold B. Lee Library Special Collections).  None of the 
newspapers of the time chronicle this event; therefore, the veracity of the event is 
questionable.  See GILLESPIE, supra note 21, at 3-60; Walters, supra note 31, at 72.  
32Before 1896, in only two instances did the time between the commission of the crime 
and the execution exceed two years.  In one case, the State tried the capital defendant four 
times before conviction.  In the other instance, the State tried the murderer nineteen years after 
the commission of the offense, yet ultimately executed him within a year of his conviction.  
Generally, most individuals were executed well within a year.  Two individuals were executed 
within eight days of the commission of the crime.  See GILLESPIE, supra note 21, at 42, 44-47, 
52. 
33GILLESPIE, supra note 21, at 42 (quoting a journal entry from his great-grandfather, the 
Sheriff of Tooele County).  
34Id. at 43; HAROLD SCHINDLER, ORRIN PORTER ROCKWELL: MAN OF GOD, SON OF 
THUNDER 353 (1993).  
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squad without a blindfold.  Facing the convicted gunmen, Hopt exclaimed 
“Gentlemen, I have come to meet my fate. . . . I have no ill-will toward any man 
living, and am prepared and ready to meet my God.”35  While manacled to the firing 
squad chair, Jason R. Luce “confessed all his sins and asked God for forgiveness . . . 
requested his brother to take care of a woman he had impregnated . . . and bid the 
people goodbye.”36 
Another execution during that time period has long been remembered in the 
Beehive State.  In 1876, Utah executed John D. Lee for his involvement in the 
Mountain Meadows Massacre, a notorious event in which several settlers in 
Southern Utah, in conjunction with a group of Native Americans, killed a wagon 
train of immigrants.37  For years, the identities of those responsible remained hidden 
in a cloak of silence.  Finally, the State tried and convicted Lee for his participation, 
and possible leadership role, in the murders.38  No other individuals were ever 
brought to justice.  Because Lee’s execution is unusual in many ways, the following 
lengthy, but well-written, narrative of his execution is compelling: 
The morning was cool, the breeze sharp enough to call for an overcoat and 
muffler, for even though he was soon to be shot, he might as well be 
comfortable while he lived.  Bringing him to the Meadows was either a 
publicity stunt or a sadistic attempt to break his morale.  They could have 
as well have stood him against the prison wall at Beaver; he would have 
died as quickly, but this made better news copy.  
The photographer, ironically enough, was James Fennimore of whom Lee 
and his family had become so fond while he lived with them at Lonely 
Dell.  He set up his tripod and took pictures of the wagons, the officers, 
the general train.  Lee obligingly posed for him sitting on the edge of his 
coffin.   
The phase, “Nothing in his life became him like the leaving of it,” 
certainly seemed to apply here.  Lee remained calm and resigned.  He had 
written a farewell message to his wives and children the night before and 
when given a last chance to speak declared his innocence in a clear, strong 
voice, faltering only at mention of his wives and children. 
“I have but little to say this morning.  Of course I feel that I am on the 
brink of eternity, and the solemnities of eternity should rest upon my mind 
at the present,” he began, and after declaring that he had tried to save the 
                                                                
35Id. at 52 (quoting Salt Lake Tribune, 12 Aug. 1887).  Hopt “seemed to live a charmed 
life, for he ha[d] been tried four times, each time convicted of murder in the first degree and 
sentenced to death, and three times he ha[d] been granted new trials.”  People v. Hopt, 9 P. 
407 (Utah 1886).  Apparently, the fourth time was the charm.  The facts of Hopt=s case can be 
found at Territory v. Hopt, 4 P. 250 (Utah 1884).  
36HOPE A. HILTON, “WILD BILL” HICKMAN AND THE MORMON FRONTIER 108 (1988).  
37See generally JUANITA BROOKS, THE MOUNTAIN MEADOWS MASSACRE (1950). 
38See id. at 188-89. 
10https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol50/iss3/3
2002-03] NOTHING LESS THAN THE DIGNITY OF MAN 345 
emigrants and that he was being sacrificed in a cowardly, dastardly 
manner, continued, “I am ready to die.  I trust in God. I have no fear.  
Death has no terror.”  Finally, he closed with the words, “Having said this, 
I feel resigned.  I ask the Lord, my God, if my labors are done, to receive 
my spirit.” 
He shook hands with those around him, removed his overcoat, hat, and 
muffler and handed them to his friends.  Only one favor he asked of the 
guards, that they center his heart and not mutilate his body.39  He was 
blindfolded, but at his request his hands remained free.  At the signal 
“Ready! Aim! Fire!” five shots rang out, and John D. Lee fell back into 
his coffin without a moan or cry or a tremor of the body except for a 
convulsive twitching of the fingers of his left hand.40 
The near dignity of Lee’s execution contrasts sharply with that of Enoch Davis, 
sentenced to die for killing his wife and burying her in a potato hole.41  As he was led 
to the place of execution “he called out asking if there weren’t ‘some prostitutes on 
the ranch.’”42  Unsympathetically, none of the firing squad members fired a blank.43  
                                                                
39History records Lee=s request as “Center on my heart boys.  Don’t mangle my body.”  
JUANITA BROOKS, THE MOUNTAIN MEADOWS MASSACRE 210 (1950).  Lee’s words echo those 
of Harry “The Breaker” Morant, who, prior to his execution by firing squad, declared “Shoot 
straight, you bastards, don=t make a mess of it.”  50 of America’s Best, FORBES, Apr. 30, 2001, 
available at www.forbes.com/fyi/2001/0403/058_print.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2003) 
(hereinafter FORBES).   
40JUANITA BROOKS, JOHN D. LEE: ZEALOT, PIONEER BUILDER, SCAPEGOAT 366-67.  For 
other accounts of the Mountain Meadows Massacre and Lee=s execution, see ORSON F. 
WHITNEY, HISTORY OF UTAH, Vol. II 827-29 (1893); SMITH, supra note 18, at 418-22; 
GILLESPIE, supra note 21, at 44-47; ALLEN, supra note 21, at 311-13; NEGLEY TEETERS, HANG 
BY THE NECK: THE LEGAL USE OF SCAFFOLD AND NOOSE, GIBBET, STAKE, AND FIRING SQUAD 
FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT, 339-42 (1967).  Teeter=s account records a one-verse 
ballad of Lee=s execution: 
See Lee kneel upon his coffin, sure his death can do no good;  
Oh, see, they=ve shot him see his bosom stream with blood. 
See TEETERS, supra note 40, at 342. 
41A local paper described how Davis would be executed: 
Enoch Davis will not be shot at Provo.  Tents will be erected at some convenient place 
along one of the railways on Utah county and [the men] placed in them the night 
before the execution.  Davis will then be brought down from the Penitentiary, placed 
out before the tents, and shot until he is dead. 
None but officers of the law, a physician, and a couple of ministers will be permitted 
to witness the execution.  Possibly two or three newspaper representatives will be 
present as Deputy Marshals. 
How Davis Will Be Shot, VERNAL EXPRESS, Sep. 13, 1894, at 1.  For the facts of Davis’ crime, 
see Enoch Davis Must Die, VERNAL EXPRESS, June 21, 1894, at 1; Davis Will Swing, VERNAL 
EXPRESS, Nov. 3, 1892, at 1. 
42GILLESPIE, supra note 21, at 53. 
43Harold Schindler, Taylor’s Death Was Quick . . . But Some Weren’t So Lucky, S. L. 
TRIB., Jan. 28, 1996 at A1. 
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A newspaper reported that “[t]he deep blush of shame fell upon the whole party.  
What little sympathy, if any, had been for the old man, was then and there lost, and 
many turned away in disgust.”44  His behavior prompted an editorial reading, “Enoch 
Davis is dead.  He died like a dog; in fact, the most despicable, mangy canine whelp 
that ever met an ignominious fate could not have whined itself out of existence in a 
more deplorable, decency-sickening state than was Enoch Davis’ last hour.”45 
Most germane to a discussion of the constitutionality of the firing squad is the 
execution of Wallace Wilkerson in 1877.46  Wallace Wilkerson and William Baxter 
were in continual friction in the small mining town of Eureka, Utah.47  Their 
contention started with braggadocio on the dance floor and ended in a charged game 
of cribbage.48  Both Wilkerson and Baxter accused each other of cheating; Wilkerson 
ultimately won the game by shooting Baxter.49  After discharging once, Wilkerson 
seized Baxter and shot him a second time in the side of the head.50  
Wilkerson was convicted and sentenced to die by firing squad.  Wilkerson 
appealed his death sentence to the United States Supreme Court.51  There, the 
Supreme Court first addressed the constitutionality of a method of execution.  The 
legal basis for the decision will be discussed later.  It is worth noting, however, that 
Wilkerson’s actual execution is laden with irony.  Wilkerson himself, if he could 
have posthumously, would have scoffed at the Supreme Court’s implicit finding that 
“terror, pain, or disgrace” did not accompany a death by firing squad.52 
On the day of his execution, Wilkerson left his cell smoking a cigar, which he 
carried until the end.53  Some witnesses later reported that “he exhibited the 
unmistakable effects of liquor.”54  Wilkerson refused to be blindfolded and would not 
submit to being tied in the chair.55  He said, “I give you my word.  I intend to die like 
a man, looking my executioners right in the eye.”56 Gillespie described his May 16, 
1878, execution as follows: 
                                                                
44GILLESPIE, supra note 21, at 53. 
45Id. at 53.  Another account of the execution can be found in Davis the Wife Murderer 
Shot, VERNAL EXPRESS, Sep.20, 1894, at 1. 
46The review of the facts of Wilkerson=s case is taken from Gillespie=s book: THE 
UNFORGIVEN.  See GILLESPIE, supra note 21, at 47-49. 
47See id. 




52Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135 (1878). 
53See Schindler, supra note 43, at A1. 
54Schindler, supra note 26, at E1.  
55See id. After Wilkerson’s execution, later requests not to be tied to the chair were 
rejected.  See Bullets End Life of Frank Rose, THE MANTI-MESSENGER, Apr. 28, 1904, at 3  
56Schindler, supra note 26, at E1.   
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[A]round twelve he was taken to the jail yard and a paper target was 
pinned to his heart. . . . The instant the bullets struck him, he raised on his 
feet, turned partially to the south, and as he was pitching forward, took 
two steps and fell on his left side on the ground.  On the instant of striking 
the ground he turned on his face, exclaiming “My God! My God! they’ve 
missed it.”  Apparently at the command to fire, Wilkerson drew his 
shoulders back, and raised the paper target pinned to his jacket.57 Three 
bullet holes were found in the target, but they were an inch above his 
heart.  The fourth bullet hit Wilkerson’s left arm, six inches above his 
heart.  Wilkerson lay on the ground fifteen minutes before he died, and 
officials briefly feared they would have to shoot him again.58 
Wilkerson’s last moments were filled with the terror, pain and disgrace 
condemned by the Supreme Court.59  Wilkerson’s botched execution, however, is an 
anomaly.  The executions during Utah’s territorial period were generally swift and 
devoid of major problems.  The next century would be marked by a consistent, and 
nearly routine, use of the firing squad.  
B.  From Statehood to Furman 
In 1896, Utah finally became a state.  That year, a proposal was introduced 
before the Utah state legislature to completely abolish the death penalty.60  This 
proposal, while ultimately unsuccessful, was the first vigorous blanket attack on 
capital punishment in Utah.  This effort and its equally unsuccessful renewal the 
subsequent year represent the first vocal tremors of death-penalty dissent in Utah.61  
These abolitionist efforts reflected a nationwide concern about the use of the death 
                                                                
57
“By straightening in his chair, he had raised the target and the shooters were misdirected.  
Three slugs touched the target, but were well above the vital spot; the fourth bullet struck six 
inches from the others and shattered Wilkerson=s left arm.”  Id.  
58GILLESPIE, supra note 21, at 48-49.  Some accounts state that it took Wilkerson twenty-
seven minutes to die.  See SCHINDLER, supra note 43, at A1.  
59Id. at 48-49 (citations and quotations omitted).  This execution prompted a local paper to 
call for the abolition of the firing squad: 
The execution of Wallace Wilkerson at Provo yesterday affords another illustration of 
the brutal exhibitions of inquisitorial torture that have of late disgraced . . . the country 
and which have in some States so shocked the natural sensibilities of the people that 
extreme punishment has been abrogated from pure disgust excited by the sickening 
spectacles of rotten ropes, ignorantly or carelessly adjusted nooses or inexperienced 
marksmen.  These disgusting scenes are invariably ascribed to accidental causes, but 
they have become so horrifyingly frequent that some other method of judicial murder 
should be adopted.  The French guillotine never fails.  The swift falling knife flashes 
in the light, and a dull thud is heard and all is over.  It is eminently more merciful to 
the victim than our bungling atrocities, and the ends of justice are as fully secured. 
Id. at 13-14.  
60ROBERT E. ASHPOLE & JOSEPH E. SCOTT, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE UTAH EXPERIENCE, 
6 (1966).  
61Id.  
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penalty that eventually led to the discontinuance of capital punishment in some 
jurisdictions.62  The abolition movement in Utah, however, did not silence the guns. 
In 1898, Utah passed its first capital punishment statute as a state.63  Mirroring its 
territorial provision, that statute declared: “The punishment of death must be 
inflicted by hanging the defendant by the neck until he is dead, or by shooting him, 
at his election.  If the defendant rejects or refuses to make election, the court at the 
time of rendering the sentence must declare the mode and enter the same as part of 
its judgment.”64 
Between 1896 and 1972, Utah executed thirty-three men.65  The State executed 
all but three of those men by firing squad.   
                                                                
62For a discussion of the historical abolitionist efforts nationwide during this time period 
see Cutler, supra note 8, at 1194-96; Jeffery L. Kirchmeier, Another Place Beyond Here, The 
Death Penalty Moratorium Movement in the United States, U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (2002).  
63UTAH CODE ANN § 4939 (1898). 
64Id.  
65Those executed between 1896 and 1972 were: 
1. Charles Thiede - hanged for slitting his wife=s throat in the first execution after 
statehood on August 7, 1896. 
2. Patrick Coughlin - executed by firing squad for killing law enforcement officers in a 
shoot-out on December 18, 1896.    
3. Peter Mortensen - executed by firing squad for the robbery and murder of a business 
acquaintance on November 20, 1903. 
4. Frank Rose - executed by firing squad for murdering his wife on April 22, 1904. 
5.  J.J. Morris (a pseudonym, he never gave his real name to protect his parents from 
knowing about his death) - hung for a murder during a robbery on April 30, 1912. 
6. Jules C. E. Szirmay - executed by firing squad in a botched burglary attempt ending 
in murder to obtain money for “scientific books” on May 22, 1912. 
7. Harry Thorne - executed by firing squad for a robbery-murder committed with 
Thomas Riley on September 26, 1912. 
8. Thomas Riley - executed by firing squad for being an accomplice to murder on 
October 24, 1912. 
9. Frank Romeo - executed by firing squad for a robbery-murder on February 20, 1913. 
10. Joe Hill - famous International Workers of the World songwriter executed by firing 
squad for murder on November 19, 1915. 
11. Howard DeWeese- executed by firing squad for murdering his wife on May 24, 
1918. 
12. John Borich - executed by firing squad for murdering a woman for insurance money 
on January 20, 1919. 
13. Steve Maslich - executed by firing squad for a murder with Nick Oblizalo on 
January 29, 1922. 
14. Nick Oblizalo - executed by firing squad for a murder with Steve Maslich on June 9, 
1922. 
15. George H. Gardner - executed by firing squad for murdering two law enforcement 
officers on August 31, 1923. 
16 Omer R. Woods - an former attorney who was executed by firing squad for the 
murder of his wife on January 18, 1924. 
17. Henry C. Hett (also known as George Allen) - executed by firing squad for 
murdering a police officer on February 20, 1925. 
18. Pedro Cano - executed by firing squad for murder on May 19, 1925. 
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Of the three men who chose not to be executed by the firing squad during this 
time period, their personal reasons for choosing to forgo the bullet did not focus on a 
fear of a violent death.  J.J. Morris, apparently chose hanging because he had killed 
his victim with a gun.  Morris stated that “I do not want to meet [the victim] on the 
way.  He dies by bullets so I don’t want to die that way.  That’s why I chose hanging 
instead of shooting.”66  When Kay Kirkham was to be executed, it had been forty-six 
years since the State of Utah had used the gallows.  Kirkham stated “I chose hanging 
instead of the firing squad because of the publicity . . . the novelty . . . to put the state 
to more inconvenience.”67  Kirkham had also heard that the firing squad members 
got to keep the rifles they used.  He chose to hang because “they’re not getting 
anything free from me.”68 
The wisdom of their election to avoid a firing squad, however, is not readily 
apparent.  Hanging can be a tortuous and disturbing spectacle.  For example, in 
Thiede’s case the State tried a new method of hanging in which the victim would be 
                                                          
19.  Ralph Seyboldt - executed by firing squad for the murder of a police officer on 
January 15, 1926. 
20. Edward McGowan - executed by firing squad for the murder of a man and the rape 
of his wife and two daughters on February 5, 1926. 
21. Delbert Green - executed by firing squad for the murder of his wife and mother-in-
law on July 10, 1936. 
22. John W. Deering - executed by firing squad for murder on October 31, 1938. 
23. Donald Condit - executed by firing squad for the murder while hitchhiking on July 
30, 1942. 
24. Walter Robert Avery - executed by firing squad for a murder-robbery on February 5, 
1943. 
25. Austin Cox, Jr. - executed by firing squad for killing a judge on June 19, 1944. 
26. James Joseph Roedl - executed by firing squad for the murder of a hitchhiker on 
July 13, 1945. 
27. Eliseo Mares - executed by firing squad for murder on September 10, 1951. 
28. Ray Dempsey Gardner - executed by firing squad for murder on July 29, 1951. 
29. Don Jesse Neal - executed by firing squad for the murder of a police officer on July 
1, 1955. 
30. Verne Alfred Braasch - executed by firing squad for the murder of a gas station 
attendant with his co-murderer Melvin LeRoy Sullivan on May 11, 1956. 
31. Melvin LeRoy Sullivan - executed by firing squad for the murder of a gas station 
attendant with his co-murderer Verne Alfred Braasch on May 11, 1956. 
32. Barton Kay Kirkham - executed by hanging for the murder of several individuals, 
allegedly in revenge to hurt his parents for not paying him enough attention due to their 
extensive church service on July 7, 1958. 
33. James W. Rodgers - executed by firing squad for the murder of a co-worker on 
March 30, 1960. 
See GILLESPIE, supra note 21, at 60-147; WALTERS, supra note 31, at 20-52; HAUTER, supra 
note 31.  
66GILLESPIE, supra note 21, at 69.  A newspaper reported of Morris’ execution that “there 
was nothing of the gruesome nature ordinarily associated with the paying of the supreme 
penalty of the law.”  J. J. Morris Hanged for Salt Lake Murder, CARBON COUNTY NEWS, May 
2, 1912, at 1. 
67Id. 
68See Schindler, supra note 26, at E1.  
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suddenly jerked upwards by a counterweight.69  When the counterweight dropped, 
the force was not sufficient to break Thiede’s neck. After fourteen minutes of 
strangulation, Thiede was pronounced dead.70  These were the last three Utahns 
executed by hanging.  Utah removed hanging as a method of execution in 1980.71   
Utah’s first execution by firing squad as a state occurred in 1896.  Patrick 
Coughlin was sentenced to die for killing two police officers, thus ending a crime 
spree that began with stealing some berries.72  When asked which method of 
execution he preferred, he answered “I’ll take lead.”73  The firing squad shot 
Coughlin with the murder weapon.74 
One execution during this period brought international attention to Utah’s use of 
the firing squad.  In 1914, a jury convicted Joe Hillstrom, commonly known as Joe 
Hill, for robbing a grocery store.75  Before the proprietor was killed, he shot one of 
his assailants.  The police arrested Hill the next day when he sought help for a 
gunshot wound.  Hill claimed that he received the injury in an argument over a 
woman.  However, he refused to give the police the name of the woman “lest her 
reputation be ruined.”76  Representing himself for much the trial, he was found guilty 
of murder and sentenced to die.77  When asked by the judge which method of 
                                                                
69A remarkably unemotional account of Thiede’s execution can be found in Thiede Pays 
the Penalty, THE WASATCH WAVE, Aug. 14, 1895, at 1.  GILLESPIE, supra note 21, at 55.  
Other attempts at using this “clumsy” method in other states similarly failed.  See TEETERS, 
supra note 40, at 173-74.  The facts of Thiede=s case can be found in People v.  Thiede, 39 P. 
837 (Utah 1895). 
70See GILLESPIE, supra note 21, at 55.    
71Currently, only three states use hanging as a method of execution: Delaware, New 
Hampshire, and Washington.  Each also uses lethal injection.  See Death Penalty Information 
Center, Methods of Execution, available at www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/methods.html (last 
visited Oct. 8, 2003). 
72 The facts of Coughlin=s crime can be found at People v. Coughlin, 44 P. 94 (1896). 
73GILLESPIE, supra note 21, at 60.  
74Rather poetically, a newspaper reported his execution as follows: 
No birds sang in the branches of the leafless trees; no hum of insects droned a 
farewell; no soft breezes fanned the condemned man=s cheek or whispered him a word 
of hope from the waving shrubbery as might have been in the summertime.  On the 
contrary, the landscape never looked more drear and the crunching now sounded harsh 
under the foot.  The cold, raw and gusty wind seemed to shriek in glee as the soul of 
the dead mounted on the echoes of the rifle shots and winded its way to the eternal 
judge. 
GILLESPIE, supra note 21, at 60.  
75The facts of Hill=s crime are recorded in the Utah State Supreme Court=s rejection of his 
appeal.  See State v. Hillstrom, 150 P. 935 (Utah 1915).  
76GILLESPIE, supra note 21, at 80.  
77At trial, Hill dismissed his counsel by stating “I have three prosecuting attorneys here, 
and I intend to get rid of two of them.”  Hillstrom, 150 P. at 943.  
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execution he preferred, Hill responded “I’ll take shooting.  I’m used to that.  I have 
been shot a few times in the past and I guess I can stand it again.”78 
Hill’s case drew international attention for two reasons: his claim of innocence, 
and, more importantly, his politics.  Hill was an ardent supporter of the Industrial 
Workers of the World (IWW), a group also known as the “Wobblies.”79  The 
Wobblies were a socialist workers organization which “represented the very 
dissidence of the dissent, the rebelliousness of rebellion, and it lived an increasingly 
violent life, battered at by all the power of industry and industry’s local law.”80  The 
IWW used music to enlist members and educate about their cause.81  Hill was the 
Wobblies’ most influential songwriter.  Hill’s strong ties to the IWW provided 
fodder for allegations that politics motivated his execution.82  Those allegations 
allowed Hill to feel like he was dying a martyr’s death, not a murderer’s.83 
As Hill’s execution approached, Utah faced an avalanche of pleas for clemency 
from such high-profile individuals as President Woodrow Wilson and Helen Keller.84  
In the end, Hill could not dodge the firing squad’s bullet.85  Pulitzer-prize winning 
writer Wallace Stegner recorded Hill’s final moments as follows: 
They removed the handcuffs from Joe Hill’s wrists and put him in the 
armchair.  Not a sound came from them. . . .  [T]he white-haired doctor 
bent forward with his stethoscope to his ears to examine the heart of Joe 
                                                                
78GIBBS M. SMITH, JOE HILL 102 (1984).  
79See id. at 115. 
80See STEGNER, supra note 12, at 344-45.  Stegner=s work, a blend of history and fiction, 
has long been used in discussing Joe Hill=s case.  Its fictional embellishments have been 
criticized, especially when relied upon to prove Hill=s innocence.  See Markman & Cassell, 
Protecting the Innocent, A Response to the Bedau-Radelet Study, 41 STAN. L. REV. 121, 138 
(1988).  The author is aware of that criticism and only relies on Stegner=s statements for their 
descriptive and literary value.  A more detailed look at the IWW=s activities, especially in 
Utah, is found in Smith, supra note 78, at 1-14, 115-134.  
81See Smith, supra note 78, at 9. 
82See id. at 142-48. 
83A prominent Utah defense attorney who teaches a university course on Joe Hill=s case 
remarks “Hill wasn=t much of a laborer, he was a troubadour.  Hill fell in love with the idea of 
being a martyr.  Many of his songs are parodies of Christian belief in the hereafter.  He saw 
himself as a Christ figure.”  Martin Reuzhofer, Joe Hill: Murderer or Martyr to A Radical 
Union, S. L. TRIB. Nov. 20, 1998, at B1.  
84President Wilson=s efforts are laden with irony as Hill had often called him “Woodhead 
Wilson” in his writings.  See Smith, supra note 78, at 154  
85Joe Hill, however, maintained his wit until the end, as shown by the following narrative: 
On the day of the execution, November 9, 1915, the prison physician said to Hill: 
‘You have a pretty stiff ordeal ahead of you . . . How about a slug of whiskey?’  Hill 
answered: “I don=t want no whiskey.  I ain=t never drunk the stuff and I don=t intend to 
start now.”  Remarked the doctor wryly: ‘Perhaps you=re right.  It might be habit 
forming.’ 
TEETERS, supra note 40, at 185.  
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Hill, workman and singer and rebel, hero now in a hundred IWW halls, 
either a martyr to law’s blindness or a double murderer . . . The doctor 
pinned a heart shaped target on Joe Hill’s right breast . . . “I die with a 
clear conscious!”  Joe said suddenly, loudly.  “I die fighting, not like a 
coward.  But mark my words, the day of my vindication is coming!”  
Beyond the execution platform the sheriff stepped out one step and raised 
his hand.  His face was graven with deep, anguished lines.  “Aim!” the 
deep preacher-voice said.  Joe struggled against the straps that held him.  
His fury pulled him to a strained half crouch, and he screamed toward the 
curtained doorway, “Yes, aim!  Let her go! Fire!”86 
Hill gave the command for his own death.  A newspaper account recorded that 
“[b]efore the sound of the officer’s voice had died, there were five reports, almost in 
unison, puffs of white smoke came from the curtained window and Hillstrom’s chest 
sank in as though he had been hit with a mighty weight.”87  One of the firing squad 
members described his feelings: 
It seemed like shooting an animal.  How my thoughts wandered!  It 
seemed an age waiting for the command to fire.  And then, when it came 
from Hillstrom himself, I almost fell to my knees.  We fired.  I wanted to 
close my eyes, but they stared at the white paper heart, scorched and torn 
by four lead balls.  Four blackened circles began to turn crimson, then a 
spurt and the paper heart was red.88 
The bullets went directly into Hill’s heart.  He died quickly.89 
                                                                
86Again, the author recognizes the fictional nature of Stegner=s work.  However, his 
exceptional writing bears repetition.  The facts of this execution are corroborated by academic 
writing as well.  See Smith, supra note 78, at 177, GILLESPIE, supra note 21, at 83.  
87Smith, supra note 78, at 177 (quoting the SALT LAKE HERALD-REPORTER, November 20, 
1915). 
88Id. (quoting the NEW YORK TRIBUNE, November 20, 1915).  
89While tangential to the discussion above, Hill=s personal will should be reprinted here, if 
nothing more than to show his individuality and wit.  It read: 
My Last Will 
My will is easy to decide 
For there is nothing to divide. 
My kin doesn=t need to fuss and moan 
“Moss does not cling to a rolling stone.” 
My body–Oh!–If I could choose 
I would to ashes it reduce 
And let the merry breezes blow 
My dust to where some flowers grow. 
Perhaps some fading flower then 
Would come to life and bloom again. 
This is my Last and Final Will. 
Good luck to All of you 
Joe Hill 
Smith, supra note 78, at 174.  In a last letter to the secretary of the IWW, Hill asked 
“Could you arrange to have my body hauled to the State line to be buried?  I don=t want to be 
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Hill’s death has long been remembered in books, poems, television, and music.90  
His request, “Don’t waste any time mourning–Organize!” has become an oft-
repeated mantra in the picket line.91  But aside from the political furor surrounding 
his execution, society will long remember Joe Hill as one who claimed innocence.  
Experts still question his guilt.92  These attempts have been sharply criticized.93  
Either way, Utah’s firing-squad execution of Joe Hill will long be remembered. 
Execution by firing squad became routine during this time period.  Utah 
eventually moved the place of execution from the county of conviction to the Utah 
State Prison, first at the old Sugarhouse facility and now at Point-of-the-Mountain, 
thus standardizing the execution experience.  The executions during this period 
provide insight into the general use of the firing squad.  For example, each execution 
during this period cost Utah between two- and six-hundred-and fifty-three dollars.94  
In one case, the State paid each member of the firing squad forty dollars for their 
                                                          
found dead in Utah.”  Id. at 172.  After cremation, Hill=s ashes were first held by the Bureau of 
Investigation (now the F.B.I.) and later given to the National Archives.  Id.  In 1988, the ashes 
were given to the IWW which distributed them to a chapter in each state.  His last ashes were 
spread across a field in Washington in 1992.  See Joe Hill=s Ashes Mark Veteran=s Day 
Massacre, S. L. TRIB., Nov. 15, 1992, at A14.  True to his request, his ashes have been spread 
throughout the United States–except in Utah.  Hill cannot be found dead in the Beehive State.  
Id. 
90For an account of tributes to Hill see Smith, supra note 78, at 83.  
91Newspaper accounts of the period foresaw the martyr status Hill would assume: 
“[P]resumably there will grow up in the revolutionary group of which he was a prominent 
member a more or less sincere conviction that he died a hero as well as a martyr . . . This is the 
regrettable feature of the episode, for it may make Hillstrom dead much more dangerous to 
social stability than he was when alive.”  Smith, supra note 78, at 179 (quoting NEW YORK 
TIMES, November 20, 1915).   
92Smith noted that  
“[t]he question of Joe Hill=s guilt or innocence is no more certain today than it was in 
1915.  After reviewing all available records, however, there is considerable reason to 
believe that Hill was denied justice in the courts of Utah, and that there was still 
reasonable doubt as to his guilt after the district court and the supreme court had 
consigned him to the firing squad.”   
Smith supra note 77, at 113; see also Bedeau and Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in 
Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21, 126 (1987).  
93See Markman & Cassel, supra note 80, at 138.  
94See GILLESPIE, supra note 21, at 95, 124.  George H. Gardner=s execution cost two-
hundred dollars, Omer R. Wood=s execution cost three-hundred-and fifty dollars, and Austin 
Cox=s cost six-hundred dollars.  See id. at 95, 97, 124.  In Gary Gilmore=s execution in 1978, 
the State paid the firing squad foreman $125 and each firing squad member $100.  See JOHN 
D. BRESSLER, DEATH IN THE DARK: MIDNIGHT EXECUTIONS IN AMERICA 168 (1997).  By way of 
contrast, the two executioners in William Andrew=s lethal injection were each paid $300.  See 
id. at 149.  Lethal injection generally costs a state several thousand dollars in total.  See The 
Florida State Committee on Criminal Justice, A Monitor: Methods of Execution and Execution 
Protocols, Appendix D (available on-line at www.fcc.state.fl.us/fcc/reports/ 
monitor/appdmon.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2003)).  
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effort.95  John W. Deering, a man who rejected his right to counsel and pleaded 
guilty because he wanted to die, allowed a physician to monitor his heart with an 
electrocardiogram as he faced the firing squad.96  His heart raced to one-hundred-
and-eighty beats per minute; had he not been shot he would have died from the 
accelerated heart rate.97  Deering’s heart stopped beating fifteen seconds after the 
command to fire.98  Other inmates were similarly declared dead within seconds.99  In 
one case, Utah conducted a double firing squad.  Verne Alfred Braasch and Melvin 
Leroy Sullivan killed a service station attendant during a robbery.100  Two separate 
firing squads killed the two prisoners simultaneously; they were both pronounced 
dead within one minute.101 
Individual idiosyncracies also played into each execution.  Several prisoners were 
occupied with “dying like a man.”102  One prisoner did not want to die with his boots 
on.103  Another dreamed of his execution three times.  He had to be forcibly removed 
from his cell, being dragged to the chair after he collapsed.104  Pedro Cano found a 
redemptive meaning to his death.  He stated “Is it not better to die and start a new life 
with an opportunity to accomplish something than to be imprisoned for life behind 
the cold grey bars and accomplish nothing?”105  Before the men shot Delbert Green, 
he muttered “My God!  Have mercy on me.”  After he was shot a small crucifix fell 
from his dead hand.106  Before Robert Avery’s execution, fellow prisoners placed 
signs behind the firing-squad chair which read “The Last Mile” and “Crime Never 
                                                                
95Id. at 95.  
96See id. at 117.  
97See id.  
98See id.  
99For example, Omer R. Woods died Awithin seconds@ and Edward McGowan died within 
sixty-two seconds.  See GILLESPIE, supra note 21, at 97, 107.  
100See GILLESPIE, supra note 21, at 139. 
101See GILLESPIE, supra note 21, at 139.  For an intriguing exploration into the eleven men 
involved in that firing squad, see GINA BERRIAULT, THE LAST FIRING SQUAD, ESQUIRE June 
(1966) 88-91.  The facts of the underlying murder are found in State v. Braasch, 229 P.2d 289 
(Utah 1951).  
102Particularly, one of the youngest men to be executed in Utah seemed unduly concerned 
with dying like a man.  When two fellow death row inmates were executed before him, he 
asked, “[w]ell did he die like a man?”  GILLESPIE, supra note 21, at 76-77.  
103See GILLESPIE, supra note 21, at 107.  The facts of Edward McGowan=s crime can be 
found at State v. McGowan, 241 P. 314 (Utah 1925).  
104See id. at 78.  Frank Romeo=s crime is detailed at State v. Romeo, 128 P. 530 (Utah 
1912).  
105Id. at 101.  The facts of Cano=s crime can be found at State v. Cano, 228 P. 563 (Utah 
1924).  
106Id. at 115.  Green=s appeal to the Utah Supreme Court can be found at State v. Green, 55 
P.2d 1324 (Utah 1936); State v. Green, 40 P.2d 961 (Utah 1935); and State v. Green, 6 P.2d 
177 (Utah 1931).  
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Pays.”107  Ray Dempsey Gardner’s last words were “I’m ready to go.  No one will 
miss me.  My life is worthless.”108 
Even facing death, other inmates found room for humor.  When asked if he had a 
last request, James Rogers reportedly exclaimed “Yes–a bulletproof vest.”109  Steve 
Maslich had a superstitious belief that he could not be killed if he took a white 
handkerchief to his execution.  When they took him to the chair, he said “Everyday 
is better.  You fellows are only fooling.”  He soon found out otherwise.110  On the 
other hand Henry C. Hett understood his dire circumstances.  As he sat in the chair 
waiting for the command to fire, he repeatedly muttered “I’m sorry, I’m sorry, I’m 
sorry.”111 
Many executions during this period were uneventful, but the circumstances of the 
underlying murders were by no means usual.  One murderer’s trial showcased 
testimony from the victim’s father-in-law detailing a vision in which God showed 
him a trail of blood leading to the murderer’s house.112  Another shot his wife in bed, 
then allowed her to hold her baby as she slowly bled to death.113 
                                                                
107See id. at 122.  Before his death, Avery wrote an autobiography in which he stated  
Death to me is simply the cashing in of a stack of chips all of us receive at birth and 
while I have lost heavily in the game of life, I intend to face the cashier as a good 
loser.  I have played my cards as I found them . . . But when I reached the place where 
all my marked cards were recognized . . . the game was practically over for me.  This 
time I=ve been called and I=m going to shove the rest of my chips with a smile. 
GILLESPIE, supra note 21, at 120.  The facts of Avery=s case can be found at State v. Avery, 
125 P.803 (Utah 1942),  
108GILLESPIE, supra note 21, at 129.  Gardner=s case is chronicled at State v. Gardner, 230 
P.2d 559 (Utah 1951).  
109Rogers was not the only prisoner who maintained his humor before his death.  J.J. 
Morris spent the night before his hanging telling jokes, including one about two men about to 
be hung from a bridge: “The first man slipped from the noose when he was swung off the 
bridge and fell into the water.  He swan to the shore and escaped.  When they started to swing 
the other fellow, he said: ‘Now be sure to tie the knot tight, for I can=t swim.’”  GILLESPIE, 
supra note 21, at 70.  
110The facts of Steve Maslich=s crime can be found at State v. Maslich, 202 P. 6 (Utah 
1921).  
111GILLESPIE, supra note 21, at 100.  The reason for Hett=s remorse can be found at State v. 
Hett, 231 P. 838 (Utah 1924).  
112See id. at 60-61; UTAH=S LAWLESS FRINGE: STORIES OF TRUE CRIME 88-107 (Stanford J. 
Layton ed. 2001).  Mortensen=s appeal in this strange case can be found in State v. Mortensen, 
74 P.120 (Utah 1903) and State v. Mortensen, 73 P.562 (Utah 1903).  
113See id. at 66.  The circumstances of this heinous crime are so heart wrenching that they 
bear repeating in full.  Gillespie=s well-written account of the tragic events is as follows: 
While lying in bed with his wife in Salt Lake City at 48 West Third South, Frank Rose 
had been talking about her “sporting around” and how it should be stopped.  
According to the Salt Lake Tribune (28 Dec. 1903), Rose said, “Well, there=s only one 
way to stop it, and that is for me to kill you.”  “All right!,” she said, “I=m perfectly 
willing you should. I=m perfectly satisfied to die and quit this life.  It=s the only way I 
can stop it.”  Rose then took out his pistol, placed it behind her right ear, and pulled 
the trigger. 
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At least one execution during this time period was less than routine.  In 1951, 
Utah executed Eliseo J. Mares for a murder he committed at eighteen years of age 
while AWOL from the Army.114  Mares’ execution would be the first at Utah’s new 
Point-of-the-Mountain facility.  When the guns became silent, it was obvious that a 
grave error had occurred.  Mares had not been shot in the heart.  “The firing squad 
and witnesses watched in horror as Mares bled to death.”115 
Newspapers contained few details of Mares’ execution–information from the 
botched execution did not surface for twenty-five years.116  Accounts vary, but 
apparently it took a second volley of bullets to kill Mares.117  Some accounts have the 
first round of bullets striking his stomach and hip.118  Others have him struck on the 
wrong side of the chest.119  Accounts also differ concerning the reason the gunmen 
missed.  One author imputes a vengeful and cruel spirit to the members of the firing 
squad.120  Others paint a more sympathetic, and unusual, scenario.  Apparently Mares 
was popular with the prisoners and prison staff.  No member of the firing squad 
wished to be the one firing the lethal shot.  Accordingly, each aimed away from the 
                                                          
She remained conscious for more than an hour.  Rose later said they talked together: 
“She asked me to put a wet towel around her head and rub the place where the bullet 
had entered.  I did as she asked.  Then she asked me to kiss her and I did so.”  The 
Deseret News (26 December 1903) goes on to report that she put her arm around her 
husband=s neck and begged him to bring the baby to her.  Blood was flowing freely 
from the wound and the sands of life were running rapidly.  The hardened man placed 
the little one in his mother=s arms.  She kissed the baby while the latter patted her head 
affectionately.  She asked Rose to leave the baby in her arms and the man lay down 
beside his wife and calmly watched her die. 
Rose then left, went on a drinking binge, and two days later told the police he had 
killed his wife.  He directed them to the apartment where they found two-year-old 
baby Elmer next to the body of his dead mother.  The child had been there the entire 
time. As they entered, the baby said, “Mamma won=t wake up; I can=t make her.” 
GILLESPIE, supra note 21, at 65-66.  
114Apparently, Mares went AWOL to see his spouse and new baby.  See GILLESPIE, supra 
note 21, at 127.  The facts of Mares= crime are found in Mares v. Hill, 192 P.2d 861 (Utah 
1948) and Mares v. Hill, 222 P.2d 811 (Utah 1950).  
115STEPHEN TROMBLEY, EXECUTION PROTOCOL 11 (1992).  
116See Schindler, supra note 26, at E1.    
117See GILLESPIE, supra note 21, at 127.  
118See id.  
119See Martin R. Gardner, Executions and Indignities: An Eighth Amendment Assessment 
of the Methods of Inflicting Capital Punishment, 39 OHIO ST. L. J. 101, 124 (1978); 
TROMBLEY, supra note 114, at 176-77; Amy Donaldson, Execution By Bullet Once Wasn=t 
Rare, DESERET NEWS, Jan. 25, 1996, at A16 [hereinafter Donaldson, Execution by Bullet].  
120See Deborah W. Denno, Is Electrocution An Unconstitutional Method of Execution? 
The Engineering of Death Over the Century, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 551, 689 (1994).  
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target.121  History is inconclusive as to the gunmen’s motive.  If the shots were fired 
in malice, they reached their target.  Any shots fired in mercy went wildly astray.  In 
the end, why the firing squad missed probably meant little to Mares.  “Although no 
one will know absolutely whether the shots blotted out consciousness earlier, it was 
several minutes before [Mares] was pronounced dead.”122 
On March 30, 1960, Utah would execute its last inmate for seventeen years.  
James W. Rogers shot and killed a co-worker.  Roger’s defense was that he was 
insane at the time of the murder due to a case of syphilis.123  Roger’s death sentence 
did not trouble him; he figured he would die from syphilis before the State could 
execute him.124  He died by firing squad. 
No executions occurred between 1960 and when the Supreme Court decided 
Furman v. Georgia125 in 1972.  In Furman, the Supreme Court found the nation’s 
death penalty laws, as then administrated, to be arbitrary and capricious.  In a flurry, 
the States revised their statutory schemes.  In 1976, the Supreme Court reopened the 
floodgates in Gregg v. Georgia, allowing executions to proceed anew.  The first 
execution occurred in Utah. 
1.  Gary Gilmore to the Present Death Row Crowd 
On January 17, 1977, Gary Gilmore faced a firing squad and became the first 
individual in a decade to be executed in the United States.  Gilmore, who was 
responsible for the death of a gas station attendant and a motel clerk, decided to 
forgo the possible lengthy appeals and allow Utah to execute him.126 
Gilmore’s execution became an international media sensation.  The world will 
not soon forget the shots that opened the modern death penalty era.  Even now, years 
later, it is rare to find a law review article addressing the modern death penalty that 
does not at least mention Gilmore or his final declaration “Let’s do it!”127  His is 
                                                                
121See TROMBLEY, supra note 115, at 11; Donaldson, Execution by Bullet, supra note 119.  
This theory, however, is difficult to understand because no prison officer has ever served on a 
firing squad in Utah.  See HAUTER, supra note 31.  
122GILLESPIE, supra note 21, at 129 (quoting SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, July 18, 1976).  One 
newspaper declared that Mares died “silently and horribly.”  See Schindler, supra note 26.  
Some accounts indicate that one of Utah=s executed men had to be shot a second time in the 
head after the firing squad sought more ammunition.  See Gardner, supra note 119, at 124.  
The author is not sure if this refers to Mares, another firing-squad victim, or is a mistake.  
123See GILLESPIE, supra note 21, at 142.  Roger=s insanity claim is discussed in State v. 
Rogers, 329 P.2d 1075 (Utah 1958).  
124See id.  
125408 U.S. 238 (1972).  
126Interestingly, the murder weapon used by Gilmore recently came up for sale.  Because 
the gun had been stolen from a gun dealer, it was returned after Gilmore=s execution.  The 
gun=s current owner believes that it is the first murder weapon to be on the market in a century.  
He reportedly has turned down a $500,000 offer for the murder weapon, hoping to make more 
money.  See Geoffry Fattah, Gilmore Gun Offered For Sale, DESERET NEWS, Jan. 17, 2002, at 
B01.  
127Id. 
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arguably the most famous modern execution–an undesirable distinction.  The events 
leading to Gilmore’s execution were true real-life drama–the books, movies, and 
television programs that have risen from the ashes of his death captivated the nation.  
The intimate details of Gilmore’s story, while provocative, are too detailed to be 
properly addressed in this article.128 
Gilmore chose to die by firing squad.129  Gilmore also elected not to pursue an 
appeal in his case.130  In a letter to the Utah Supreme Court he clarified the reason for 
hastening his death: 
Any and all efforts made by any group of people including particularly the 
ACLU or any other organization of person or persons . . . designed to stall 
or delay my forthcoming legal execution set for November 15, 1976, are 
to be considered null and void.  It is my opinion that they seek nothing but 
personal publicity.  Whatever their reasons, they do not represent me and 
are acting contrary to Utah law.  Utah law is clear: appeal is not 
mandatory on death sentence.131  I have been sentenced to die November 
15, 1976, at 8:00 a.m.  This thing involves nobody except the sentencing 
court, myself and the firing squad.  Don’t the people of Utah have the 
courage of their convictions?  You sentence a man to die–me–and when I 
                                                                
128The author would recommend any wishing to learn more about Gilmore=s life read 
Norman Mailer=s Pulitzer Prize winning novel The Executioner=s Song.  NORMAN MAILER, 
THE EXECUTIONER’S SONG (1979)  A compelling summary of the State=s post-conviction 
efforts to bring about Gilmore=s execution can also be found in a manuscript prepared by the 
assistant attorney general who supervised the Gilmore case.  See Earl F. Dorius, Personal 
Recollections of My Involvement and the Involvement of the Attorney=s General=s Office Staff 
with the Gary Gilmore Case Between November 1, 1976 and January 17, 1997 (manuscript, 
on file with J. Reuben Clark Law School and Brigham Young University).  
129See MAILER, supra note 128, at 442.   When asked by the sentencing judge, Gilmore 
simply replied AI prefer to be shot.”  Id. 
130See Fattah, supra  note 126, at B01.  Gilmore=s choice to forgo the lengthy appeals 
process was challenged by several individuals.  The United States Supreme Court, however, 
ruled Gilmore made a knowledgeable waiver of his right to appeal.  In a decision that would 
hint at the future Supreme Court action in choice-of-execution cases, the Supreme Court 
upheld Gilmore=s choice to accept his execution: 
After carefully examining the materials submitted by the State of Utah, the Court is 
convinced that Gary Mark Gilmore made a knowing and intelligent waiver of any and 
all federal rights he might have asserted after the Utah trial court's sentence was 
imposed, and, specifically, that the State=s determinations of his competence 
knowingly and intelligently to waive any and all such rights were firmly grounded. 
Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 1013 (1976).  Interestingly, of the six men who have been 
executed in Utah during the modern death penalty era, four of them have been Avolunteers@--
they have waived their remaining challenges and submitted to the State=s judgment.  Id. 
131The law has since changed.  Utah law now provides an automatic, nonwaivable direct 
appeal to the Utah Supreme Court.  UTAH CODE ANN. ' 76-3-206(2)(a) (2002) (“The judgment 
of conviction and sentence of death is subject to automatic review by the Utah State Supreme 
Court within 60 days after certification by the sentencing court of the entire record unless time 
is extended an additional period not to exceed 30 days by the Utah State Supreme Court for 
good cause shown.”).  
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accept this most extreme punishment with grace and dignity, you, the 
people of Utah want to back down and argue with me about it.  You’re 
silly.  Look, I am sane, rational and more intelligent than the average 
person.  I have been sentenced to die.  I accept that.  Let’s do it and to hell 
with all the bullshit.132 
In spite of (or maybe because of) the media circus surrounding the impending 
execution, 71 percent of Americans favored Gilmore’s death by firing squad.133  
Notwithstanding the commotion of media and demonstrators outside the prison 
walls, Gilmore died quickly and quietly.  After Gilmore sat in the firing-squad chair, 
the warden asked if he had anything to say.  Gilmore uttered his famous response, 
“Let’s do it.”134  A priest delivered Gilmore his last rites, then three men placed a 
hood over his head.  They secured Gilmore’s body to the chair with thick straps.  A 
doctor located Gilmore’s heart and pinned a white circle to his clothing.  Silence 
reigned.  Finally, from behind the firing-squad blind, a whispered cadence of “one, 
two, three”–shots tore through the silence and into Gilmore.135  He “never raised a 
finger.  Didn’t quiver at all.”136  Blood flowed through his shirt and dripped to the 
floor.137  Gilmore lifted his hand slightly.  Twenty seconds later, he was dead.138 
Since Utah ushered in the new capital punishment era, the State has executed six 
men,139 bringing the total executions in Utah to 50.  Of those, four have died by lethal 
                                                                
132Dorius, supra note 128, at 7-8.  Gilmore further explained his decision to face death to 
his brother: 
But I am serious about this, and I don=t want you or anybody else to interfere.  It=s 
totally my affair.  I killed two men, the court sentenced me to die, and now I=m 
accepting that sentence.  I don=t want to spend the rest of my life on trial or in prison.  
I=ve lost my freedom.  I lost it a long time ago.  Now I=m jury going to make them 
finish the job they started twenty years ago. 
MIKAL GILMORE, SHOT IN THE HEART 328 (1994).  These kinds of statements by death row 
inmates are not uncommon.  For example, a member of the “Texas Seven” recently pleaded 
for a death sentence: “What you call the death penalty, I call freedom.  I can finally be free.  
I=m telling you right now I don=t want another life sentence.”  Jail Break Leader Gets Death 
Penalty, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2001, at A21.  
133Ray Boran, Silent Majority No Longer Silent, DESERET NEWS, Jan. 17, 1977; MAILER, 
supra note 128, at 979-80.  
134MAILER, supra note 128, at 955.  
135Customarily five shots are fired, one being a blank.  Gilmore=s brother, now in 
possession of the clothing Gilmore wore, says that there are five bullet holes in his shirt.  See 
GILMORE, supra note 132, at 390.  Utah did not take any chances with Gary Gilmore.  See id.  
136MAILER, supra note 128, at 958.  
137See id.  
138See id.  
139Those executed after 1976 are: 
1. Gary Gilmore - executed by firing squad for two murders on January 17, 1977. 
2. Pierre Dale Selby - executed by lethal injection for his participation in the “Hi-Fi 
murders” on August 28, 1987. 
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injection.140  Interestingly, Utah has hanged more men that it has killed by lethal 
injection.  Nonetheless, and mostly due to the nation’s predominant use of lethal 
injection, Utah’s lethal injections are called “routine.”141  Lethal injection draws little 
attention.  The almost-mechanical medical procedure involves few unforseen 
circumstances.142  Utah’s use of lethal injection blends into the national mosaic of 
death, without significant distinction.  This caused some to predict the end of the 
firing squad.143  John Albert Taylor’s 1996 execution by firing squad squelched any 
belief that the State had shot its last man. 
John Albert Taylor raped and killed a girl the day before her twelfth birthday.144  
At his sentencing, Taylor chose to die by the firing squad.145  Taylor would provide 
several reasons for his choice: he did not want to face death laying down,146 he 
wished to make it “hard on the State” by choosing a more “gruesome” method,147 and 
he did not “want to go flipping around like a fish out of water on that table.”148  
Taylor also wished to draw attention to his death.  He felt that “people will notice . . . 
when four or five bullets hit his chest . . . his life will virtually be ripped from him. 
                                                          
3. Arthur Gary Bishop - executed on June 10, 1988, by lethal injection for the sexual 
assault/murder of five young boys.  
4. William Andrews - executed by lethal injection for his participation on the “Hi-Fi 
murders” on July 29, 1992. 
5. John Albert Taylor - executed by firing squad for child rape and murder on January 
16, 1996. 
6. Joseph Mitchell Parsons - pleaded guilty to the multiple stabbing murder and 
robbery of a driver who picked him up while hitchhiking.  Parsons was executed by lethal 
injection on October 15, 1999.  
140Utah adopted lethal injection as an execution method in 1983.  See UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 77-18-5.5 (1983).  In 1987, Utah first executed a prisoner by that method.  See GILLESPIE, 
supra note 21, at 153-54.  Pierre Dale Selby died by lethal injection for his involvement in 
what has been known as the “Hi-Fi” or “Drano” murders.  See id. at 151-56. 
141See Michael Vigh, Parson’s Execution ‘Routine’ Because of Choice of Lethal Injection, 
S. L. TRIB. Oct. 15, 1999, at A14.  
142There are, of course, occasional problems with the use of lethal injection.  Mainly, 
problems stem from difficulty finding a vein and a delayed death.  “Botched” lethal injections 
are chronicled at www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/botched.html (last revisited Oct. 8, 2003). 
143See, e.g., GILMORE, supra note 132, at 351.  
144The facts of Taylor=s crime are detailed at State v. Taylor, 818 P.2d 1030 (Utah 1991).  
145See GILLESPIE, supra note 21, at 167. 
146Amy Donaldson, Killer Gives Interview to Two Teens, DESERET NEWS, Jan. 26, 1996, at 
A5 [hereinafter Donaldson, Killer Gives Interview].  
147Amy Donaldson, Death Wish Puts Utah in Spotlight, DESERET NEWS, Dec. 15, 1995, at 
B1.  
148Beverly Devoy, 11-Year-Old=s Killer Picks Death By Firing Squad, DESERET NEWS, 
Dec. 9, 1995 at B2; John Hiscock, Citizens Queue to Join Firing Squad, DAILY TELEGRAPH, 
Jan. 7, 1996, at 22; GILLESPIE, supra note 21, at 168. 
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. . . [T]his is murder.”149  Like many other inmates, Taylor saw the firing squad as a 
way to maintain his masculinity and dignity.150 
As Taylor’s execution approached, an erroneous news report stated that Utah was 
having difficulty finding people to participate in the firing squad.151  Utah’s 
Department of Corrections found itself inundated with volunteers.152  An entire 
military unit from Fort Bragg North Carolina volunteered to participate.153  Utah 
procedure provides that only law enforcement officers may participate in the 
execution.154  Understandably, their identity is kept secret.155 
After finishing his last meal of a pizza and a Coke, Taylor entered into the 
execution chamber.156  In light of past experience, the prison officials made 
modifications of the firing-squad procedure.  For instance, the chair had been altered 
with holes in the bottom like a strainer, allowing the blood to flow into a pan under 
the seat.157  A witness described the actual execution as follows: 
As the curtains opened, Taylor was already strapped to the chair and was 
looking directly at us.  He continued to look at us as he was blindfolded.  
He sat motionless as he was asked if he had any final words.  He 
expressed love to his family and friends, as the poem was written,  
‘Remember me, but let me go.’  I next heard a voice say, ‘Ready–Aim–1-
2-3,’ followed by one loud bang, four live rounds and one blank.158  The 
                                                                
149Donaldson, Killer Gives Interview, supra note 146; GILLESPIE, supra note 21, at 168.  
150See GILLESPIE, supra note 21, at 171.  
151Bob Greene, Will Olympic Judges Soon Be Firing Blanks?, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Feb. 25, 
2002, at 1.  
152Donaldson, Execution by Bullet, supra note 119.  One prison official reported Amy 
telephone has been ringing non-stop.  Hundreds of people have volunteered . . . we had calls 
coming in from everywhere.”  Hiscock, supra note 148.  
153See Donaldson, Execution by Bullet, supra note 119.  
154One correction official stated “We let the agencies choose the men because we wanted 
the most reliable, dependant, and well-adjusted individuals possible.  If we left it up to 
volunteers, some might have a ghoulish desire to inflict damage rather than execute the man.”  
Louis Sahagun, Utah is Under Fire Over Firing Squads, L. A. TIMES, 1/22/1996, at 1.  
155See Amy Donaldson, McCotter Knows the Drill, Goes by the Book, DESERET NEWS, 
Jan. 7, 1996, at A1.  
156See GILLESPIE, supra note 21 at 171 
157Corrections officials apparently added the pan because prison custodians refused to 
clean up after Gary Gilmore=s execution.  See David K. Kaplan & Daniel Glick, Ready, Aim 
. . . Fire, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 29, 1996, at 54.  
158The members of the firing squad practice extensively to shoot simultaneously.  One 
former corrections official noted “You don’t want to hear bangety-bang-bang-bang-bang.”  
See id.  
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white target pinned to his dark blue jumpsuit flew off his chest.159  His 
body lurched, his hands clenched and unclenched twice, and he was still.  
I looked for blood but could see none.  Others said that they saw a dark 
discoloration on his jumpsuit where the bullets entered.  From start to 
finish it had taken four minutes to execute John Albert Taylor.160 
Taylor was dead “before witnesses could bring themselves to breathe again.”161  One 
corrections official with execution experience in Texas opined that Taylor’s death 
“was carried out in as dignified a manner as I’ve ever witnessed.”162 
Taylor considered his death murder; the medical examiner agreed.163  Since his 
death fit the legal definition, Taylor’s death certificate records the cause of death as 
“homicide” by “multiple gunshots.”164 
Today, eleven men sit on Utah’s death row.165  They have predominantly chosen 
to die by lethal injection.  Yet the fact that a minority still elect to die by firing squad 
                                                                
159One witness described how “[t]he target flew off in an arc and landed a good four or 
five feet in front of him.  It didn=t flutter, it was propelled.”  Brian Maffly, Dead Calm to the 
End, A Tranquil Taylor Showed No Remorse, S. L. TRIB., Jan. 27, 1996, at A1.  
160GILLESPIE, supra note 21, at 171.  Another witness recorded 
the white target that had been velcroed to his blue jumpsuit disappeared.  His chest 
heaved upward, his left hand tightened into a fist, released slightly, tightened again 
and then gradually loosened as his body succumbed to death.  His head fell back . . . 
with latex gloved hands, the doctor climbed onto the podium where the chair was 
mounted and lifted the black hood.  He felt Taylor=s neck for a pulse.  He then took a 
pair of scizzors out of his front pocket and cut two holes in the hood.  He used a pen 
light to look into Taylor=s eyes.  Taylor, 36, was pronounced death at 12:07 a.m.  
Amy Donaldson, Firing Squad Carries Out Execution, DESERET NEWS, Jan. 26, 1996, at A1.  
161Schindler, supra note 26.  
162Mike Carter, Bill Voiding Firing-Squad Option Dropped, S. L. TRIB., Feb. 10, 1996, at 
E3.  
163Chip Parkensen, Execution Will Be Listed As a Homicide, DESERET NEWS, Feb. 1, 1996, 
at B1.  The firing squad members are, of course, exempt from prosecution due to the legal 
justification for the homicide.  Id. 
164Id. 
165Those who currently await execution (in order of time spent on death row as of 2003) 
are: 
1. Elroy Tillman - sentenced to death for bludgeoning his ex-girlfriend=s boyfriend 
while he slept and then setting fire to the mattress.  Tillman was sentenced on January 20, 
1983, and will be executed by lethal injection. 
2. Ronnie Lee Gardner - Gardener was sentenced to death for killing an attorney 
during an infamous court-house escape attempt before a hearing.  Gardner was sentenced on 
October 25, 1985.  Gardner also received a second death sentence for an aggravated assault in 
prison, but the Utah Supreme Court later found the statute he had been convicted under to be 
unconstitutional.  Gardner hopes to die by firing squad, but has chosen lethal injection. 
3. Douglas Carter - sentenced to death for stabbing and shooting a 57-year old woman 
to death in a burglary.  Carter was sentenced on December 18, 1985 (due to procedural errors 
in his first trial, he was re-sentenced on January 27, 1992).  Carter will die by lethal injection. 
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ensures that method will not disappear due to disuse.166  The demise of the firing 
squad will only come through judicial or political intervention.  The constitutionality 
of the firing squad depends on the judicially-imposed intricacies of the Eighth 
Amendment. 
2.  Modern Firing Squad Procedure 
Unlike the historical use of the firing squad that took place in the county of 
conviction without a standardized procedure, Utah has now codified elements of its 
firing-squad procedure.  Following tradition, the modern firing squad is composed of 
five men, all peace officers.167  Now, statutory law provides that the execution will 
take place at a “secure correctional facility.” 168  Executions are conducted in a 
special room in the Utah State Prison.  Executions generally occur at midnight. 
Administrative procedures provide intricate details concerning the procedure to 
be used in all firing squads.  Administrative policy authorizes the Executive Director 
of the Department of Corrections and the Warden to select the members of the firing 
                                                          
4. Ralph Leroy Menzies - sentenced to die for slitting the throat of a gas station 
attendant during a robbery/kidnaping.  Menzies was sentenced on March 23, 1988 and has 
chosen to die by firing squad. 
5. Michael Anthony Archuleta - sentenced to death for the kidnaping torture/murder of 
a college student.  Archuleta was sentenced on December 19, 1989 and will die by lethal 
injection. 
6. Von Lester Taylor - pleaded guilty to the murder of an elderly woman and her 
daughter in their cabin near Oakley, Utah and was sentenced to die on May 24, 1991.  Taylor 
will die by lethal injection. 
7. Douglas Anderson Lovell- pleaded guilty to murdering a victim in a sexual assault 
case who was to testify against him in a pending trial.  Lovell was sentenced on August 5, 
1993 and will die by lethal injection. 
8. Ronald Lafferty - sentenced in 1985 for the double murder of his brother=s wife and 
her 19-month-old baby, allegedly under the direction of deity.  After the Tenth Circuit 
overturned his conviction, he was retried and sentenced to death again on April 23, 1996.  
Lafferty will die by lethal injection. 
9. Troy Michael Kell - sentenced to die for stabbing a fellow inmate over 67 times 
while the victim was handcuffed and shackled.  Kell was sentenced on August 14, 1996 and 
chose to die by firing squad. 
10. Roberto V. Arguelles - sentenced to die on June 20, 1997, for kidnapping, sexually 
abusing, and murdering four women.  Arguelles chose to die by firing squad. 
11. Dave Taberone Honi, sentenced to die on May 20, 1999, for slashing the throat of 
his ex-girlfriend=s mother and then stabbing her genital area.  Honi will die by lethal injection. 
166Robert Arguelles and Troy Kell had execution dates set for this summer, but they both 
chose to seek judicial relief, thus postponing their deaths.  Ralph Menzies is set to die on 
November 10, 2003, by firing squad.  See Ashley Broughton, Condemned Killer will be Kept 
in Suspense, S. L. TRIB., Oct. 2, 2003, at C3.  However, at the time of writing, a state district 
judge is considering a motion that may stay his execution.  See id.  Interestingly, Arguelles has 
requested that he be shot without wearing a hood.  The Utah Supreme Court has approved his 
request.  See Kevin Cantera, Firing Squad Death OK=d, S. L. TRIB., Oct. 26, 2002, at B1  
167UTAH CODE ANN. ' 77-19-10(2).  
168UTAH CODE ANN. ' 77-19-10(1).  
29Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2003
364 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:335 
squad.169  A team leader and an alternative gunman, in case one member cannot 
fulfill the duties, are chosen.170  Utah recently purchased two Winchester lever-action 
rifles to be used in the unrealized executions planned for Summer, 2003.171  
Guidelines allow nine members of the media to be present at an execution, with strict 
instructions for their admittance and conduct.172  The execution chamber is arranged 
so the witnesses can view the actual execution, but cannot see the firing squad 
members.173 
Administrative procedures also clarify such minutia as where demonstrations 
may take place and where visitors may park.174  Any prison demonstrations are also 
limited.  Demonstrators cannot block or interfere with traffic, cannot erect any 
structure, and cannot leave behind any “object, substance, or material.”175  To avoid 
any First Amendment concerns, the prison officials will not separate groups 
according to their view regarding capital punishment.176  Salt Lake City police 
officers provide crowd control, and the ability to demonstrate at executions will be 
revoked in the case of a riot or disturbance that “jeopardizes the security, peace, 
order, or any function of the prison.”177 
Utah’s execution chamber serves for both lethal injections and firing squads: the 
room houses a gurney and a chair.  The chair is set against one wall, surrounded by 
absorbent sandbags.  The opposite wall, around twenty feet away, contains a canvas-
covered opening through which the firing-squad members penetrate their high-
powered rifles.  The condemned is led into the room and bound to the chair with 
thick leather straps.  A doctor locates the inmate’s heart and pins a circular white 
cloth target to the chest.  The team leader counts the cadence.  Five shots ring out as 
one.  A pan collects the dripping blood.  A doctor pronounces death.  The room is 
cleaned, and waits vacantly for its next victim. 
As evinced by the discussion above, Utah’s use of the firing squad has produced 
a vibrant and colorful history.  Executions have varied from painlessly quick to 
tortuously drawn-out.  Each execution has differed, and each firing squad death 
contributes to a greater overall understanding of the method’s inherent dignity (or 
                                                                
169UTAH. ADMIN. R. R251-107-4(3).  Correction officials want to have “reliable, stable, 
and well-adjusted people” on the firing squad.”  Amy Donaldson, Death Wish Puts Utah in 
Spotlight, DESERET NEWS, Dec. 15, 1995, at B1.  
170UTAH ADMIN. R. R251-107-4(3)(a).  
171Jennifer Dobner, State Buys Rifles for 2 Executions Set for June, DESERET NEWS, May 
29, 2003, at B01. 
172UTAH ADMIN. R. R251-107-7.  Nearly 200 media representatives requested a seat at 
John Albert Taylor=s execution.  See Michael Vigh, Parson=s Execution Routine Because of 
Choice of Lethal Injection, S. L. TRIB. 10/15/1999, at A14.  
173UTAH ADMIN. R. R251-107-7(6)(e).  
174UTAH ADMIN. R. R251-107-5 and -6.  
175UTAH ADMIN. R. R251-107-5(10)-(12).  
176UTAH ADMIN. R. R251-105-5(8).  
177UTAH ADMIN. R. R251-105-5(8). 
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lack thereof).  An understanding of the constitutional implications of Utah’s firing 
squad is only complete after comprehending, and correlating, the firing squad’s 
history in light of the Eighth Amendment’s historical and current application. 
III.  EIGHTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE 
Words mean more than we mean to express when we use them; so a 
whole book ought to mean a great deal more than the writer meant.178 
The clause seems to express a great deal of humanity, on which account I 
have no objection to it; but, as it seems to have no meaning in it, I do not 
think it necessary.179 
The text of our Eighth Amendment is concise: “Excessive bail shall not be 
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment 
inflicted.”180  Its brevity belies its influence; its simplicity disguises its interpretation.  
The hermeneutical treatment given this provision has shaped and formed modern 
criminal law.  And no area of law has been so transformed as capital jurisprudence.  
In the personal eschatology of the condemned, a successful Eighth Amendment 
challenge is the holy grail of constitutional claims.   
The Eighth Amendment’s legal history is compelling: arising from the dust 
created by years of neglect, the modern Supreme Court treats this provision as a 
mirror, now reflecting those progressive standards that characterize a civilized 
society.  The Supreme Court’s modern pondering on the Amendment creates a lively 
legal landscape where the preferences and prejudices of the populace may become 
enshrined in constitutional precedent.  Yet the forward-looking Amendment still 
maintains one foot squarely on historical understanding.  A review of the historical 
                                                                
178LEWIS CARROL, THE HUNTING OF THE SNARK, 28 (Martin Gardner ed. 1995).  
179Statement of Mr. Samuel Livermore during the debates surrounding the adoption of the 
Bill of Rights, as quoted in Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 369 (1910) and Furman v. 
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 244 (1972) (Douglas, J. concurring).  Mr. Livermore=s entire quote is 
as follows: 
The clause seems to express a great deal of humanity, on which account I have no 
objection to it; but as it seems to have no meaning in it, I do not think it necessary.  
What is meant by the terms excessive bail? Who are to be the judges? What is 
understood by excessive fines?  It lies with the court to determine.  No cruel and 
unusual punishment is to be inflicted; it is sometimes necessary to hang a man, villains 
often deserve whipping, and perhaps having their ears cut off; but are we in future to 
be prevented from inflicting these punishments because they are cruel?  If a more 
lenient mode of correcting vice and deterring others from the commission of it could 
be invented, it would be very prudent in the Legislature to adopt it; but until we have 
some security that this will be done, we ought not to be restrained from making 
necessary laws by any declaration of this kind.  
Id. 
180U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.  
31Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2003
366 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:335 
basis and evolution of the Eighth Amendment is indispensable to comprehend its 
modern application to the execution methods.181 
A.  A History of Pain 
The language and meaning of the Eighth Amendment find textual roots in the 
English Bill of Rights of 1689.182  Earlier sources, including the Magna Carta183 and 
biblical understanding, influenced the meaning behind the words.184  The English 
proscription that “excessive Baile ought not to be required not excessive Fines 
imposed not cruell and unusuall Punishments inflicted”185 generally “was concerned 
with selective or irregular application of harsh penalties . . . [whose] aim was to 
                                                                
181The author recognizes that a review of the Eighth Amendment=s history and current 
application may be found in many other sources.  The treatment found in the text that follows 
above, however, lays a bedrock foundation for the later discussion of the firing squad=s 
constitutionality.  
182See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 966 (1991) (examining the background of the 
Eighth Amendment).  
183The Magna Carta, however, served more to restrain the lawmakers and law enforcers 
than to create individual rights, as anticipated by the Bill of Rights.  See McGautha v. 
California, 402 U.S. 183, 244 (Douglas, J., concurring).  
184See Furman, 408 U.S. at 242.  One author described the historical underpinnings of the 
Eighth Amendment as follows: 
Following the Norman conquest of England in 1066, the old system of penalties, which 
ensured equality between crime and punishment, suddenly disappeared.  By the time 
systematic judicial records were kept, its demise was almost complete.  With the exception of 
certain grave crimes for which the punishment was death or outlawry, the arbitrary fine was 
replaced by a discretionary amercement.  Although amercement’s discretionary character 
allowed the circumstances of each case to be taken into account and the level of cash penalties 
to be decreased or increased accordingly, the amercement presented an opportunity for 
excessive or oppressive fines.  The problem of excessive amercements became so prevalent 
that three chapters of the Magna Carta were devoted to their regulation. Maitland said of 
Chapter 14 that ‘very likely there was no clause in the Magna Carta more grateful to the mass 
of the people.=  Chapter 14 clearly stipulated as fundamental law a prohibition of 
excessiveness in punishments: “A free man shall not be amerced for a trivial offense, except in 
accordance with the degree of the offence; and for a serious offence he shall be amerced 
according to its gravity, saving his livelihood; and a merchant likewise, saving his 
merchandise; in the same way a villein shall be amerced saving his wainage; if they fall into 
our mercy.  And none of the aforesaid amercements shall be imposed except by the testimony 
of reputable men of the neighborhood.” 
Anthony F. Granucci, ‘Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:’ The Original 
Meaning,’ 57 CALIF. L. REV. 839, 845-46 (1969).  Additionally, “[h]istorians have viewed the 
English provision as a reaction to either the ‘Bloody Assizer,’ the treason trials conducted by 
Chief Justice Jeffereys in 1685 after the abortive rebellion of the Duke of Manmouth, or to the 
prosecution of Titus Oats in the same year.”  Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).  For a 
comparison between the Eighth Amendment=s protections and Talmudic principles, see the 
amicus brief of the National Jewish Commission on Law and Public Affairs and International 
Association of Jewish Lawyers and Jurists in Bryan v. Moore available at 1999 WL 1249428 
(Dec. 20, 1999).  
185Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 966 (quoting the English Bill of Rights of 1689).  
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forbid arbitrary and discriminatory penalties of a severe nature.”186  While the 
American colonies initially only enforced “a rude, untechnical popular law,” 
gradually the protections of English law curbed government infringement of 
individual rights.187  The protection against cruel and unusual punishments eventually 
became commonly adopted on this side of the Atlantic. 
Several States included a prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments in 
their own constitutions when the Bill of Rights was adopted.188  Notwithstanding the 
general acceptance of similar provisions, there is little to suggest the Founders’ intent 
in proscribing such punishments.189  Due to its background in English law, the 
prevalence of similar provisions in state constitutions, and its early inactivity, the 
Eighth Amendment could have been considered mere “constitutional boilerplate” 
language.190  Whatever gaps may exist in our understanding of the Framers’ intent, it 
is clear that they meant the Eighth Amendment to afford at least the same protections 
                                                                
186Furman, 408 U.S. at 242 (Douglas, J., concurring).  The Supreme Court has also noted 
that the English Bill of Right=s phrase “appears to have been directed against punishments 
authorized by statute and beyond the jurisdiction of the sentencing court, as well as those 
disproportionate to the offense involved.”  Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976) (joint 
opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, J.J.).  
187ROBERT ALLEN RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 1776-1791 12 (University 
of North Carolina Press 1955).  
188See Furman, 408 U.S. at 244 (Douglas, J. concurring).  The Northwest Ordinance also 
contained a similar protection.  See id.; THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS 617  (Neil H. Cogan 
ed. 1997).  
189There is little in history to suggest the intent of Congress in adding the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment Clause.  During Congressional debate, however, some concern was 
expressed that the Eighth Amendment would deter such common punishments as hanging, 
whipping, and ear-cropping.  See Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 666; Furman, 408 U.S. at 242 
(Douglas, J., concurring).  
190See Jeffery D. Bukowski, The Eighth Amendment and Original Intent: Applying the 
Prohibition Against Cruel and Unusual Punishments to Prison Deprivation Cases is Not 
Beyond the Bounds of History and Precedent, 99 DICK. L. REV. 419, 429 (1995).  One 
newspaper of the time noted  
Many of these articles of the Bill of Rights in England, without due attention to the 
difference of the cases, were largely adopted when our Constitutions were formed, the 
minds of men then being so warmed with their exertions in the cause of liberty, as to 
lean too much perhaps towards a jealousy of power to repose a proper confidence in 
their own government.  From these articles in State Constitutions, many things were 
attempted to be transplanted into our new Constitution, which would either have been 
nugatory or improper:  This is one of them.  The expression “unusual and severe” or 
“cruel and unusual” surely would have been too vague to have been of any 
consequence, since they admit of no clean and precise signification . . . Thus, when we 
enter into particulars, we must be convinced that the proposition of such a restriction 
would have led to nothing useful, or to something dangerous, and therefore that its 
omission is not chargeable as a fault in the new Constitution. 
THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS 622 (Neil H. Cogan ed. 1997).  
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as the analogous English guarantee.191  At the most basic level, the Framers’ seemed 
to prohibit governmental endorsement of “tortures,” “inhumane,” or “barbarous” 
methods of punishment, and “the most cruel and unheard-of punishments.”192  Due to 
the dearth of information regarding the Framers’ intent, they apparently left the 
interpretation of this provision to the judiciary.193 
B.  Early Supreme Court Cases 
Before the later portion of the nineteenth century, the Eighth Amendment only 
received the briefest attention by the Supreme Court.  To that point, the Supreme 
Court only declared that the amendment did not apply to the states, but made no 
attempt to delineate its contours.194  The Supreme Court barely hinted at its 
interpretation of cruelty or unusualness.195   
The Supreme Court targeted its first foray into the depths of the Eighth 
Amendment in two method-of-execution cases: Wilkerson v. Utah196 and In re 
                                                                
191See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986) (“Although the Framers may have 
intended the Eighth Amendment to go beyond the scope of its English counterpart, their use of 
the language of the English Bill is convincing proof that they intended to provide at least the 
same protection.”); Solem v. Helm, 462 U.S. 277 (1983) (same).  
192See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 169 (joint opinion); 
Furman, 408 US. at 260 (Brennan, J., concurring), Furman, 408 U.S. at 391-92 (Burger, C.J., 
concurring).  
193The committee report for the House during the drafting of the Eighth Amendment noted 
that “the truth is, matters of this kind must be left to the discretion of those who have the 
administration of the laws.”  GAZETTE OF THE U.S., August 22, 1789, at 249, col. 3.  The 
modern court has interpreted the Framers= silence as a mandate for judicial definition of the 
phrase “cruel and unusual.”  See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 821 (1988) (“The 
authors of the Eighth Amendment drafted a categorical prohibition against the infliction of 
cruel and unusual punishments, but they made no attempt to define the contours of that 
category.  They delegated that task to future generations of judges . . . .”).   
194In Pervear v. Commonwealth, 72 U.S. 475, 479-80 (1866), the Supreme Court held that 
the Eighth Amendment was a federal restraint and did not apply to the states.  In Pervear, the 
defendant was found guilty of keeping a tenement for the sale of liquors without a licence, 
sentenced to three months confinement, and ordered to pay a fine of fifty dollars.  The 
Supreme Court only declared that the Eighth Amendment did not apply to the States, but did 
not further elaborate on that Amendment.  Id. 
195Id. at 480.  
19699 U.S. 130 (1878).  Interestingly enough, Wilkerson rose out of Utah=s use of the firing 
squad.  Wilkerson was convicted of murder in the first degree, for which the Territory 
mandated that he would “suffer death.”  The convicting court sentenced Wilkerson as follows:  
That you be taken from hence to some place in this Territory, where you shall be 
safely kept until Friday, the fourteenth day of December next; that between the hours 
of ten o=clock in the forenoon and three o=clock in the afternoon of the last-named day 
you be taken from your place of confinement to some place within this district, and 
that you there be publicly shot until you are dead. 
Id. at 130-31. 
Unfortunately, when the territorial legislature revised the criminal code in 1876, it 
failed to provide for a designated method of execution.  Wilkerson sought reversal of 
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Kemmler.197  Two factors limited the Supreme Court from plenary consideration of 
the Eighth Amendment in those early cases.  First, the Eighth Amendment at that 
time remained shackled to federal constraint, its principles had not yet been liberated 
to govern the States.198  Second, constitutional thought focused more on the opinions 
of the dead Founding Fathers than on the Constitution as a living document.  
Constitutional interpretation did not transcend the Framers’ opinions.  Wilkerson and 
Kemmler, therefore, provide little more than a snapshot of those punishments that 
eighteenth-century society tolerated.  Yet this view allows us to understand at least 
the most basic concern expressed by the Eighth Amendment. 
The Wilkerson Court prophetically noted that “[d]ifficulty would attend the effort 
to define with exactness the extent of the constitutional provision which provides 
that cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted . . . .”199  According to the 
Wilkerson and Kemmler Courts, the most basic concern expressed by the 
Amendment is a freedom from “terror, pain, or disgrace.”200  The Supreme Court 
deemed it safe to say that punishments of torture, and all others of similar cruelty, 
violate the Constitution.  The Kemmler Court remarked that “[p]unishments are cruel 
when they involve torture or a lingering death; but the punishment of death is not 
cruel within the meaning of that word as used in the Constitution.  It implies there 
something inhuman and barbarous–something more than the mere extinguishment of 
life.”201  
                                                          
his sentence, claiming that the statutory silence deprived the court of jurisdiction to 
sentencing him to die by the firing squad.  The Supreme Court rejected Wilkerson=s 
jurisdictional claim.  The narrow holding of Wilkerson was that the lower court had 
the authority to designate the firing squad as the method of his demise.  The Supreme 
Court reached this conclusion by virture of the previous statutory scheme’s 
approbation of the firing squad and its general use in Utah and other areas.   
See id. at 130-37. 
197136 U.S. 436 (1890).  
198In 1962 the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment applies to the States.  See 
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).  
199Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 135-36.  
200Id. at 134.  The Wilkerson Court reviewed punishments traditionally considered to be 
cruel and unusual, recognizing 
That in very atrocious crimes other circumstances of terror, pain, or disgrace were 
sometimes superadded. Cases mentioned by [one author] are, where the prisoner was 
drawn or dragged to the place of execution, in treason; or where he was embowelled 
alive, beheaded, and quartered, in high treason. Mention is also made of public 
dissection in murder, and burning alive in treason committed by a female. History 
confirms the truth of these atrocities, but the commentator states that the humanity of 
the nation by tacit consent allowed the mitigation of such parts of those judgments as 
savored of torture or cruelty, and he states that they were seldom strictly carried into 
effect. 
Id.  For a detailed account of horrific executions in early American history see TEETERS, supra 
note 40, at 95-110.  
201Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 446 (emphasis added).  
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The Wilkerson Court, however, made one pronouncement that will influence the 
later discussion of the firing squad.  After referring to traditional uses of the firing 
squad, mainly by the military, the Supreme Court stated that  
Cruel and unusual punishments are forbidden by the Constitution, but . . . 
the punishment of shooting as a mode of executing the death penalty for 
the crime of murder in the first degree is not included in that category, 
within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.202 
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s finding in Kemmler and Wilkerson that the 
electric chair and the firing squad do not violate the Constitution, the actual 
executions in those cases are laden with irony.  Wilkerson’s last moments were filled 
with terror, pain, and disgrace.  His executioners missed their target.  He bled to 
death over a 15-minute period.  His tortuous death was sadly echoed in Kemmler’s 
death.  
Kemmler challenged the use of the newly-invented electric chair.203  Kemmler, 
the first slated to be executed by the new apparatus, did not appreciate his role as the 
electric chair’s guinea pig.204  The Supreme Court, however, seemed impressed with 
                                                                
202Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 134 (emphasis added).  The Supreme Court’s review of the firing 
squad included an interesting comparison between those military crimes which merited the 
firing squad and those more egregious cases requiring hanging.  Presumably, some aspect of 
hanging made it a more proper method of execution for more egregious crimes.  Id.  
203Modern society=s concern for the relative humanity of an execution method are not of 
recent origin.  In 1886, New York=s governor appointed a commission to recommend a better 
method than the excruciatingly unpredictable use of hanging.  One member of the commission 
had once seen an inebriated man die from accidentally touching an electrical wire.  From this 
experience, he reasoned that electricity could kill a murderer as easily as it could a drunk.  
This led to the nation=s first experiment with executions by electricity.  New York=s adoption 
of the electric chair prompted a fascinating batting, pitting Thomas Edison and his direct 
current (DC) against George Westinghouse’s alternating current (AC).  Attempting to create a 
fear of his competitor’s electrical current, Edison campaigned for the use of AC with the 
electric chair, claiming that the “dangerous” current would kill instantly.  In an attempt to 
disassociate AC with such deadly results, Westinghouse contributed $ 100,000 to Kemmler=s 
appeals.  See Dawn Macready, The “Shocking” Truth About the Electric Chair: An Analysis of 
the Unconstitutionality of Electrocution, 26 Ohio N.U. L. REV. 781 (2000); Deborah W. 
Denno, Adieu to Electrocution, 26 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 665, 670 n.38 (2000).  
204One newspaper noted that  
A great deal is said about the electrical execution of Kemmler being an experiment.  
Undoubtedly it will be.  So is every other execution an experiment, and many of them 
are complete failures.  When a man is to be hanged, no one seems able to guarantee 
beforehand, at least in this country, when the drop will fall or that the rope will not 
break or stretch or slip into such a position as to prolong the victim=s agony . . . .  With 
all that is known of the deadly effect of the electric current, the chances are infinitely 
greater in favor of an immediate killing upon its first application . . . .  No method of 
execution seems absolutely trustworthy except some which Anglo-Saxon nations 
hesitate about accepting.  But as between hanging and the electric current the chances 
ought to be a hundred to one in favor of the certainty and prompt efficiency of the 
later. 
CRAIG BRANDON, THE ELECTRIC CHAIR: AN UNNATURAL AMERICAN HISTORY 176-78 (1999) 
(quoting NEW YORK TRIBUNE, August 9, 1889).  
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the fact that the New York legislature adopted the electric chair “in the effort to 
devise a more humane method.”205  Motive aside, Kemmler, like Wilkerson, died a 
tortuous death.  When they missed their target, the executioners in Wilkerson 
thought that they may have to try killing him again.  In Kemmler’s case, they had to.  
The first volt of electricity did not kill Kemmler.  Unprepared for the chance that the 
first volt would not be fatal, the dynamo took two minutes to charge a second time.  
Kemmler struggled to breathe, groaning as a frothy liquid dripped from his lips.  
Kemmler’s head was burned severely, so much so that his brain measured ninety-
seven degrees three hours after his death.  In all, Kemmler suffered a gruesome 
death, finally succumbing after a second electrical charge.206  He died in a sickening 
                                                                
205Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 447.  
206One author vividly described the disturbing facts of Kemmler’s execution: 
Within the room, Davis sent the two-bell signal to the dynamo room.  The voltage was 
increased, lighting the lamps on the control panel.  Then Davis pulled down the switch 
that placed the electric chair into the circuit.  The switch made a noise that could be 
heard in the execution chamber.  Kemmler stiffened in the chair.  The plan had been to 
leave the current on for a full 20 seconds. 
 
Dr. Spitzka, who had stationed himself next to Kemmler in the room, watched 
Kemmler’s face and hands.  At first they turned deadly pale but quickly changed to a 
dark red color.  The fingers of the hand seemed to grasp the chair.  The index finger of 
Kemmler=s right hand doubled up with such strength that the nail cut through the 
palm.  There was a sudden convulsion as Kemmler strained against the straps and his 
face twitched slightly, but there was no sound from Kemmler’s lips.   
 
. . .  
 
“He=s dead,” said Spitzka to [Warden] Durston as the witnesses who surrounded the 
chair congratulated each other.   
 
“Oh, he=s dead,” echoed Dr. MacDonald, as the other witnesses nodded in agreement.  
Spitzka asked the other doctors to note the condition of Kemmler’s nose, which had 
changed to a bright red color.  He then asked the attendants to loosen the face harness 
so he could examine the nose more closely.  He then ordered that the body be taken to 
the hospital. 
 
“There is the culmination of ten years= work and study,” exclaimed Southwick.  “We 
live in a higher civilization for this day!” 
 
Durston, however, insisted that the body was not to be moved until the doctors signed 
the certificate of death. 
 
Dr. Balch, who was bending over the body looking at the skin, noticed a rupture on the 
right index finger of Kemmler’s right hand, where it had bent back into the base of his 
thumb, causing a small cut, which was dripping blood. 
 
“Dr. MacDonald,” said Balch, “see that rupture?” 
 
Spitzka then gave the order, “Turn on the current!  Turn on the current, instantly.  This 
man is not dead!” 
 
Faces turned white, and the doctors fell back from the chair.  Durston, who had been 
next to the chair, sprang back to the doorway and echoed Spitzka=s order to “turn on 
the current.” 
 
“Keep it on!  Keep it on!”  Durston ordered Davis. 
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manner.  The Supreme Court’s first two efforts at addressing the Eighth Amendment 
resulted in nauseating and tortuous deaths.207 
It is not uncommon for commentators to synthesize the Supreme Court’s 
approach in those cases into a “historical interpretation” test.208  These early Supreme 
Court cases disapproved of “the wanton infliction of physical pain” based on 
historical standards, but by no means created a “pragmatic analysis of punishments 
approved by legislatures.”209  To the extent that Wilkerson and Kemmler established 
                                                          
This was not as easy as it might have been.  When he had been given the stop order, 
Davis had sent the message to the control room to turn off the dynamo.  The voltmeter 
on the control panel was almost back to zero.  Davis sent the two-bell signal to the 
dynamo room and waited for the current to build up again. 
 
The group of witnesses stood by horror-stricken, their eyes focused on Kemmler, as a 
frothy liquid began to drip from his mouth.  Then his chest began to heave and a heavy 
sound like a groan came from his lips.  Witnesses described it as “a heavy sound,” as 
if Kemmler was struggling to breathe.  It continued as a regular interval, a wheezing 
sound that escaped Kemmler=s tightly clenched lips.   
 
. . .  
 
Then, just two minutes after it had been turned off, the dynamo was up to full speed 
again.  The voltmeter read 2,000 volts, and Davis switched the chair back into the 
circuit.  It was a repeat of the first shock, with Kemmler=s body straining against the 
straps.  The moaning sound ended immediately as the body became rigid, but the 
frothy foam continued to drip down from his mouth onto his grey vest. 
 
The estimates of how long the current was on this second time vary from witness to 
witness.  Some estimated it to be as long as four and a half minutes.  Others said it was 
more like two.  The official report was that it stayed on for 70 seconds.  No one was 
anxious to give the order to stop this time.  Smoke was seem coming from the top of 
Kemmler’s head, and the room was filled with the stench of burning flesh.  There was 
a sizzling sound.  The reason for this was that the electrode that was attached to 
Kemmler’s head had been loosened at Spitzkas order after the first application of 
power.  It was therefore not in close contact with Kemmler’s skin and had created a 
spark that had burned his head.  
 
 . . .  
 
Dr. Fell turned to G.G. Bain, the United Press reporter who was next to him, and said,  
 
“Well, there is no doubt about one thing.  The man never suffered an iota of pain.”  
The other physicians in the room were quick to agree . . . . 
See BRANDON, supra note 204, at 176-78.  
207As the Supreme Court decided Kemmler=s case before any State killed by the electric 
chair, and before we understood the inherent pain involved in an execution, some have 
questioned Kemmler=s precedential value with respect to its holding that the electric chair does 
not violate the Eighth Amendment.  See Poyner v. Murray, 508 U.S. 931, 933 (Souter, J. 
dissenting from denial of certiorari).  The same cannot be said of Wilkerson=s holding with 
respect to the traditional use of the firing squad.  The potential for a painful firing squad death 
was well known and considered by the Wilkerson Court.  See Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 135-37.  
However, this article presupposes that Wilkerson=s holding must be reconsidered in light of 
modern Eighth Amendment principles.  
208See, e.g,. Roberta M. Harding, The Gallows and the Gurney: Analyzing the 
(Un)constitutionality of the Methods of Execution, 6 B.U. PUB., INT. L. J. 153, 158 (1996).  
209Furman, 408 U.S. at 392-93 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).  
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any comprehensive Eighth Amendment review, they “compar[ed] challenged 
methods of execution to concededly inhuman techniques of punishment.”210 
Even while focusing on the historical prohibition against tortuous physical pain, 
the Wilkerson and Kemmler Courts hinted that the Eighth Amendment addressed 
more than a constitutionally-enforced ceiling on the amount of physical pain inflicted 
in punishment.  Those cases acknowledged the unconstitutionality of painless, yet 
undignified, post-mortem events such as drawing and quartering, public display of a 
corpse, and mutilation.211  Kemmler’s condemnation of inhumane executions 
implicitly recognizes that cruel and unusual punishments are offensive in a way that 
transcends individual pain.  By recognizing that the Framer’s sought to avoid 
disgrace in executions, the Supreme Court implicitly recognized that something 
about ignoble executions can diminish the worth of men in the eyes of society.  The 
intimations of these cases, however, were limited by their simple rejection of archaic 
punishments long deplored by society. 
C.  Evolving Standards of Decency and the Dignity of Man 
In later cases, the Supreme Court would plant the seeds of its modern cruel and 
unusual punishment clause jurisprudence.  Subsequent Supreme Court cases not only 
shifted the constitutional focus beyond a myopic view of the eighteenth century, they 
                                                                
210Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); see also Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 136 (“[I]t is safe 
to affirm that punishments of torture . . . and all others in the same line of unnecessary cruelty 
are forbidden by that amendment . . . .”); Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 447 (“Punishments are cruel 
when they involve torture or a lingering death . . . .”).  This focus is also illustrated by 
Louisiana ex rel Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1946).  In that case, the Supreme Court 
considered Louisiana=s ability to attempt killing an inmate after botching his first 
electrocution.  The Supreme Court reviewed the influence of the Eighth Amendment as 
follows: 
Petitioner’s suggestion is that because he once underwent the psychological strain of 
preparation for electrocution, now to require him to undergo this preparation again 
subjects him to a lingering or cruel and unusual punishment.  Even the fact that 
petitioner has already been subjected to a current of electricity does not make his 
subsequent execution any more cruel in the constitutional sense than any other 
execution.  The cruelty against which the Constitution protects a convicted man is 
cruelty inherent in the method of punishment, not the necessary suffering involved in 
any method employed to extinguish life humanely.  The fact that an unforeseeable 
accident prevented the prompt consummation of the sentence cannot, it seems to us, 
add an element of cruelty to a subsequent execution.  There is no purpose to inflict 
unnecessary pain nor any unnecessary pain involved in the proposed execution.  The 
situation of the unfortunate victim of this accident is just as though he had suffered the 
identical amount of mental anguish and physical pain in any other occurrence, such as, 
for example, a fire in the cell block.  We cannot agree that the hardship imposed upon 
the petitioner rises to that level of hardship denounced as denial of due process 
because of cruelty. 
Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 464.  One justice=s dissent in O=Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323 (1892), 
however, suggested that the Supreme Court would consider the cruelty and usualness of 
punishments not involving pain.  See id. at 339-40.  
211See Campbell v. Wood, 511 U.S. 1119 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of 
certiorari).  
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qualitatively reconsidered the nature of a cruel or unusual punishment.  The Supreme 
Court first began establishing its methodological schema for the evaluation of 
punishments in Weems v. United States.212 
In Weems, the Supreme Court addressed an Eighth Amendment challenge rising 
out of federal jurisdiction for the first time, providing an opportunity for substantive 
review of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.  The Weems Court recognized 
the tentative nature of its earlier expeditions into the Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
Clause when noting that “what constitutes a cruel and unusual punishment has not 
been decided.”213  Yet even in its review the Weems Court would not fully define the 
scope of the Eighth Amendment.214  If anything, Weems stands for the proposition 
that the Eighth Amendment cannot be contained in a simplistic and inflexible 
definition.  
The Weems decision involved two important departures from earlier cases: first, 
Weems eschewed any limited reliance on an Eighth Amendment tied solely to the 
tolerance of the Founding Fathers.  In expanding the Amendment’s prohibition 
beyond those punishments considered cruel and unusual by the Framers, the Court 
stated that  
Legislation, both statutory and constitutional, is enacted, it is true, from an 
experience of evils but its general language should not, therefore, be 
necessarily tied to the form that evil has theretofore taken.  Time works 
changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes.  Therefore a 
principle, to be vital, must be capable of wider application than the 
mischief which gave it birth.  This is particularly true of constitutions.  
They are not ephemeral enactments, designed to meet passing occasions.  
They are, to use the words of Chief Justice Marshall, “designed to 
approach immortality as nearly as human institutions can approach it.”  
The future is their care, and provision for events of good and bad 
tendencies of which no prophecy can be made.215 
Weems’ legacy thus can be summarized in one sentence: “[T]he words of the 
Amendment are not precise . . . their scope is not static.”216  The Eighth 
Amendment’s focus “cannot be of what has been, but of what may be.”217  While not 
dispensing completely with the historical focus of Wilkerson and Kemmler, the 
Weems Court allowed the judiciary to consider modern interpretations of cruelty and 
unusualness.218  
                                                                
212217 U.S. 349 (1910).  
213Id. at 368.  
214See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99 (“The exact scope of the constitutional phrase >cruel 
and unusual= has not been detailed by this Court.”) (plurality decision).  
215Weems, 217 U.S. at 373. 
216Trop, 356 U.S. at, 100-01.  
217Weems, 212 U.S. at 373.  
218One Supreme Court justice noted that, had the logic in Kemmler and Wilkerson 
remained the law without consideration of contemporary standards, “the Clause would have 
been effectively read out of the Bill of Rights.”  Furman, 408 U.S. at 265 (Brennan, J. 
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Second, Weems suggested a pragmatic approach to reviewing punishments.  
Turning to the punishment in question, the Weems Court compared the gradation of 
punishment with the corresponding prohibited behavior.  In the words of the lone 
dissenter in the case, the Weems court interpreted “the inhibition against cruel and 
unusual punishment as imposing upon Congress the duty of proportioning 
punishment according to the nature and the crime . . . .”219  Drawing a sharp 
distinction between the unrestrained power of the State and restrained justice as 
imposed under constitutional limitations, the Weems Court empowered the judiciary 
to evaluate the harshness of society’s punishments.  The judiciary thereby adopted 
the duty “of determining whether punishments have been properly apportioned in a 
particular statute and if not, to decline to enforce it.”220  In sum, Weems recognized 
the evolving nature of the Eighth Amendment and entrusted to the judiciary the 
guardianship of its standards. 
The theoretical underpinnings in Weems would be further developed in Trop v. 
Dulles.221  In Trop, the Supreme Court considered a statute divesting the citizenship 
of those dishonorably discharged from military service.  The Trop Court reaffirmed 
that no exact definition of the Eighth Amendment’s language would be 
appropriate.222  Refining the approach hinted at in Weems, and avoiding creating a 
constitutional definition to govern cruel and unusual punishment claims, Trop 
outlined an approach that would guide later Eighth Amendment cases.223 
                                                          
concurring).  Indeed, “the provision >would seem to be wholly unnecessary in a free 
government, since it is scarcely possible that any department of such a government should 
authorize or justify such atrocious conduct.”  Weems, 217 U.S. at 371.  The Weems decision 
added vitality and meaning to a provision that would otherwise be a rubberstamp of modern 
legislative enactments.  
219Weems, 217 U.S. at 385.  
220Id.  
221356 U.S. 86 (1957).  
222The Supreme Court noted its “failure to give precise content to the Eighth Amendment 
. . . is not surprising” because we live in “an enlightened democracy.”  Id. at 100.  From this 
statement, one must question whether the flood of cases examining the amendment after the 
Trop decision demonstrates a greater or lesser enlightenment in our current society.  Id. 
223As a preliminary matter, the Supreme Court also explained that the death penalty would 
not be “an index of the constitutional limit on punishment.”  Trop, 356 U.S. at 99.  
Specifically, the Supreme Court stated  
At the outset, let us put to one side the death penalty as an index of the constitutional 
limit on punishment.  Whatever the arguments may be against capital punishment, 
both on moral grounds and in terms of accomplishing the purposes of 
punishment--and they are forceful--the death penalty has been employed throughout 
our history, and, in a day when it is still widely accepted, it cannot be said to violate 
the constitutional concept of cruelty. But it is equally plain that the existence of the 
death penalty is not a license to the Government to devise any punishment short of 
death within the limit of its imagination. 
Id.  In other words, “the existence of the death penalty is not a licence to the Government to 
devise any punishment short of death within the limit of its imagination.”  Id.  
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First, the Supreme Court identified the premise that undergirds the Eighth 
Amendment: “The basic principle underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less 
than the dignity of man.”224  This principle serves to focus judicial review of 
punishment.  All punishment must be considered in light of “the limits of civilized 
standards.”225  This pronouncement shifted the focus of the Amendment from a 
subjective measurement of pain to an objective inquiry into those values held in 
common by society.  Dignity, a word that connotes a state of honor, worth, or 
esteem,226 reflects a relationship between an individual’s self-worth and society at 
large.  The Court no longer would measure only whether an amount of pain reached 
the level of “tortuous,” but rather whether the punishment degraded our dignity.  The 
Supreme Court thereby came to evaluate man’s dignity from several vantage points.  
The Court considered the punishment’s multifaceted affect on the punished, the 
society, and the “international community of democracies.”227 
Second, the Trop Court emphasized Weems’ progressive approach to the 
Amendment.  Trop interpreted Weems as establishing that the “words of the 
Amendment are not precise; their scope is not static.”228  On that basis, Trop 
delivered the mantra that would henceforth govern all Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence: “The Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards 
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”229  Here, the Supreme 
Court endorsed man’s ability to become more humane, more refined, more dignified.  
As men become better than before, they must also progress in their treatment of 
those who fall short of society’s expectations.  Man’s level of decency only rises to 
the level of its treatment of the most indecent.  Therefore, the Trop Court’s decision 
allows for more humane treatment where socials norms progress.  Justice Benjamin 
N. Cardozo captured the essence of society’s evolving tolerance in punishment as 
follows: 
                                                                
224Id.  
225Id. at 100.  
226MIRRIAM-WEBSTER=S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 325 (10th ed. 1993).  This article will 
reserve a more comprehensive discussion of dignity for later.  
227Trop, 356 U.S. at 102.  The focus of the Trop decision was recently a source of 
contention in the Supreme Court=s consideration of the execution of mentally-retarded 
defendants.  See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).  While the Supreme Court 
subsequent to Trop clarified that the evolving standards should focus on the opinion of the 
American society, see Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 n.1 (1989), the Atkins 
majority, albeit in a footnote, considered the world community=s opposition to the execution of 
the mentally retarded.  See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316.  The dissent strongly criticized this review.  
See id. at 347 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
228Trop, 356 U.S. at 100-01.  The Supreme Court states that 
The provisions of the Constitution are not time-worn adages or hollow shibboleths.  
They are vital, living principles that authorize and limit governmental powers in our 
Nation.  They are the rules of government.  When the constitutionality of an Act of 
Congress is challenged in this Court, we must apply those rules.  If we do not, the 
words of the Constitution become little more than good advice. 
Id. at 103-04.  
229Id. at 101 (emphasis added).  
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I have faith . . .  that a century or less from now, our descendants will look 
back upon the penal system of today with the same surprise and horror 
that fill our own minds when we are told that only about a century ago 
160 crimes were visited under English law with the punishment of death, 
and that in 1801 a child of 13 was hanged at Tyburn for the larceny of a 
spoon.  Dark chapters are these in our history of law.  We think of them 
with a shudder, and say to ourselves that we have risen to heights of 
mercy and of reason far removed from such enormities.  The future may 
judge us less leniently than we choose to judge ourselves.230  
In sum, Trop clarified that the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause needed no 
definition, especially one tied only to historical standards.  The standards enshrined 
in the amendment would thereby develop with enlightened society’s maturing 
standards of decency and dignity. 
Applying the twin concerns of dignity and decency, the Supreme Court 
considered the punishment of denationalization against its approach in Kemmler and 
Wilkerson.  The Court recognized that Trop’s punishment involved “no physical 
mistreatment, no primitive torture” as condemned by its earliest cases.231  Yet the 
Court recognized that some punishments, though non-physical, may be “more 
primitive than torture.”232  The inherently amorphous concerns of dignity and 
decency could not be quantified by tangible pain alone.  The Supreme Court thus 
moved past any consideration focusing exclusively on the amount or nature of the 
pain inflicted.233  Instead, the Supreme Court considered intangible factors that 
detract from one’s dignity such as fear, distress, and apprehension of threat.  
Concerns of dignity and decency thereby superceded any constitutionally-tolerated 
threshold of pain. 
D.  Current Eighth Amendment Methodology 
Weems and Trop marked a turning point in the Supreme Court’s Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence, which directs the Court’s modern Eighth Amendment 
analysis.234  Nevertheless, these cases did not yield a precise formula to be followed 
                                                                
230B. N. CARDOZO, WHAT MEDICINE CAN DO FOR LAW, IN SELECTED WRITINGS 381 (M. E. 
Hall ed. 1947).  
231Trop, 356 U.S. at 101.  
232Id.  
233To clarify, the Supreme Court “never held that pain is the exclusive consideration under 
the Eighth Amendment.”  Campbell v. Wood, 511 U.S. 1119 (Blackmun, J., dissenting from 
denial of certiorari).  But the Wilkerson and Kemmler Courts did not focus on the non-
corporeal aspects of cruel and unusual punishment.  
234However, as the first major Eighth Amendment case after Trop, and an amazingly 
important case in death penalty jurisprudence, Furman v. Georgia, does not conclusively 
follow the same pattern as other modern cases.  In Furman, each member of the Supreme 
Court wrote a separate opinion.  Each opinion reflects a separate approach to the Eighth 
Amendment.  While similarities exist between those approaches and modern review, the 
disjointed Furman decision defies any attempt to provide longstanding guidance.  Furman=s 
opinions may stand for the general proposition that a death sentence may not be imposed 
arbitrarily or freakishly, but provides little guidance by way of creating a uniform method of 
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in considering an Eight Amendment claim.  No “static test” guides the evaluation of 
punishment.235  However, when the Supreme Court “cast loose from the historical 
moorings consisting of the original application of the Eighth Amendment, it did not 
embark rudderless upon a wide-open sea.”236  Using the Weems and Trop decisions, 
often in conjunction with the historical scrutinizing of pain from Wilkerson and 
Kemmler, a review of the Supreme Court’s modern cases reveals an approach 
generally, although not always completely, followed in Eighth Amendment cases. 
The twin concerns of decency and dignity guide modern Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence.  The most obvious consideration by a court is whether the “evolving 
standards of decency” prohibit the use of a particular punishment.  Here, the 
Supreme Court may first review the history of the Eighth Amendment and analogous 
punishments, presumably because a punishment would be found unconstitutional if 
prohibited as cruel and unusual in the eighteenth century.237  The modern thrust of 
the “evolving standards of decency” analysis questions whether a “national 
consensus” has emerged with regard to a particular punishment.  The Supreme Court 
derives a national consensus from objective indicia such as nationwide legislation 
and the activities of jurors in this evaluation.  In some cases, other factors, such as 
the views of professional organizations, may influence a review of contemporary 
standards.238  In the end the Supreme Court may look beyond the objective indicia of 
                                                          
review.  Gregg v. Georgia, the case upholding the use of the death penalty, on the other hand, 
clarifies the Supreme Court=s modern approach.   
235Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346.  
236Stanford, 492 U.S. at 379.  
237Recently, Justice Scalia recognized that the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence finds punishments to be cruel and unusual if they fall within one of two 
categories: (1) those punishments considered cruel and unusual at the enactment of the Bill of 
Rights and (2) those punishments offending the “evolving standards of decency.”  Atkins, 526 
U.S. at 339 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Ford, 477 U.S. at 405-06 (stating that a court must 
look at both historical common law and evolving standards of decency).  As recognized above, 
the Supreme Court cases often encompass these two inquiries.  First, the Supreme Court looks 
at the historical background, second it contemplates the contemporary standards.  
238Some effort has been made to distinguish between the Supreme Court=s review in its 
pre-Weems cases, calling them a “methodology” review, and the modern case law, terming 
that a “proportionality” review.  This effort treats method-of-execution cases as 
“methodology” cases that would not be governed by modern “proportionality” analysis.  The 
clearest example of this effort can be found in the Ninth Circuit cases of Campbell v. Woods, 
18 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 1994) and Fierro v. Gomez, 88 F.3d 301 (9th Cir. 1996).  Because 
“methodology review focuses more heavily on objective indicia of the pain involved in the 
challenged method,” Campbell, 18 F.3d at 682, it is “not necessary to analyze legislative 
trends,” Fierro, 77 F.3d at 307, or the other objective indicia.  There is no basis for the Ninth 
Circuit=s abandonment of modern Eighth Amendment principles in method-of-execution 
cases.  In drawing a distinction between “methodology” and the modern review, the Ninth 
Circuit referred to Justice Brennan=s dissent from denial of certiorari in Glass v. Louisiana, 
471 U.S. 1080 (1985), where he stated that “[f]irst and foremost, the Eighth Amendment 
prohibits ‘the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’”  Glass, 471 U.S. at 1084.  Justice 
Brennan, however, did not advocate a method-of-execution analysis limited only to a 
quantification of pain.  Justice Brennan clearly stated that “[t]he Eight Amendment protection 
of the dignity of man extends beyond profiling the unnecessary infliction of pain when 
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decency, concentrating on the overriding concern for dignity which ultimately shapes 
any Eighth Amendment analysis. 
1.  Evolving Standards of Decency  
The touchstone of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is now the “evolving 
standards of decency” analysis.  The Supreme Court has refused to transform this 
analysis into a constitutional “test.”  Instead, the phrase becomes a framework by 
which the Court evaluates the Eighth Amendment’s evolving reflection of modern 
society.  In ascertaining the “contemporary values concerning the infliction of a 
challenged sanction,” the Court “look[s] to the objective indicia that reflect the 
public attitude toward a given sanction.”239  The Supreme Court explicitly clarified 
that this review is objective; the subjective views of the judges should not appear to 
influence the evolving-standards review.240  The Supreme Court cautions that “the 
phrase cruel and unusual punishments limits the evolving standards appropriate for 
our consideration to those entertained by the society rather than those dictated by our 
personal consciences.”241 
This oft-repeated admonition, however, does not hamper dissenting justices from 
labeling the majority’s evolving standard review as nothing more than an example of 
subjective bias.  For example, in the recent case of Atkins v. Virginia,242 in which the 
Court found that society had evolved beyond executing the mentally retarded, two 
dissenters labeled the majority’s opinion “a post hoc rationalization for the 
                                                          
extinguishing life.”  See Glass, 407 U.S. at 1080.  Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. at 100 (plurality 
opinion)  Justice Brennan did not mention the objective indicia or “evolving standards,” but 
did not expressly limit method-of-execution cases to the Wilkerson/Kemmler line of cases.  
Justice Blackmun=s dissent from the denial of certiorari in Campbell most pointedly discussed 
the error in the Ninth Circuit=s analysis:  “The Ninth Circuit=s analysis is surprising given that 
this Court never has held that pain is the exclusive consideration under the Eighth 
Amendment, nor distinguished between challenges to the proportionality and the method of 
punishment.”  Campbell, 511 U.S. at 1119 (1994).  Obviously, the Supreme Court never has 
applied more than a consideration of pain to a method-of-execution case–the Supreme Court 
has not considered such a case since deciding that the Eighth Amendment transcends a 
consideration of pain.  A consideration of the inhumane techniques of punishment is still a 
consideration, but not the only consideration.  “Methodology” review is not a distinct and 
separate analysis, but a historical antecedent to the modern review.  The overriding concerns 
of dignity and decency ultimately govern the Eighth Amendment.  There is no reason to 
support that the Supreme Court would abandon its modern review in method-of-execution 
cases.  Other authorities assume that the Supreme Court will apply its modern case law to 
method-of-execution cases.  See, e.g., Deborah W. Denno, Adieu to Execution, 26 OHIO N. U. 
L. REV. 665, 669-79 (2000).  This Article, therefore, will review the Supreme Court=s 
comprehensive Eighth Amendment analysis. 
239Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173. 
240Indeed, “it has never been thought that [the evolving standards of decency inquiry] was 
a shorthand reference to the preferences of a majority of [the Supreme Court].”  Stanford, 492 
U.S. at 379; see also Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 345 (1981); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 
U.S. 263, 275 (1980); Coker, 433 U.S. at 592; Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173.  
241Thompson, 487 U.S. at 873 (O=Connor, J, concurring).  
242536 U.S. 304 (2002).  
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majority’s subjectively preferred result rather than an objective effort to ascertain the 
content of an evolving standard of decency”243 and commented that “[s]eldom has an 
opinion of this Court rested so obviously upon nothing but the personal views of its 
members.”244  These caustic accusations are not uncommon. 
To avoid the improper intrusion of subjective beliefs into the Court’s review, the 
Supreme Court generally agreed upon three objective factors that bolster its 
“evolving standards” review: (1) historical evidence; (2) legislative action; and (3) 
jury response.  The Court vigorously debated the inclusion of other factors in this 
analysis.  For a functional understanding of how the Supreme Court approaches an 
“evolving standards” question, each factor will be reviewed. 
a.  Historical Review 
Generally, when considering whether a given punishment violates the Eighth 
Amendment, the Supreme Court at least perfunctorily looks at the punishments 
tolerated by society at the enactment of the Bill of Rights.245  The Supreme Court 
begins with this review because “[t]here is now little room for doubt that the Eighth 
Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment embraces, at a minimum, those 
modes or acts of punishment that had been considered cruel and unusual at the time 
that the Bill of Rights was adopted.”246  This analysis tends to be brief, and rightfully 
so.  A testament to the “evolving standards of decency,” our society moved beyond 
the punishments considered “barbaric” during the eighteenth century.  It is not likely 
that a modern legislature would tolerate in any form those punishments abhorred by 
the Founding Fathers.  The whipping post and the pillory are not to return.  
Wilkerson and Kemmler’s legacy remains intact, but society generally moved beyond 
the fear or torture implicit in those cases.247  Accordingly, the Supreme Court’s use 
                                                                
243Atkins, 536 U.S. at 322 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).  It should be noted that Chief 
Justice Rehnquist did not respectfully dissent in that case.  
244Atkins, 536 U.S. 338 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
245See, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330-33 (1989); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 
U.S. 361, 368 (1989) (plurality decision); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405-06 (1986); 
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284-86 (1983); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 345-46 
(1981); Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 664-67; Gregg, 428 U.S. at 176-77; Woodson v. North 
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 288-91 (1976); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 101-04 (1969).  
246Ford, 477 U.S. at 405; see also Penry, 492 U.S. at 330.  On the basis of this argument, 
the review of the historical treatment of a given punishment may either form a discrete portion 
of the “evolving standard” inquiry or serve as an independent judgment that, contemporary 
society aside, the framers would have found the punishment to be cruel and unusual.  
Practically, given the comparatively-humane nature of punishment administered today, the 
second use is without teeth.  Generally, a reviewing court will consider history as a portion of 
its “evolving standards” inquiry.  
247Commentators generally disparage and distinguish the Wilkerson and Kemmler 
approach.  This criticism also finds its way into some Supreme Court cases.  See Furman, 408 
U.S. at 263-70.  The Supreme Court, however, regularly relies on those cases in its analysis, at 
least as a transitional argument to focus its inquiry on modern societal values.  Also, as 
discussed further in the text that follows below, courts use those cases by way of comparison 
in evaluating the evolving standards.  While not the sole basis for judicial review, Wilkerson 
and Kemmler still influence Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.   
46https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol50/iss3/3
2002-03] NOTHING LESS THAN THE DIGNITY OF MAN 381 
of a historical review rarely decides the case, but instead provides a background for 
contemporary values review.248  
b.  Legislation 
“First among the objective indicia that reflect the public attitude toward a given 
sanction are statutes passed by society’s elected representatives.”249  The Supreme 
Court’s approach requires a survey of legislative action.250  Often, this inquiry looks 
at the legislative response to evolving legal standards, such as the States’ response to 
Furman v. Georgia, where the Supreme Court found that the States arbitrarily and 
capriciously administered the death penalty at that time.251  This inquiry may also 
reflect historical trends, mapping a legislative maturation of a century or more.252  
Overall, the Supreme Court looks at legislation as a codification of society’s modern 
humanity.  “Of course, the recognition of a right under state law does not translate 
automatically into the existence of federal constitutional protection.”253  The 
Supreme Court is mindful that “[t]he fact that a majority of jurisdictions have 
adopted a different practice, however, does not establish that contemporary standards 
of decency are offended.” by that State’s peculiar practices.254  Even taking into 
account a State’s latitude in administering justice in the way it sees fit, a national 
consensus on an issue may provide insight into the requirements of the federal 
Constitution. 
A recent Supreme Court case, Atkins v. Virginia,255 raises questions concerning 
how to interpret evidence of legislative action.256  Atkins, as will be seen, may mark a 
milestone in how the Supreme Court looks at Eighth Amendment cases and which 
factors influence its objective review.  In Atkins, the Supreme Court reviewed those 
                                                                
248The extent of any historical review may depend on the particular philosophy of the 
writing judge.  For instance, Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist are more likely to 
review history than Justice Stevens.  Compare Stanford, 492 U.S. at 368 (Scalia, J.), 
Thompson, 487 U.S. at 864-65 (Scalia J., dissenting) Roberts, 431 U.S. at 645 n.1 (Rehnquist, 
J., dissenting) with Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311-12 (Stevens, J.), Thompson, 487 U.S. at 821-22.  
249Stanford, 492 U.S. at 370 (citing McKlesky v. Kemp).  
250The following cases provide a helpful insight into the Supreme Court=s use of legislative 
indicators:  Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314-15; Stanford, 492 U.S. at 370-73; Thompson, 487 U.S. at 
826-29; McClesky, 481 U.S. at 300; Edmund, 458 U.S. at 789-94; Coker, 433 U.S. at 593-97; 
Woodson, 428 U.S. at 291-94; Gregg, 428 U.S. at 179-82.  
251See, e.g., Gregg, 428 U.S. at 179; Coker, 433 U.S. at 594; Edmund, 458 U.S. at 3372.  
252See, e.g., Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314-15; Woodson, 428 U.S. at 291; Coker, 433 U.S. at 593.  
253Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 250 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting).   
254Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 464.  
255536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
256Atkins, however, is not the first time that legislative review has been a source of debate.  
In Woodson, the dissent sharply criticized the majority=s review, stating that its interpretation 
of the available information “seems . . . more an instance of its desire to save the people from 
themselves than a conscientious effort to ascertain the context of any ‘evolving standards of 
decency.’”  Woodson, 428 U.S. at 313 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).  
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state statutes that prevented the execution of mentally-retarded defendants.  Yet the 
Supreme Court not only noted those States enacting legislation to prevent their 
execution, it noted jurisdictions where such legislation had passed, but failed to 
achieve gubernatorial approval.257  The majority opinion also observed that “[t]he 
evidence carries even greater force when it is noted that the legislatures that have 
addressed the issue have voted overwhelmingly in favor of the prohibition.”258  
Labeling the movement a “procession,” the majority commented that “[i]t is not so 
much the number of these States that is significant, but the consistency of the 
direction of change.”259  The Atkins majority treated legislative review as less a 
mathematical operation, but more an attempt to identify trends and movements 
possibly not reflected in mere codification. 
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas and Chief Justice Rehnquist,260 delivered 
a characteristically stinging dissent, challenging the use of any information other 
than codification.  Justice Scalia argued that the majority’s numbers did not show a 
national consensus at all.  At best, according to Justice Scalia, the majority could 
only cite to eighteen States actually barring the execution of the mentally retarded.261  
Justice Scalia challenged a broad inquiry into legislative action, especially calling 
“absurd” the reliance on the voting record in those States abolishing the execution of 
the mentally retarded.262  In the end, Justice Scalia essentially accused the majority of 
using an intellectual subterfuge to mask the operation of its own bias.263 
The Atkins approach toward finding a national consensus may or may not have a 
lasting impact on the evaluation of legislative review.  The nuances of its analysis 
may be replicated in the future.  One thing is clear from the majority’s opinion: 
legislative review is not a matter of mathematical precision.  It is an attempt to 
discern societal trends.  Understandably, it may be difficult to ascertain society’s 
predilections through what is “on the books.”  But Atkins’ approach generally 
focuses on the opinions of society, while accounting for counter-majoritarian 
concerns.  Atkins’ review allows a vocal minority’s opinion to influence 
constitutional law.   
                                                                
257See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315 n.16.  
258Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316.  
259See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315.  
260Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered a separate dissenting opinion, mainly criticizing the 
majority from relying on factors besides legislative action and jury decisions.  The substance 
of his dissent will be discussed later.  
261Atkins, 536 U.S. at 344 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
262Id. at 346.  
263Again, Justice Scalia harshly begins his dissent by stating:  
Today=s decision is the pinnacle of our Eighth Amendment death-is-different 
jurisprudence.  Not only does it, like all of that jurisprudence, find no support in the 
text or history of the Eighth Amendment;  it does not even have support in current 
social attitudes regarding the conditions that render an otherwise just death penalty 
inappropriate.  Seldom has an opinion of this Court rested so obviously upon nothing 
but the personal views of its members. 
Id. at 337-38.  
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Atkins’ approach in this area also highlights concern over the permanency of 
Supreme Court fiat.  Atkins accents the manner in which the Eighth Amendment 
allows those enactments in the independent “laboratories of the states”264 to become 
nearly immutable constitutional law.265  The Supreme Court’s approach to the Eighth 
Amendment acts as a mirror, reflecting the concerns of the States.  But that mirror’s 
image, once cast, cannot be removed lightly, and reflects regressive legislative 
movement only with great difficulty.  Indeed, the Supreme Court’s actions may more 
appropriately be characterized as the indelible photograph.  Nonetheless, the 
Supreme Court’s use of legislative action as an objective indicator in this regard 
intuitively makes sense.  The successful repetition of an experiment suggests its 
universal applicability.  Generalizations may certainly be made from independently 
reoccurring phenomena.  
While encompassing an important piece of the “evolving standards” puzzle, 
legislative enactment alone does not define the contours of the Eighth Amendment.  
Legislative enactment only fills in one portion of a larger mosaic. 
c.  Juries 
Another objective factor endorsed by the Supreme Court to gauge social decency 
is the decision made by juries.  A jury’s direct contact with society itself and the 
                                                                
264This phrase originated in Justice Brandeis= dissent in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 
285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932):  
It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state 
may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic 
experiments without risk to the rest of the country . . . novelty itself is not a vice.  
These novel experiments, of course, must comply with the United States Constitution; 
but their mere novelty should not be a strike against them. 
Id. 
265Justice Scalia=s comments during oral arguments in Atkins voice some of the reason for 
concern when relying on legislative enactments as an indicator of societal views: 
[Y]ou must agree that--that we have to be very careful about finding new consensuses, 
don't you?  Because we can’t go back.  I mean, if we find a consensus here that it is 
indeed unconstitutional to execute the mentally retarded and then it turns out that there 
are a lot of problems, that indeed in every case, every capital case, there's going to be a 
claim of mental retardation and people come to believe that in many of these cases you 
get expert witnesses—you can easily get them on—on both sides— people become 
dissatisfied with that.  We won’t be able to go back, will we?  Because the evidence of 
the consensus is supposed to be legislation, and once we've decided that you cannot 
legislate the execution of the mentally retarded, there can't be any legislation that 
enables us to go back.  So, we better be very careful about the national consensus 
before we come to such a judgment, don’t you think? 
 
Oral Arguments in Atkins v. Virginia, 2002 WL 341765, at *8-9.  The wisdom behind 
using these enactments, however, also was identified in oral arguments: 
 
I think must recognize the premise that one of the great facts of life in American 
Government is legislative inertia.  Legislatures don't act unless they’re prompted to do 
so.  And a legislature is not going to just sit down and say, oh, I think it’s a good time 
for us to pass a—a bill on--against executing the mentally retarded if there’s no such 
person on death row.  Legislatures just don’t operate that way. 
Id. at * 38.  
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criminal justice system makes its actions a reliable barometer of public opinion.  
Indeed,  
one of the most important functions any jury can perform in making a 
[punishment] selection is to maintain a link between contemporary 
community values and the penal link without which the determination of 
punishment would hardly reflect “the evolving standards of decency that 
mark the progress of a maturing society.”266 
By looking at jury action, the Supreme Court divides the shared beliefs of 
common society.267  An example of the Supreme Court’s review of jury action is 
found in Furman, where the Supreme Court found that the “infrequent and 
haphazard handing out of death sentences was a prime factor” in ruling that “the 
death penalty, as then administered in unguided fashion, was unconstitutional.”268  In 
Furman, the Court treated the jury’s infrequent imposition of the death penalty not as 
an objection to capital punishment per se, but as “reflect[ing] the humane feeling that 
this most irrevocable of sanctions should be reserved for a small number of extreme 
cases.”269 
Notwithstanding its accepted use, problems exist in relying on the jury’s decision 
to discern society’s standards.  The Supreme Court has recognized that “the jury’s 
                                                                
266Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. at 521 n. 15 (quoting Trop, 356 U.S. at 11; see also 
Woodson, 428 U.S. at 294.  Justice Stevens has written that “[t]hus the lesson history teaches 
is that the jury-and in particular jury sentencing-has played a critical role in ensuring that 
capital punishment is imposed in a manner consistent with evolving standards of decency.  
This is a lesson of constitutional magnitude.”  Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 484 (Stevens, J., 
concurring/dissenting opinion).  
267Justice Stevens has noted that;  
That the jury provides a better link to community values than does a single judge is 
supported not only by our cases, but also by common sense.  Juries—comprised as 
they are of a fair cross section of the community—are more representative institutions 
than is the judiciary; they reflect more accurately the composition and experiences of 
the community as a whole, and inevitably make decisions based on community values 
more reliably, than can that segment of the community that is selected for service on 
the bench.  Indeed, as the preceding discussion demonstrates, the belief that juries 
more accurately reflect the conscience of the community than can a single judge is the 
central reason that the jury right has been recognized at the guilt stage in our 
jurisprudence.  This same belief firmly supports the use of juries in capital sentencing, 
in order to address the Eighth Amendment=s concern that capital punishment be 
administered consistently with community values.  In fact, the available empirical 
evidence indicates that judges and juries do make sentencing decisions in capital cases 
in significantly different ways, thus supporting the conclusion that entrusting the 
capital decision to a single judge creates an unacceptable risk that the decision will not 
be consistent with community values. 
Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 486-89 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
268Thompson, 487 U.S. at 831.  Justices Douglas, Brennan, and White=s concurring 
opinions in Furman especially focused on jury action.  See Furman, 408 U.S. at 249 (Douglas, 
J., concurring); id. at 274-77 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 312-13 (White, J., concurring).  
269Gregg, 428 U.S. at 182.  
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role in the criminal process is essentially unreviewable and not always rational.”270  
The irrationality of a particular jury’s response to a discrete criminal action may or 
may not reflect broad community judgments.  This may be especially true in 
jurisdictions that bring few capital prosecutions, unlike in southern “death-belt” 
states.  A sparsity of capital cases creates too small a data pool to draw universal 
conclusions. 
Also, it may be difficult to correlate a jury’s unwillingness to impose a death 
sentence to any narrow constitutional argument.  It is nearly impossible to tell if a 
jury refused to impose a death sentence because of a general distrust of the current 
system, the failure to afford some personal liberty to the defendant, the individual 
characteristics of the defendant, or on the particular facts of the crime.271  Despite the 
individual idiosyncrasies of juries in some cases and jurisdictions, the Supreme 
Court considers jury behavior to reliably expose modern society’s values.  Generally, 
the Supreme Court reviews statistical analysis to evaluate jury behavior.272 
d.  Other Indicia 
The Supreme Court officially endorsed only the use of historical inquiry, 
legislative action, and jury decisionmaking in the “evolving standards” inquiry.  The 
justices, however, vigorously debate the use of other indicia of society’s decency.  In 
the past, some members of the Court have looked at the views of professional and 
religious organizations,273 the consensus of the international community,274 the 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion,275 and public opinion polls276 as other objective 
indicia of contemporary standards.  In Stanford, however, a majority of the court 
criticized the use of such information.  When presented with public opinion polls, the 
views of interest groups, and the position of professional organizations, the plurality 
“decline[d] the invitation to rest constitutional law on such uncertain foundation.  A 
                                                                
270Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 455.  
271Also, the decisions of juries are limited to the cases presented before them.  A 
prosecutorial filter may hamper the ability to ascertain society=s standards from juries.  
Consider a possible scenario: a state enacts a law allowing for the execution of offenders 
committing a violent and horrendous, yet non-homicidal, crime such as the aggravated sexual 
assault of a child.  Based on the Supreme Court=s Coker decision, prosecutors may be wary of 
enforcing that law, even when the jury would be willing to impose a death sentence.  
Prosecutorial discretion may color the impact of the jury as an objective indicator.  
272For an example of the Supreme Court=s use of statistical jury analysis, see Stanford, 492 
U.S. at 373; Thompson, 487 U.S. at 832-33; Enmund, 458 U.S. at 794; Woodson, 428 U.S. at 
294; Gregg, 428 U.S. at 181-82.  The use of statistics, however, may lead to debate concerning 
the Court=s interpretation of those numbers.  See, e.g., Enmund, 458 U.S. at 818-19.  
273See, e.g., Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21; Penry, 492 U.S. at 336-37 (O=Connor, J., 
opinion); Stanford, 492 U.S. at 384 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Thompson, 487 U.S. at 830-31.  
274See, e.g., Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21; Stanford, 492 U.S. at 384 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting); Thompson, 487 U.S. at 830-31; Enmund, 458 U.S. at 796 n.22; Coker, 433 U.S. at 
596 n.10; Trop, 356 U.S. at 107.  
275See, e.g., Enmund, 458 U.S. at 797.  
276See, e.g., Woodson, 428 U.S. at 299 n.34.  
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revised national consensus so broad, so clear, and so enduring as to justify a 
permanent prohibition upon all units of democratic government must appear in the 
operative acts (laws and the application of laws) that the people have approved.”277  
The same opinion eschewed any influence stemming from an international 
consensus.278  Notwithstanding Stanford’s language, other factors frequently play 
into the Supreme Court’s “evolving standards” inquiry, though often relegated to a 
footnote. 
Atkins v. Virginia279 provides a recent example of the Supreme Court’s internal 
debate over the use of other supporting factors.  In Atkins, the majority, albeit in its 
twenty-first footnote, looked at the views of professional organizations and the world 
community in finding that the execution of the mentally retarded violated the 
Constitution.280 The majority’s reliance on international data echoed Trop’s use of 
such information in discerning the contemporary values of society.281 
The dissent, however, resisted footnote twenty-one’s broadening of the factors 
used in the objective review.  Relying on Stanford’s pronouncement that the Eighth 
Amendment inquiry should focus only American society,282 Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s dissent argued that legislation and juries should be the “sole indicators 
by which courts ascertain the contemporary American conceptions of decency for the 
purposes of the Eighth Amendment.”283  Chief Justice Rehnquist rejected Trop’s use 
of international opinion because it “represent[ed] the view of only a minority of the 
Court.”284 
The interplay between the majority and the dissent over Atkins’ footnote 21 
emphasizes the sharp division over evidence may be marshaled to reach a national 
consensus.  Only time will tell whether footnote 21 actually legitimatizes a broad 
inquiry into objective data.  It is likely that consideration of other factors may 
continue in the margins, with relegation to a footnote belying the factors’ true 
influence.  While the extent to which other factors may influence the Supreme 
Court’s “evolving standards” inquiry is not yet settled, it is evident that some justices 
will consider a broad range of information in making that evaluation.  At least some 
judges consider the views of the international community,285 professional 
organizations, and other groups to indicate society’s standard of decency. 
                                                                
277Stanford, 492 U.S. at 378.  
278See Stanford, 492 U.S. at 369.  
279536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
280See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316.  
281The Trop court emphasized that it partially based its decision on the opinion of the 
“civilized nations of the world.”  Trop, 356 U.S. at 102.  
282See Stanford, 492 U.S. at 369-70 and n.1 (plurality opinion).  
283Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).  
284Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).  
285While based on Fourteenth Amendment due process principles, the Supreme Court 
recently overturned Texas’ sodomy statute, basing its reasoning in part on the consensus of the 
international community.   See Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2480-81 (2003).  Atkins 
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2.  The Dignity of Man 
While the Supreme Court’s review of the objective indicia provides important 
insights into society’s evolving standards, that inquiry alone does not define the 
parameters of the Eighth Amendment.  The fact that contemporary society has 
evolved to a level of decency in which it considers a given punishment repugnant is 
still insufficient to create a new constitutional principle.  The challenged punishment 
must strike at the core of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause–the punishment 
must offend the basic dignity of man.286   
The “dignity of man” is apparently not a concept easily reduced to a simple 
definition.  Without full elaboration, the Supreme Court clarified some factors that 
may contribute to the dignity of a punishment.  First, at a bare minimum, a 
punishment must not be “excessive.”287  For a punishment to be considered 
excessive, it must involve the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain”288 or be 
“grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime.”289  An analysis of dignity, 
therefore, harkens in some ways back to the Wilkerson/Kemmler jurisprudence. 
“Pain, certainly, may be a factor in the judgment.”290  But it is important to note 
the adjectives used in describing the consideration of pain in the excessiveness 
evaluation.  The pain must be “unnecessary and wanton”291 or “gratuitous”292 in a 
manner that offends the dignity of man.  Indeed, the true significance of prohibited 
punishment is that it “treat[s] members of the human race as nonhumans, as objects 
to be toyed with and discarded.”293  It would be difficult to conceive of an execution 
method that did not inflict some degree of pain, however infinitesimal.294  In its 
                                                          
and Lawrence may signal a new international emphasis in the interpretation of American 
constitutional law. 
286The Supreme Court cases “make clear that public perceptions of standards of decency 
with respect to criminal sanctions are not conclusive.  A penalty also must accord with ‘the 
dignity of man’ which is the ‘basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment.’”  Gregg, 428 
U.S. at 173.  
287Id.  
288Id.; see also Weems, 217 U.S. at 381; Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 136.  
289Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173; see also Trop, 356 U.S. at 100; Weems, 217 U.S. at 367.  
290Furman, 408 U.S. at 271 (Brennan, J., concurring).  
291Furman, 408 U.S. at 271 (Brennan, J., concurring).  
292Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183.  
293Furman, 408 U.S. at 272 (Brennan, J., concurring).  
294Viewed objectively, though, many who oppose a particular method of execution, or the 
death penalty in general (or most likely both--the demise of an execution method is used as a 
means to an end, or rather, the end of the death penalty--even though many will rarely admit 
that goal) seem to think that an execution must be entirely painless.  For that reason, we read 
accounts detailing every grimace, every groan, every wince made by the condemned.  If a 
lethal injection spans ten minutes, it is “botched.”  Any cough or cowering is viewed as a 
constitutional offense.  Undeniably, there are horrific events that occur during executions.  The 
electric chair, for example, has a history of undignified mutilation and inhumane error.  But to 
compare electrocution=s failure to the generally-humane lethal injection lessens the credibility 
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review, the Supreme Court will not invalidate a punishment merely because the State 
could use a less severe method.295  The punishment itself must offend man’s essential 
dignity.  The focus seems to be on whether the pain, physical or mental, offends 
those basic attributes that make us human. 
Second, the dignity of man analysis may entail a search for a nexus between the 
judicially-recognized purposes for the death penalty and the use of a given sanction.  
The Supreme Court acknowledges two societal purposes for the death penalty: 
retribution and deterrence.296  Unless the death penalty contributes to one of these 
two primary purposes, “it ‘is nothing more that the purposeless and needless 
imposition of pain and suffering’ and hence an unconstitutional punishment.”297  
Constitutionally-recognized dignity finds its expression in those punishments which 
benefit a larger, and recognized, societal aim.  An unnecessary punishment is 
unconstitutional. 
Finally, “the Constitution contemplates that in the end [the Supreme Court’s] 
own judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the acceptability” of a given 
punishment.298  The Supreme Court repeatedly suggests that its review of a particular 
punishment is an objective review.299  While other objective factors “weigh heavily 
in the balance,”300 the Supreme Court is the ultimate arbitrator of what punishment 
violates the Constitution.  The Supreme Court cautioned that their review is not “a 
shorthand reference to the preferences of a majority of” that Court.301  The Court 
                                                          
of the abolition movement.  Further, it misconstrues Eighth Amendment precedent.  Some 
pain is anticipated in execution.  Otherwise, lethal injection=s needle prick, no more tortuous 
than that experienced by the millions of citizens who give blood each year, would have to 
violate the core dignity of society.  In the public eye, lethal injection is acceptable.  Death 
penalty opponents have valid, meritorious, and convincing reasons for seeking the extinction 
of capital punishment.  Yet, the credibility of those arguments is lessened by an approach that 
makes victims out of the humanely-killed victimizers.  Continued attack on lethal injection 
may not turn the public entirely away from the death penalty, but galvanize the populace 
against potentially disingenuous arguments that camouflage pure abolitionist aims.   
295Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183; Furman, 408 U.S. at 451, (Blackmun, J., concurring).  
296See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318-21; Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183.  Gregg also recognized in a 
footnote that incapacitation (“individual deterrence”) is another important justification for the 
death penalty.  See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183 n.28.  
297Enmund, 458 U.S. at 798 (quoting Coker, 433 U.S. at 592); see also Atkins, 536 U.S. at 
319.  
298See Coker, 433 U.S. at 597.  See also Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321; Thompson, 487 U.S. at 
833; Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 462; Enmund, 458 U.S. at 797; Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346.  To 
require that the ultimate decision be based on objective factors “to the maximum possible 
extent,” Rummel, 445 U.S. at 274-75; see also Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346; Coker, 433 U.S. at 
592, implicitly recognizes that some subjective opinion will influence the ultimate 
determination.    
299See Stanford, 492 U.S. at 379; Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 345; Rummel, 445 U.S. at 275; 
Coker, 433 U.S. at 592; Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173.  
300Enmund, 458 U.S. at 797.  
301Stanford, 492 U.S. at 379.  
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does not intend to “replace judges of the law with a committee of philosopher-
kings.”302  Nonetheless, the Supreme Court’s judgment in this area parallels that 
sentiment captured in Justice Frankfurter’s classic quote: “there comes a time when 
this court should not be ignorant as judges of what we know as men.”303  It is 
apparent from the vigorous debates between the justices that their personal views 
play some role in the analysis.  Commonsense dictates that justices’ personal view 
will play a part.  It is ultimately for the Supreme Court to judge whether the Eighth 
Amendment permits the imposition of a particular punishment.304 
E.  Choice-of-Execution Statutes 
Lest any review of the Eighth Amendment jurisprudence outlined above begins 
tilting windmills, serious preliminary hurdles face any challenge to the 
constitutionality of the firing squad.  Preeminent among these is the fact that Utah 
employs a choice-of-execution statute.305  Under Utah law, 
When a person is convicted of a capital felony and the judgment of death 
has been imposed, the defendant is entitled to select, at the time of 
sentencing, either a firing squad or a lethal intravenous injection as the 
method of execution. If the defendant does not indicate a preference at 
that time to the court, the judgment of death shall be executed by lethal 
intravenous injection.306 
Any inmate facing the firing squad in Utah chose his fate.307  In fact, Utah has 
allowed the condemned to choose his own death for over a century and a half.  After 
receiving his death sentence, a capital prisoner elects whether to face bullets or 
poison.  Anyone with standing to challenge the use of the firing squad must have 
selected that fate.  Supreme Court precedent transforms Utah’s choice-of-execution 
statute into a waiver provision, forcing a prisoner to relinquish any method-of-
execution challenges. 
In Stewart v. Walter LaGrand,308 the Supreme Court considered the effect a 
State’s choice-of-execution statute would have on a challenge to the elected method 
of execution.  Walter LaGrand, a German national sentenced to death for a murder 
committed during a failed bank robbery with his brother, chose to be executed in 
                                                                
302Id. 
303Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 52.  
304Thompson, 487 U.S. at 833.  
305UTAH CODE ANN. §77-18-5.5 (2002). 
306Id.  
307Id. 
308526 U.S. 115 (1999).  To avoid confusion with his brother Karl, who similarly 
challenged the use of lethal injection, the author will include the first name of the petitioner 
when referring to this case.  For more developed discussion of the Walter LaGrand case and 
choice-of-execution statutes in general see Jeffery L. Kirchmeier, Let’s Make a Deal: Waiving 
the Eighth Amendment by Selecting a Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 32 CONN. L. REV. 615 
(2000).  
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Arizona’s gas chamber.309  At the time of his sentencing, Arizona only executed by 
lethal gas.310  Subsequent changes in the law, however, allowed Arizona capital 
inmates to choose between lethal gas and lethal injection, with the injection being the 
default method.311  When given a choice, LaGrand selected the gas chamber.312  Even 
when Arizona’s governor again allowed LaGrand to alter his decision, he maintained 
his wish to be executed by gas.313 
                                                                
309The facts of LaGrand=s case can be found at State v. LaGrand, 733 P.2d 1066 (Ariz. 
1987).  For a treatment of the international legal issues springing from the LaGrand case; see 
Howard S. Schiffman, The LaGrand Decision: The Evolving Legal Landscape of the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations in U.S. Death Penalty Cases, 42 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 
1099 (2002). 
310ARIZ. REV. STAT ANN. § 13-704 (amended 1980). 
311The Arizona choice-of-method statute reads as follows: 
A.  The penalty of death shall be inflicted by an intravenous injection of a substance or 
substances in a lethal quantity sufficient to cause death, under the supervision of the 
state department of corrections. 
 
B.  A defendant who is sentenced to death for an offense committed before November 
23, 1992 shall choose either lethal injection or lethal gas at least twenty days before 
the execution date.  If the defendant fails to choose either lethal injection or lethal gas, 
the penalty of death shall be inflicted by lethal injection. 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. ' 13-704 (West 1998).    
312LaGrand v. Stewart, 173 F.3d 1145 (Ariz. 1987). 
313In 1999, LaGrand=s brother, Karl, filed a successive state application for post-
conviction relief arguing that execution in the gad chamber constituted cruel and unusual 
punishment.  Due to his failure to raise the issue in his previous proceedings, the trial court 
procedurally barred the claim.  The Arizona Supreme Court denied review.  When Karl 
LaGrand raised the issue in a federal habeas petition, the district court reaffirmed the state-
imposed procedural bar because he did not overcome that procedural hurdles as required by 
federal law. 
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court=s opinion.  Finding that a procedural bar 
indeed existed, the Ninth Circuit nonetheless considered Karl LaGrand=s petition.  The Ninth 
Circuit found that “cause” existed to allow consideration of Karl LaGrand=s claim because, at 
the time of his previous state proceedings, no court or attorney could have anticipated the 
trends in capital jurisprudence that would support his claim.  The Ninth Circuit relied on its 
earlier choice-of-execution jurisprudence to find “prejudice.” 
The Ninth Circuit, therefore, enjoined Arizona “from executing Karl Hinz LaGrand, or 
anyone similarly situated, by means of lethal gas.”  LaGrand, v. Stewart, 173 F.3d 1144, 1149 
(9th Cir. 1999).  The Supreme Court, however, subsequently granted an application to vacate 
the stay.  See LaGrand v. Stewart, 525 U.S. 1173.  Karl LaGrand ultimately mooted the issue 
at the last minute by choosing to be executed by lethal injection.  Id. 
When Walter LaGrand filed his second federal habeas petition, the district court assumed 
that the Supreme Court=s removal of the stay vacated the merits of the Ninth Circuit=s opinion, 
removing questions concerning the constitutionality of lethal gas.  On appeal, the Ninth 
Circuit concluded that the Supreme Court did not vacate its review of the merits, and again 
enjoined Arizona from using lethal gas.  The Supreme Court=s subsequent consideration of 
Walter=s petition did not give further light as to its action in Karl=s case, other than to explain 
the ability to waive Eighth Amendment claims.  
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Prior to the LaGrand case, the Supreme Court had not explicitly addressed 
whether a death row prisoner could waive an Eighth Amendment challenge.  In 
Gilmore v. Utah,314 however, the Supreme Court suggested that such a wavier would 
be tolerated by the Constitution.315  As previously discussed, Gary Gilmore hastened 
his execution by forgoing appellate review.  In a short order, the Supreme Court held 
that Gilmore “made a knowing and intelligent waiver of any and all federal rights he 
might have asserted after the Utah trial court’s sentence was imposed” by choosing 
not to appeal.316  Implicitly, the Gilmore Court allowed the waiver of Eighth 
Amendment claims, failing to draw a distinction in death penalty cases.  Other case 
law, however, explicitly questioned the applicability of such waiver in the capital 
context.317  Notably, several dissenting opinions challenged a defendant’s ability to 
choose a cruel and unusual punishment.318 
Walter LaGrand faced two hurdles in the federal review of his claims.  First, 
because LaGrand’s challenge to the gas chamber had not been presented to the state 
courts before filing his first federal proceeding, the district court found that he had 
procedurally-defaulted his claim.319  Second, as LaGrand raised the constitutionality 
                                                                
314429 U.S. 1012 (1976).  
315Id. 
316Gilmore, 429 U.S. at 1013.   
317See, e.g., Campbell v. Woods, 18 F.3d 662, 680 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (rejecting “the 
argument that the government may cloak unconstitutional punishment in the mantle of 
choice”).  
318See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 172 (1990)  
A defendant’s voluntary submission to a barbaric punishment does not ameliorate the 
harm that imposing such a punishment causes to our basic societal values and to the 
integrity of our system of justice.  Certainly a defendant’s consent to being drawn and 
quartered or burned at the stake would not license the State to exact such punishments.  
Nor could the State knowingly execute an innocent man merely because he refused to 
present a defense at trial and waived his right to appeal.  Similarly, the State may not 
conduct an execution rendered unconstitutional by the lack of an appeal merely 
because the defendant agrees to that punishment. 
Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting); Lenhard v. Wolff, 444 U.S. 807, 810 (1979) (“Society=s 
independent stake in enforcement of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and 
unusual punishment cannot be overridden by a defendant's purported waiver.”) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting); Gilmore, 429 U.S. 1018.  
Because of Gary Gilmore’s purported waiver of his right to challenge the statute, none 
of these questions was resolved in the Utah courts. I believe, however, that the consent 
of a convicted defendant in a criminal case does not privilege a State to impose a 
punishment otherwise forbidden by the Eighth Amendment.  
Id. (White, J., dissenting).  
319
“When a state court declines to hear a prisoner’s federal claims because the prisoner 
failed to fulfill a state procedural requirement, federal habeas is generally barred if the state 
procedural rule is independent and adequate to support the judgment.”  Sayre v. Anderson, 
238 F.3d 631, 634 (5th Cir. 2001).  “This doctrine ensures that federal courts give proper 
respect to state procedural rules.”  Glover v. Cain, 128 F.3d 900, 902 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. 
denied, 523 U.S. 1125 (1998); see also Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451 (2000) 
(finding the procedural default doctrine standard to be “grounded in concerns of comity and 
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of lethal injection on federal habeas review, he faced the stringent non-retroactivity 
principle enshrined in Teague v. Lane.320  Under Teague, federal habeas relief 
generally may not be premised on “a new rule” of law if that rule was announced 
after the petitioner’s conviction became “final,” if the petitioner is seeking to 
establish a wholly new rule, or to apply a settled precedent in a novel way that would 
result in the creation of a new rule.321  The Supreme Court ultimately found federal 
relief unavailable to LaGrand on both grounds. 
Most germane to the current discussion, the Supreme Court first found that 
Teague barred federal relief on LaGrand’s claim.322  The Supreme Court noted that 
“[b]y declaring his method of execution, picking lethal gas over the State’s default 
form of execution–lethal injection–Walter LaGrand has waived any objection he 
might have to it.”323  The Supreme Court referred to its line of cases holding that a 
                                                          
federalism”).  When a prisoner defaults his federal claims in state court pursuant to an 
independent and adequate state procedural rule, “federal habeas review of the claims is barred 
unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the 
alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will result in 
a fundamental miscarriage of justice.”  Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991).  To 
show a fundamental miscarriage of justice, a petitioner must generally establish his actual 
innocence.  See Finley v. Johnson, 243 F.3d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 2001).  
320489 U.S. 288 (1989).  
321See Teague, 489 U.S. at 310; Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 313 (1989) (finding 
Teague applicable in the capital context).  “In general . . . a case announces a new rule when it 
breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal government. . . . 
To put it differently, a case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by precedent 
existing at the time the defendant=s conviction became final.”  Teague, 489 U.S. at 301; see 
also Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 467 (1993).  “[T]here can be no dispute that a decision 
announces a new rule if it expressly overrules a prior decision . . . .”  Graham, 506 U.S. at 
467.  The Supreme Court recognizes two narrow exceptions to the non-retroactivity principle 
of Teague.  The first exception applies to rules that would place private conduct beyond the 
government=s power to proscribe or a class of persons beyond its power to punish.  Id. at 477-
78.  Under the second exception for rules implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, Teague 
includes fundamental principles of liberty, justice, and fairness, and procedures insuring 
factfinding reliability and accuracy of criminal proceedings, i.e., “watershed” rules that are 
central to truthseeking.  Id.; Teague, 489 U.S. at 312-13.  The Fifth Circuit recently recognized 
a third exception to the rule in Teague:  “When an alleged constitutional right is susceptible of 
vindication only on habeas review, application of Teague to bar full consideration of the claim 
would effectively foreclose any opportunity for the right ever to be recognized.”  Jackson v. 
Johnson, 217 F.3d 360, 364 (5th Cir. 2000).  
322As a general rule, “if the State . . . argue[s] that the defendant seeks the benefit of a new 
rule of constitutional law, the court must apply Teague before considering the merits of the 
claim . . . .”  Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 389 (1994)  Under Supreme Court precedent, 
however, any “procedural-bar issue should ordinarily be considered” before any Teague 
analysis.  Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 524 (1997).  The Supreme Court has also 
noted that “[j]udicial economy might counsel giving the Teague question priority, for 
example, if it were easily resolvable against the habeas petitioner, whereas the procedural-bar 
issue involved complicated issues of state law.”  Id. at 525.  Here, the Court considered the 
Teague question first, although neither issue required complicated analysis.  
323LaGrand, 526 U.S. at 119 (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).  
58https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol50/iss3/3
2002-03] NOTHING LESS THAN THE DIGNITY OF MAN 393 
defendant may waive constitutional claims.324  On that basis, the Supreme Court 
concluded that “[t]o hold otherwise, and to hold that the Eighth Amendment 
protections cannot be waived in the capital context, would create and apply a new 
procedural rule.”325  Essentially, the Supreme Court found that the special rules of 
habeas review prevented carving out an exception to the general rule of waiver for 
Eighth Amendment claims.  In addition, the Supreme Court noted that LaGrand 
procedurally defaulted his federal claim due to the exhaustion doctrine.326   
Those courts considering choice-of-method statutes after LaGrand have followed 
its dictates without question.327  LaGrand seriously limits constitutional review of 
                                                                
324See, e.g., Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464.  
325LaGrand, 526 U.S. at 119.  In a dissent, Justice Stevens criticized this holding by saying 
“[i]n my opinion the answer to the question whether a capital defendant may consent to be 
executed by an unacceptably torturous method of execution is by no means clear.  I would not 
decide such an important question without full briefing and argument.  I, therefore, 
respectfully dissent.”  Id. at 121 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
326The Supreme Court recognized that the long history of constitutional challenges to 
lethal injection prevent any excuse for his failing to appropriately advance that claim.  
LaGrand, 526 U.S. at 119.  Specifically, the Supreme Court stated 
In addition, Walter LaGrand=s claims are procedurally defaulted, and he has failed to 
show cause to overcome this bar.  See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 
(1991).  At the time of Walter LaGrand=s direct appeal, there was sufficient debate 
about the constitutionality of lethal gas executions that Walter LaGrand cannot show 
cause for his failure to raise this claim.  Arguments concerning the constitutionality of 
lethal gas have existed since its introduction as a method of execution in Nevada in 
1921.  See H. BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 16 (3d ed. 1982).  In the 
period immediately prior to Walter LaGrand=s direct appeal, a number of States were 
reconsidering the use of execution by lethal gas, see Gray v. Lucas, 710 F.2d 1048, 
1059-1061 (5th Cir. 1983) (discussing evidence presented by the defendant and 
changes in Nevada's and North Carolina's methods of execution), and two United 
States Supreme Court Justices had expressed their views that this method of execution 
was unconstitutional, see Gray v. Lucas, 463 U.S. 1237, 1240-1244 (1983) (Marshall, 
J., joined by Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).  In addition, lethal gas 
executions have been documented since 1937, when San Quentin introduced it as an 
execution method, and studies of the effect of execution by lethal gas date back to the 
1950’s.  See BEDAU, supra note 326, at 16. 
Id. at 119-120.  
327See Stanford v. Parker, 266 F.3d 442, 462 (6th Cir. 2001) (“[I]f Stanford chooses 
electrocution over lethal injection, the constitutionality of which he does not challenge, he will 
waive any objection to electrocution.  Thus, we need not consider whether electrocution is 
cruel and unusual punishment because, for that issue to be relevant, Stanford would first have 
to waive it.”); State v. Bays, 716 N.E.2d 1126, 1144 (Ohio 1999) (“Moreover, a condemned 
prisoner may elect to be executed by lethal injection; thus, if Bays objects to electrocution as a 
mode of execution, he need not submit to it.”), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1090 (2000); State v. 
Morris, 24 S.W.3d 788, 797 (Tenn. 2000) (finding that because a “defendant who elects a 
certain means of death such as electrocution waives his constitutional challenges to the 
manner of executing the sentence,” a defendant who did not waive the default execution by 
lethal injection could not challenge the constitutionality of electrocution), cert. denied, 531 
U.S. 1082 (2001).  
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Utah’s firing squad.  Since 1852, Utah has employed a choice-of-execution statute.328  
Utah’s choice-of-execution statute causes any defendant electing to die by firing 
squad to waive his right to challenge its constitutionality.329  
Presumably, LaGrand renders Utah’s sentencing hearing into a waiver 
proceeding where, whether consciously voluntary or not, a defendant abdicates his 
right to challenge the manner in which he will die.  It is, of course, expected that the 
doctrine of stare decisis would render the LaGrand decision nearly inalterable.  The 
choice-of-execution provision shelters Utah’s use of lethal injection and the firing 
squad from judicial intervention.  The value of this wavier is heightened by the 
increasingly frequent challenges to the constitutionality of lethal injection throughout 
the United States.330  Several principles nonetheless suggest weaknesses in LaGrand 
and provide hope for those challenging the firing squad.   
First, it is important to remember that the Supreme Court considered the 
LaGrand under the special constraints of federal habeas review.  If a defendant were 
to challenge the constitutionality of the firing squad on direct appeal, the Supreme 
Court would be able to consider whether a defendant could waive a method-of-
execution argument.  Removed from the strict habeas prohibition against imposing a 
new constitutional requirement retroactively, direct review would allow the Supreme 
Court to consider plenary arguments on the issue.  While opening the door to 
consideration, this approach by no means guarantees relief.  The Supreme Court 
repeatedly and regularly endorsed the waiver of constitutional claims, so long as the 
waiver is “intelligent and knowing.”  No exception has been made for capital cases 
in general or methods of execution specifically.  Yet, on the other hand, the Supreme 
Court repeatedly and emphatically cautioned that “death is different.”331  The waiver 
of the Eighth Amendment challenge to an otherwise cruel and unusual punishment is 
different in finality and unforgiveability than other waivers.  The choice to die by a 
method that offends the dignity of man differs in magnitude and effect than the 
                                                                
328See Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 132.  The first choice-of-execution statute read “. . . said 
person shall suffer death by being shot, hung, or beheaded as the Court may direct, or the 
person so condemned shall have his option as to the manner of his execution.”  SESS. LAWS 
UTAH § 125 (amended 1876).  
329While not employing the Supreme Court=s waiver jurisprudence, other constitutional 
challenges suggest that the LaGrand decision would prevent constitutional review of the firing 
squad.  For example, in Andrews v. Shulsen, 802 F.2d 1256 (10th Cir. 1986), the Tenth 
Circuit rejected a challenge to the firing squad based on the Establishment clause and the 
Eighth Amendment.  The Tenth Circuit rejected the Eighth Amendment claim because “Utah 
now allows defendants who have been sentenced to death to select either a firing squad or a 
lethal injection as the means of execution and mandates lethal injection if a defendant 
expressed no preference.”  Id. at 1275 n.16.  The Tenth Circuit, at least implicitly, recognized 
the waiver of challenges to Utah=s firing squad.  The Supreme Court of Idaho reached a similar 
conclusion with respect to a challenge to its seldom used statutory provision authorizing the 
firing squad.  See Sivak v. State, 731 P.2d 192, 216 (Idaho 1986).  
330For an example of the recent challenges to Louisiana’s use of lethal injection see Gwen 
Filosa, Defense Lawyers Say Punishment is Cruel, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE, Aug, 11, 2003, at 
01. 
331Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188.  
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waiver of, say, the right to a jury trial.  If death is different, a wavier ending in an 
otherwise-impermissible death also is different. 
Second, a defendant could challenge the constitutionality of the firing squad on 
the basis of Utah law alone in state court.  Again, he faces the same challenges as 
under federal law, but may hope for a different outcome by the state courts.  While 
Utah constitutional law frequently mirrors federal precedent, state courts generally 
consider federal constitutional law to be a floor, not a ceiling.  The federal 
Constitution presents the bare minimum protections a state must afford, and the State 
is free to augment those protections beyond those principles found in the federal Bill 
of Rights.332  The Utah State Supreme Court encouraged attorneys to bring claims 
under the state constitution.333  If a prisoner made a strong case for departure from 
the federal constitution on purely state law grounds, LaGrand may not hamper full 
review. 
Finally, the LaGrand Court emphasized the fact that the defendant affirmatively 
elected to die by lethal gas, even when afforded a second opportunity to change his 
mind.  One commentator opined that the Supreme Court probably viewed LaGrand’s 
choice of the gas chamber and subsequent constitutional challenge as a mere delay 
tactic, thus prompting the Court’s terse resolution of the issue.334  If a capital 
defendant elected the firing squad and then attempted to change the method of 
                                                                
332The comparable provision in the Utah constitution reads as follows: “Excessive bail 
shall not be required; excessive fines shall not be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual 
punishments be inflicted.  Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated with unnecessary 
rigor.”  UTAH CONST. article I ' 9.  Utah=s constitutional convention adopted this provision 
without discussion.  See State v. Gardner, 947 P.2d 630, 635 (Utah 1997) (opinion of Durham, 
J.).  Nevertheless, “comments by members of the convention suggest an intention to 
incorporate into article I of the Utah Constitution—the “Declaration of Rights”—the same 
rights as had been developed throughout the history of the common law and had been 
preserved in the constitutions of other states.”  Id.  There exists a “paucity of guidance offered 
by decisions of [the Utah Supreme Court] or the court of appeals on the meaning of article I. 
section 9 of the Utah Constitution.”  Id. at 632 n.2.  Some judges on the Utah Supreme Court 
have opined that “[t]he essence of section 9’s prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishments is the principle of proportionality.”  Id. at 644 (opinion of Durham, J., joined by 
Stewart, J.).  It appears, at least, that the federal cruel and unusual punishment principles apply 
“with equal force” to Utah=s comparable provision.  State v. Herrera, 993 P.2d 854, 865 (Utah 
1999).  One significant area of departure is the Utah Constitution=s inclusion of an 
“unnecessary rigor” provision.  The contours of this phrase are not well defined.  See State v. 
M.L.C., 933 P.2d 380, 384-85 (Utah 1997); State v. Deli, 861 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah 1993).  
Utah, however, applies an “unnecessary abuse” standard in evaluating claims brought under 
the “unnecessary rigor” clause.  See Herrera, 993 P.2d at 865; Bott v. Deland, 922 P.2d 732, 
740-41 (Utah 1996).  The “unnecessary rigor” provision “makes section 9 broader than its 
federal counterpart.”  State v. Lafferty, 20 P.3d 342, 365 (Utah 2001) (citing State v. Bishop, 
717 P.2d 261, 267 (1986)).  To show a violation under that provision, a prisoner must show 
“treatment that is clearly excessive or deficient and unjustified . . . .”  Bott, 922 P.2d at 741.  
An interesting argument could be made that the firing squad results in an excessively harmful 
death, the mutilation and pain being “unnecessary abuse,” and thus constitutes “unnecessary 
rigor.”  
333See generally State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1272 (Utah 1990).  
334See Kirchmeier, supra note 308, at 651.  
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execution, and the State of Utah then refused any change, a defendant may argue that 
he did not truly waive his claim.   
This scenario is not as unlikely as one may think.  Ronnie Lee Gardner, a 
notorious resident of Utah’s death row, publicly changed his mind several times 
concerning how he would like to die.335  Gardner first chose the firing squad, fearing 
that “lethal injection would leave him flopping on a gurney like a dying fish.”336  
Gardner hoped that choice would make his execution more difficult for the State.337  
A few years later, Gardner later decided that he would prefer lethal injection.338  He 
explained that his young children would not understand his wanting to be shot to 
death.339  A state district court later refused to let him again switch to the firing 
squad.340 
Under such a narrow scenario, a defendant’s “choice” of the firing squad is 
qualitatively different than that presented in LaGrand.  The waiver would not be a 
mere delay tactic, and the prisoner would not consent to execution by a potentially-
unconstitutional method.  A different factual scenario may result in a much different 
result.   
In the end, LaGrand most likely created a nearly insurmountable hurdle to 
judicial evaluation of the firing squad.   Due to LaGrand, it is unlikely that a 
constitutional challenge to the firing squad would receive substantive consideration.  
This article, however, does not end here.  A discussion of the Eighth Amendment 
ramifications of the firing squad is not merely academic.  LaGrand notwithstanding, 
it is anticipated that legal challenges to the firing squad will arise in the future.  Their 
understanding of the constitutional issues may well impact the Constitution’s 
influence in this area. 
After all has been said, the judiciary provides, at best, an ineffectual forum to 
decide the future of the firing squad.  The legal issues are complex; the cards stacked 
against a judicial extermination of the firing squad.  But the courts are not the only 
bodies which defend our constitutional rights.  While the Supreme Court is the final 
arbitrator of what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, the elected legislature 
                                                                
335Gardner is an interesting, and extremely violent, character, known to make blunt 
statements to the press.  Gardner has proposed his solution to the death-penalty dilemma: arm 
the inmates and let them kill one another.  He said “What would be the loss?  Its not like they 
would be killing innocent people.  There are no innocent people here.”  David Clifton, So 
What?  Ronnie Gardner Scoffs, S. L. TRIB., Nov. 14, 1994, at B2.  Gardner, with great 
bravado, expressed that his future execution is no “big deal” because he is “dead anyway.”  Id.  
336Brian Maffry, Corrections Boss: Lethal Injection Far from Perfect, S. L. TRIB., Feb. 18, 
1996 at B2.  
337Id.  One department of corrections official has opined that Gardner only wants to go out 
in a “blaze of glory.”  See Mike Carter, Bill Voiding Firing Squad Option Dropped, S. L. 
TRIB., Feb. 10, 1996, at E3. 
338Gardner May Get Stay for March 8 Execution Date, S. L. TRIB., Jan. 15, 1996, at D2.  
339Amy Donaldson, Inmate Threatens to Sue If State Won=t Let Him Die by Firing Squad, 
DESERET NEWS, Feb. 9, 1996, at A1.  
340Mike Carter, Convict Asks Judge to Drop Appeal So He Can Be Executed, S. L. TRIB., 
Apr. 9, 1998, at B3.  
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and societal-influenced jurors play an important role in defining the scope of the 
Eighth Amendment.  By swearing to uphold the supreme law of the land, legislatures 
and members of the executive branch take on a duty to ensure the constitutional 
administration of justice.341  When considering death penalty legislation, the 
members of a legislative body should be mindful of constitutional protections.  In 
signing legislation, and especially in the clemency process, the executive branch 
should consider the protection of constitutional liberties.  
True, LaGrand may allow capital defendants to waive their Eighth Amendment 
claim, but that waiver does not extend to the public debate, the political arena, and 
polemic discussion.  Indeed, if the evolving standards of decency language carries 
any validity, it is those bodies extraneous to the judiciary that will be most 
responsive and best equipped to adjust to emergent societal concerns.342  An analysis 
of the constitutionality of any method of execution, therefore, transcends a prediction 
of how a court may respond to legal arguments.  A national consensus requires 
national concern and national debate.  In that respect, the constitutionality of the 
firing squad is not academic, but an important societal issue. 
IV.  CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE FIRING SQUAD 
Best State to Be Executed In: Utah.  Utah gets it.  This is the state that 
offers its capital criminals the option of going out the old-fashioned 
way—by firing squad.  Electrocution and lethal injection, the choices in 
most states, just don’t get the job done with the same no-nonsense 
immediacy as a bunch of guys with rifles.343 
After an understanding of the historical use of the firing squad, the Eighth 
Amendment establishes a background for the consideration of society’s acceptance 
of the firing squad.  As will be seen, an objective review raises objective questions 
about the use of the firing squad.  These questions, however, are by no means so 
conclusive or determinative as to render the firing squad blatantly unconstitutional.  
A review of the evidence will suggest that, more than anything else, subjective 
factors may decide one’s opinion regarding the firing squad’s use. 
A.  Decency 
The firing squad’s modern use echos its historical significance.  Each of Utah’s 
firing squads shares a common legacy with some of history’s most infamous deaths.  
It seems unlikely that the cur Gary Gilmore and the coquette Mata Hari would share 
anything in common–except their death by bullet.  Songwriter Joe Hill finds himself 
                                                                
341See Arthur J. Goldberg & Alan M. Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penalty 
Unconstitutional, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1773, 1814 (1970).  
342Choice of execution statutes have been criticized because “the ‘choice’ only serves as a 
vehicle to ease legislators’, jurists’, and society’s mind.”  Pamela S. Nagy, Hang By the Neck 
Until Dead: The Resurgence of Cruel and Unusual Punishments in the 1990s, 26 PAC. L. J. 85, 
123 (1994).  Others, on the other hand, view choice statutes as offering a modicum of dignity 
to offenders, by respecting their choices on the method of death.  Gardner, 947 P.2d at 477.  
What impact the choice statutes may have on the broader debate is difficult to ascertain. 
343See Forbes, supra note 39.  
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in famous company as he died by the same method which nearly killed literary 
genius Fyodor Dostoevsky.  Every execution for a double murder reminds us of 
Private Eddie Slovik’s execution for double desertion in World War II.  Granted, 
institutional policy prevents Utah’s condemned from being shot with a cigarette 
dangling from their lips, but Utah’s use of that method reminds us of the firing 
squad’s traditional, nearly romantic, use.  The firing squad’s historical context, 
therefore, causes us to reexamine its current use.  We must ask ourselves if we 
progressed as a society in a manner that would require the abolition of this violent, 
but arguably nostalgic, method of death.   
The evolving standards of decency analysis requires us to look beyond the most 
visceral human response, to transcend our gut feeling.  Instead, the analysis asks us 
to evaluate the gut feeling of the Nation, to determine the collective opinion of which 
our own opinion plays but a small part.  Casting personal emotions aside, the 
evolving standards inquiry tries to evaluate those quantifiable principles that reflect 
an amorphous societal sentiment.  As will be seen, this objective review provides 
clues, but few conclusions, about Utah’s peculiar method of death. 
1.  History  
Utah’s use of the firing squad, while important, is not the solitary facet of the 
nation’s firing-squad history.  A firing squad carried out the first official execution 
on American soil in 1608.  Before the passage of the Bill of Rights, one source 
records over thirty firing squad executions on what would become American soil.344  
Many of these executions were carried out in California and Louisiana, areas then 
governed by foreign nations.  The majority of firing squad executions seem to have 
involved military action; the condemned were shot for treason, espionage, or 
desertion, and many were soldiers.  While information regarding these early firing 
squads is sparse, the firing squad’s use in early American history does not seem to be 
unusual. 
The firing squad’s use during that time period contrasts sharply with other 
gruesome methods of execution.  Early American history is tainted by executions by 
such unusual methods as pressing,345 gibbeting,346 breaking on the wheel,347 burning 
                                                                
344See Espy file, supra note 5.  
345
“Pressing” is technically known as peine forte et dure.  TEETERS, supra note 40, at 98.  
Believing that truth could literally be squeezed out of a person, especially in cases where a 
person refused to acquiesce to a court=s jurisdiction by not pleading guilty or not guilty, large 
weights were applied until the victim was crushed to death.  See TEETERS, supra note 40, at 
98-99.  
346
“Gibbetting” refers to hanging in chains.  
347When breaking on the wheel, the victim is spread out on the ground, often naked, with 
blocks of wood placed under each extremity=s joints.  A wooden wheel with an iron edge 
would then smash each of the victim=s limbs.  The broken limbs were then woven into the 
wheel and the victim hoisted up to die slowly.  One author commented [t]he victim is 
transformed into a sort of huge screaming puppet writhing in rivulets of blood, a puppet with 
four tentacles, like a sea monster of raw, slimy and shapeless flesh mixed up with splinters of 
smashed bones.”  A. HYATT VERRILL, THE INQUISITION 138-48 (1931) (citing an early German 
newsletter). 
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at the stake, and bludgeoning.  These methods, the progeny of a bloody British past, 
found some acceptance in the Colonies.  Apparently, society reserved the majority of 
these atrocities for pirates, slaves, and soldiers.   
Even the more commonly employed methods such as hanging were accompanied 
by post-mortem abominations.  Dismemberment and public display of the executed’s 
corpse seemed common in the American colonies.348  Often a condemned’s sentence 
included prescriptions such as having “their heads and quarters set up in several parts 
of the Country” or having “their heads cut off their bodies and fixed to the chimneys 
of the court house.”349  The Virginia Colony commonly placed the heads of executed 
slaves at the crossroads as a warning to others.350  Often, though, courts imposed 
sentences of drawing and quartering, but humanity prevented the realization of such 
a gruesome task.351   
The post-mortem dismemberment and display of a corpse, however, formed only 
one part of the ghastly public spectacle of early executions.  Public executions, often 
held in the public square or a designated “Gallows Hill,” were the norm.352  A circus-
like atmosphere pervaded many executions.  Aside from the harsh spectacle of death 
alone, the frequency of botched executions in early America heightened the cruelty 
of executions.  Due to the regularity with which the rope broke, a good hangman 
kept a second noose close at hand.  In those cases in which a misplaced knot did not 
break the condemned’s neck, the hangmen “mercifully” beat the victim’s chest or 
hung onto his legs to hasten death.353  Without any uniform procedure, various 
complications often enhanced the tortuous quality of the death.354  As aptly noted by 
John Stuart Mill, “[t]he men of old cared too little about death, and gave their own 
lives or took those of others with equal recklessness.”355  
One legacy of Wilkerson is its recognition that the historical context of our 
Nations’s founding did not consider the firing squad cruel and unusual.  The 
Wilkerson Court suggests that, when compared to a commonly-used method such as 
hanging, the firing squad maintained some modicum of dignity, reserved by society 
for less-egregious crimes.356  Wilkerson found that, at a bare minimum, the Drafters 
                                                                
348See TEETERS, supra note 40, at 95.  
349Id.  
350See id.  
351See id. at 96-97.  
352See id. at 59.  
353See id. 
354This is not to say that complications are non-existent in our orderly execution process 
today.  This is only to recognize that a thousand additional variables increased the chance of a 
“botched” execution in the past.  
355John Stuart Mill, Speech in favor of Capital Punishment (April 21, 1868).  Mill=s 
statements provide a caution for our day: “Our danger is of the opposite kind, lest we should 
be so much shocked by death, in general and in the abstract, as to care too much about it in 
individual cases, both those of other people and our own, which call for its being risked.”  Id. 
356See Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 134.  The Manual for Courts-Martial stated “[h]anging is 
considered more ignominious than shooting and is the usual method, for example, in the case 
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intended the Eighth Amendment to prohibit torture; whatever that method’s 
shortcomings, Wilkerson did not categorize the firing squad as tortuous.357  In 
contrast to the tortuous deaths imposed before the Bill of Rights, the firing squad 
passes any historically-based constitutional inquiry. 
The enactment of the Bill of Rights, nonetheless, did not end punishments we 
would now consider inhumane.  History records several burnings at the stake in the 
nineteenth century, generally subjecting slaves to the flames.  The last burning at the 
stake occurred in South Carolina in 1825.  From that time forward, history has left 
behind the more cruel execution methods.  In the name of mercy, society has several 
times invented a putatively more humane mode of death.  Modern executions are 
carried out by lethal injection, the gas chamber, hanging, electrocution, and the firing 
squad.  
It is worth noting that, aside from Utah’s historical use of the firing squad, other 
shootings have occurred since the passage of the Bill of Rights.  Like before, the 
firing squad’s use outside of Utah was confined mostly to the military and those 
areas under territorial governance.  In fact, since 1900 only one firing squad 
execution occurred outside of Utah.358  Between 1912 and 1920, Nevada law allowed 
for execution by firing squad as an alternative to hanging.359  During that time, 
Andrija Mirkovitch elected to die by shooting.360  Nevada, however, had difficulty 
finding volunteers to perform the execution.  To accommodate his requested method, 
Nevada constructed a “firing squad machine,” mounting three rifles on a framework 
that fired the weapons with the pulling of three strings.  The execution apparently 
went without incident, but Nevada removed the firing squad as a sentencing option 
in 1920.361  Nevada ironically chose lethal gas over the firing squad as “a method of 
inflicting the death penalty in the most humane manner known to modern science.”362 
Having reviewed the national history of the firing squad, it seems clear that the 
firing squad is not one of those punishments “that had been considered cruel and 
                                                          
of a person sentenced to death for spying, for murder in connection with mutiny or for a 
violation of the [Article of War].  Shooting is the usual method in the case of a person 
sentenced to death for a purely military offense, as sleeping at post.”  MANUAL FOR COURTS 
MARSHAL 1928, WAR DEPARTMENT  93 & 103(a) (1936).  Hanging became the more popular 
means of military execution, probably because it “was also a symbolic expression of ignobility 
and disgrace.”  J. Robert Lilly, Little Dirty Details: Executing U.S. Soldiers During WWII, 
CRIME & DELINQUENCY, at 491 (1996).  
357Wilkerson=s holding most likely explains both Idaho and Oklahoma=s addition of the 
firing squad as a method of execution in the aftermath of Furman.   
358This excludes military firing squads.  Apparently, the military executed at least one 
serviceman during World War II by firing squad.  There were other firing squad executions in 
the First World War.  Most of these executions occurred in Europe or Great Britain.  See Espy 
file, supra note 5. 
359See Deborah W. Denno, Getting to Death: Are Executions Constitutional? 82 IOWA L. 
REV. 319, n. 452 (1997). 
360See id. 
361See id.  
362State v. Gee, 211 P. 676, 682 (Nev. 1932).  
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unusual at the time that the Bill of Rights was adopted.”363  The Wilkerson court, at a 
minimum, clarified the historical acceptance of the firing squad. 
2.  Legislative Action 
The next inquiry in the evolving standards of decency analysis is a review of 
legislative action.  With respect to the current discussion, it must be determined 
whether a national consensus has emerged over the firing squad’s constitutionality.  
Following the lead from Atkins’ footnote twenty-one, this review requires more than 
a simple amassing of legislative code.  This review focuses on trends and 
progressions. 
It would be fair to say that a national consensus solidified in the last few decades 
for maintaining dignity and humanity in executions.  A reflection of this concern is 
seen in the move away from electrocution and the gas chamber.  Some challenge this 
national movement as little more than a legislative “cover your back” effort.  Sensing 
unrest in the populace and the judiciary, state legislatures avoided the establishment 
of legal precedent by enacting choice-of-execution statutes or removing arguably 
unconstitutional methods.  The once commonplace gas chamber, electric chair, and 
gallows are now irregularly used; lethal injection is the predominant method of 
execution.  Of the 805 executions in the modern death penalty era, 639 were by 
lethal injection.364  Since the turn of the new century, only six out of 206 executions 
were by a method other than lethal injection.365  All of the sixty-five inmates killed in 
2001 were executed by lethal injection.366 
Whatever the reason for this change, be it a true concern for humanity or an 
effort to avoid judicial precedent, many jurisdictions have moved to the more-
humane lethal injection as the primary method of execution.  Of the thirty-eight 
states that permit the death penalty, thirty-seven execute primarily by lethal 
injection.367  In eighteen of these states, lethal injection is the sole method of 
execution.  Ten states still allow the use of the electric chair.368  Five states still use 
                                                                
363Ford, 477 U.S. at 405.  
364150 executions have been by electrocution, 11 by the gas chamber, 3 by hanging, and 2 
by the firing squad.  See Death Penalty Information Center, available at 
www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/methods.html (last revisited Apr. 29, 2003).  These numbers are 
current as of October 16, 2002.  
365See id.  Those six executions were electrocutions.  Id. 
366Id. 
367See id.  The following states currently authorize the use of capital punishment: 
Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, 
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, 
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North 
Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, 
Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming.  Only Nebraska does not allow for lethal 
injection.  Id. 
368Id.  The states using the electric chair are Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Illinois, 
Kentucky, Nebraska, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia.  Arkansas, 
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the gas chamber.369  Three states use the gallows.370  As previously discussed, three 
allow for firing squads.371  Only in Nebraska are the condemned left with 
electrocution as the only option.  In most jurisdictions allowing an alternative 
method, lethal injection is still the preferred and default method. 
The Nation’s move toward lethal injection, however, does not necessarily reflect 
a move away from the firing squad.  As evinced by the Atkins decision, serious 
questions remain concerning how to evaluate legislative action to ascertain a national 
consensus.  The mere fact that all but one death penalty state allowed for lethal 
injection does not automatically render all other methods unconstitutional.  
Significantly, half of all death penalty states retain an alternative method of death on 
the books, often in case lethal injection itself is declared unconstitutional.  The 
direction of change toward the exclusive use of lethal injection is not constant, and 
still encumbered by alternative methods.  Lethal injection’s predominance does not 
guarantee its exclusivity.   
If anything, modern legislative action shows a trend toward accepting the firing 
squad as a valid execution option.  In enacting a capital sentencing statute after 
Furman, the Utah legislature renewed the firing squad.  For the first time in their 
history as a state, Idaho and Oklahoma added the firing squad as an option after 
Furman.372  Recently, the New Mexico legislature considered a bill that would have 
added the firing squad, along with hanging, lethal gas, and electrocution, as an 
option.373  Currently, New Mexico only allows for lethal injection.  The proposed bill 
would have allowed the prisoner to die by his preferred method, including the firing 
squad.  The bill, however, did not pass.374 
                                                          
Kentucky, and Tennessee only allow the electrocution of those sentenced to die before a 
statutorily-defined date.  Illinois and Oklahoma would only use the electric chair if other 
methods are found to be unconstitutional.  Death Penalty Information Center, supra note 364. 
369The gas chamber is used in Arizona, California, Maryland, Missouri, and Wyoming.  In 
Arizona and Maryland, the gas chamber is only available for those sentenced to die before a 
statutorily-specified date.  In Wyoming, lethal gas would only be used if lethal injection were 
found to be unconstitutional.  See id. 
370Hanging is still an option in Delaware, New Hampshire and Washington.  Hanging is 
only an option in Delaware for those sentenced before 1986.  See id.  In New Hampshire, 
hanging is only an option if lethal injection is unavailable.  See id. 
371Again, Idaho, Oklahoma, and Utah allow for the use of the firing squad.  
372Firing-squad executions occurred in Oklahoma while it was a territory, but apparently 
were not sanctioned immediately by the State=s criminal code.  
373See H.B. 90, 45th Leg. 2d Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2002).  
374New Mexico is not the only state to have recently considered alternative methods of 
execution.  In 1996 a state legislator in Georgia proposed a bill allowing for execution by 
guillotine.  The bill proposed the guillotine as a means by which the condemned could donate 
their organs.  The organ-donor bill ultimately failed.  Its author described his intention in 
submitting the bill: “I have a pretty dramatic style.  I was pretty sure my bill wasn=t going to 
go anywhere. . . . The guillotine is kind of a dramatic thing. . . .  People say that the guillotine 
is so barbaric.  But I say the method of cooking somebody alive [by the electric chair] is not 
exactly swift and sure.”  Jon Kerr, Georgia Guillotine Execution Bill Cut, WEST=S LEGAL 
NEWS, Mar. 14, 1996, available at 1996 WL 259071.  
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Utah’s firing squad has not been without legislative challenge.  On the eve of 
John Albert Taylor’s execution in 1996, State Representative Sheryl L. Allen, a 
Republican from Bountiful, introduced a bill that would excise the firing squad 
option from Utah’s capital sentencing statute.375  Prompted by the negative publicity 
from Taylor’s upcoming execution, Allen stated “I don’t think its humane.  The 
firing squad should be eliminated, now and forever.”376  She did not want Utah’s 
image to be one of “brutality.”377 
The bill’s introduction caused quite a stir in the Beehive State.  Corrections 
Director Lane McCotter opposed the bill in interviews, stating, “[f]rankly, the firing 
squad was easier to deal with from a logistical standpoint because you didn’t need 
medical support.”378  McCotter, however, opined that the firing squad choice should 
not rest in the defendant, but in the courts:  “I think [the choice] should belong to the 
courts.  I don’t have any problems with any of the options, I just think the court 
should decide and sentenced the individual.  Why should he make those kind of 
choices?  He choose the method of execution for his victims.  That’s as far as it 
should go.”379 
In a poll, fifty-nine percent of Utahns wanted to keep the firing squad.  Thirty-
one percent supported the bill to the remove the firing squad option.  Ten percent did 
not care.380  Interestingly, the bill found opposition from at least one death row 
inmate.  Ronnie Lee Gardner stated that “I’m going to fight for [the firing squad].  
We have no other decisions on our own, basically, and that’s one I’d like to keep.”381  
Gardner’s attorney agreed because “[i]t’s form over substance to say that lethal 
injection--because it is sanitized, hidden and unseen–is more civilized and less 
barbaric than a firing squad.  At the end of the day, the person is just as dead.”382 
However the Governor’s office supported the bill.  Utah Governor Michael O. 
Leavitt promised to sign the bill if it passed.  Stating that humanity and dignity 
should govern executions, Leavitt signaled that he was not “crazy about”383 the firing 
squad and preferred the “quiet and order” of lethal injection.384  Specifically, 
                                                                
375See Stephen Hunt, Utah Aims at Firing Squad, Bill Would Exempt Jan. 26 Execution, S. 
L. TRIB., Jan. 6, 1996, at A1 [hereinafter Hunt, Utah Aims].  
376Id.  
377Id.  
378Amy Donaldson, Officials Breathe New Life into Firing Squad Option, DESERET NEWS, 
Feb. 13, 1996, at A1 [hereinafter Donaldson, Officials Breathe New Life].  
379Amy Donaldson, Taylor Execution May Not Be The Last In Utah, DESERET NEWS, Jan. 
7, 1996, at A6. 
380Bob Bernick, Jr., Nearly 60% Want Utah To Retain Firing Squad, DESERET NEWS, Feb. 
9, 1996, at A1.  
381Donaldson, Officials Breathe New Life, supra note 378.  
382Stephen Hunt, After Taylor, The Guns May Fall Silent In Utah, S. L. TRIB., Jan. 13, 
1996, at A1.  
383Death Change Backed, Utah Guv. Supports Firing Squad Ban, DENVER POST, Jan. 7, 
1996, at B03.  
384Hunt, Utah Aims, supra note 382.  
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Governor Leavitt praised the “quiet dignity” of lethal injections.385  Notwithstanding 
the Governor’s support, the bill ultimately died.386   
Signaling a national concern for dignity in death, state legislatures have 
increasingly moved toward lethal injection as the primary means of extinguishing a 
murder’s life.  Nevertheless, the embodiment of this concern in lethal injection does 
not necessarily constitute an across-the-board rejection of the firing squad.  Because 
of its simplicity and unique legal history in the Supreme Court, two states in the last 
quarter century sanctioned its use.  No widely supported effort has been introduced 
to curtail its use.  Legislative action does not clearly define a national consensus 
regarding the firing squad. 
Recent events in Utah, however, signal that a change may soon come.  After the 
media circus surrounding the scheduled executions of Arguelles and Kell, Rep. Allen 
indicated that she would reintroduce her bill to remove the firing squad as a 
sentencing option.  Her bill now finds support from the Utah Sentencing 
Commission. 387  The Sentencing Commission has even decided that any legislation 
enacted to abolish the firing squad would apply retroactively, even though such a 
decision would surely prompt litigation from the four death-row inmates who have 
chosen to die by that method.388  The eyes of the nation will surely be on the Utah 
legislature in the upcoming session which begins in January 2004. 
3.  Jury 
As previously noted, juries provide an important link between public opinion and 
the administration of justice.  However, several factors detract from juries’ 
helpfulness as an objective factor with respect to the firing squad.  First, capital 
prosecutions in those States allowing for a firing squad are relatively rare.  The 
infrequent jury consideration of a death sentence to be carried out by firing squad 
makes it difficult to generalize individual juries’ responses.  Second, the States 
endorsing the firing squad shelter the decision to employ that method from the jury.  
Idaho and Oklahoma only use the firing squad in extraordinary circumstances.  Utah 
leaves the firing decision to the defendant.  In each case, the jury may feel less 
responsible as the firing squad’s use lies beyond their control.  Third, unlike issues 
                                                                
385Jerry Spangler, Leavitt Calls Order, Dignity Paramount, DESERET NEWS, Jan. 26, 1996, 
at A4.  Governor Leavitt has clarified that he thinks the firing squad “does add some element 
of notoriety.  [But] I’m not on a crusade on either side of this.”  Joshua B. Good, The Debate: 
Pro or Con, the Firing Squad is a Hot Topic, S. L. TRIB. Jan. 26, 1996, at A6.  In fact, 
Governor Leavitt recognized that “I am not sure you can reach a level of comfort with any of 
these methods . . . There is no easy way to do this.  It is a hard, difficult and anxiety-filled 
experience.”  See Spangler, supra note 385.  
386Death row inmate Ronnie Lee Gardnder was glad to hear that the firing squad abolition 
bill failed:  “I think its basically an image deal . . . They didn’t want people to say, [T]hese 
(expletive) Utahns, they’re barbaric.  This ain’t the 1800s in the 1990s.  I just hope they keep 
it.”  Amy Donaldson, Inmate Threatens to Sue if State Won=t Let Him Die by Firing Squad, 
DESERET NEWS, Feb. 9, 1996, at A1.    
387Stephen Hunt, End to Firing Squads Sought, S.L. TRIB., Aug. 7, 2003, at A1. 
388Stephen Hunt, Firing Squad Choices Opposed, S. L. TRIB., Oct. 2, 2003, at C1; Jennifer 
Dobner, Firing Squad Days Numbered?, DESERET NEWS, Oct. 2, 2003, at B03.   
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such as mental retardation, execution methods may not receive prominent emphasis 
at trial.  The issue would likely not be debated, and only mentioned tangentially by 
the parties.  Finally, little information exists concerning jury activity in the firing 
squad states.  To the author’s best knowledge, no statistics or other objective data 
have been developed concerning a jury’s response to the firing squad option.  
Insofar as the ultimate goal of jury action is to ascertain public opinion through 
generally-reliable data, polling may provide clues to a jury’s reaction to the firing 
squad.  In Utah, public support for the firing squad traditionally has been high.  Only 
thirty-one percent of Utahns opposed the firing squad in 1996.389  While polling data 
may not rest upon the same precision or integrity as jury verdicts, or even be 
generally reliable, it does not seem likely that jury action would be inconsistent with 
the general public support for the firing squad. 
4.  Other Factors 
Atkins’ footnote twenty-one has raised substantial questions about the influence 
other objective factors may have on the evolving standards inquiry.  Courts have 
occasionally looked at a consensus of the international community, views of 
professional and religious organizations, the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, and 
public opinion polls to gauge a national consensus.  These factors may contribute to 
a more full understanding of the nation’s view of the firing squad. 
Difficulty attends determining what weight these objective factors bring to the 
evolving standards discussion.  Often, as is the case with jury discretion, it is hard to 
separate opposition to the firing squad from general abolitionist aims.  Opposition to 
the firing squad may be nothing more than a reflection of general opposition to the 
death penalty.  This does not render the abolitionist opposition insignificant or 
meritless; it merely lessens the opinion’s value as an objective factor.  Indeed, such 
opinions reveal little about humanitarian concerns about the specific use of the firing 
squad, they merely convey distaste for any execution, however humanely carried out.  
Looking at the objective factors below, care will be taken to isolate those factors 
which clarify the constitutionality of the firing squad, rather than the death penalty in 
general. 
a.  International Community 
Less than half of the countries in the world actively sanction execution as an 
appropriate punishment.390  Execution in those countries vary from the medically-
sterile lethal injection to traditional hanging to bloody beheading to archaic stoning.  
Of all the methods, the firing squad is the predominant means of execution in the 
world.  Of the 115 nations that authorized the death penalty in 1999, 73 of those 
countries executed by firing squad.391  Of these nations, the firing squad is the sole 
                                                                
389Bernick, supra note 380.  
390See Amnesty International, Website Against the Death Penalty, at 
www.web.amnesty.org/rmp/dplibrary.nsf (last visited Oct. 8, 2003). 
391See Amnesty International, Methods of Execution Worldwide, available at 
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method of execution in 45 countries.392  By way of comparison, 58 countries execute 
by hanging, with 33 nations doing so exclusively.  More nations kill by stoning (six) 
than by lethal injection (five).393  Only the United States uses lethal gas and 
electrocution.394   
The firing squad procedure varies among nations.  Vietnam uses a five member 
firing squad in a manner similar to Utah.395  In China, the condemned kneels as a 
single shot is fired into his head.396  The family of the executed is often expected to 
reimburse the government for the expense of the bullet.397  In Thailand, the 
condemned is strapped to a pole and allowed to hold emblems used in Buddhist 
prayer.398  A target is placed over his heart and a lone executioner fires with a 
machine gun at the condemned through a blue screen.399  In Yemen, executions have 
also been carried out in a 50,000 seat sports stadium.400  In one case, the condemned 
laid on the ground as he was shot in the heart and head with an AK-47.401  The corpse 
was then crucified and placed on public display for three days afterwards.402   
At first blush, the overwhelming use of the firing squad would appear to show an 
international consensus supporting its use.403  Significant developments in the last 
few years, however, signal international unrest with the firing squad’s use.  Notably, 
China, the notorious human-rights violator, is moving away from the firing squad 
                                                          
African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Comoros, Congo, Corte=d Ivoire, Cuba, Dijouti, Egypt, 
El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, 
Jordan, Kazakhstan, North Korea, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, 
Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Palestine, Qatar, Russian Federation, 
Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Suriname, Syria, Taiwan, Tajikistan, 
Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United 
States of America, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Yemen, and Yugoslavia.  South Korea also 




395See Three Executed in Vietnam Corruption Scandal, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Jan. 17, 
1998, available at 2000 WL 24715944. 
396See Robert Matthews, The Quest for a Painless Exit from Death Row, THE SUNDAY 
TELEGRAPH, Apr. 26, 1992, at 10.  
397See Yap Su-yin, This Man Killed 55 People.  Its His Job., STRAITS TIMES, Oct. 5, 2003, 
available at 2003 WL 61887530.  
398See id.  
399See id.  
400See Executions in Yemen at www.al-bab.com/Yemen/data/execute.htm  (last visited 
Oct. 8, 2003).   
401See id.  
402See id.  
403This, of course, does not take into account those nations that have abolished the death 
penalty.  Their concern is not with the firing squad, but with execution in general.  
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and toward lethal injection.  China has sought a more “civilised, humane, and 
scientific manner of death.”404  In support of this effort, Chinese officials cited 
Confucian principles regarding the treatments of corpses as a reason to find an 
alternative to the firing squad.405  The move away from the firing squad is not yet 
complete.  Currently, lethal injections are only being conducted on a trial basis.  
Interestingly, China has been criticized for its use of lethal injection.  Some contend 
that China only uses lethal injection as a means of harvesting the organs of the 
executed.406  Others criticize China’s move as illusory.  One human rights activist 
stated: “It doesn’t really make much difference how you kill someone.  The issue is 
not the method, but the way it is used in an indiscriminate fashion after what are 
often only summary trials.  We feel that this isn’t an improvement.  The death 
penalty should be eliminated.”407 
Vietnam, another human rights violator, also signaled that it may seek other 
methods of execution.  Calling the firing squad “appalling” and “no longer suitable,” 
one Communist authority stated that Vietnam would consider other options like 
lethal injection and electrocution.408  Vietnam also apparently worries about the 
mental strain on the gunmen.409  Thailand also indicates that it will begin using lethal 
injection in 2003.410  These efforts mirror Guatemala’s abandonment of the firing 
squad in 1997.  Notwithstanding their rhetoric to the contrary, China, Vietnam, and 
Thailand continue executing by firing squad. 
In sum, a review of those nations that actively employ the firing squad 
demonstrates an international support for its use, albeit with some reservation.  
Significant developments portend a shift in world opinion, though.  Nations that have 
long ignored basic human rights have started seeking humanity in executions, 
targeting the use of the firing squad.  Yet even that movement is not so universal as 
to threaten the firing squad’s predominance. 
This international consensus, however, may prove a double-edged sword for 
Utah.  While judicial recognition of the international death penalty community’s 
tolerance for the firing squad may support its constitutionality, the court of public 
opinion may not look at such evidence in a positive light.  Public opinion may not 
look so favorably on Utah’s strange bedfellows in the firing squad affair.  Little good 
can come from a comparison to Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, Fidel Castro’s 
Cuba, and Communist Vietnam.  Utah surely does not want to be considered in the 
same human rights league as China.  It may seem a strange anomaly in our 
                                                                
404Judge Backs Needle For Humane Executions, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 15, 2001, 
at 13. (hereinafter Judge Blacks Needle). 
405See id.  
406John Gittings, Execution Row Centres on Organ Theft, THE GUARDIAN, Sept. 15, 2001.  
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Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2002. 
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politically-correct world of cultural tolerance, but comparison to North Korea, 
Bosnia, Iraq, and Iran engenders negative public response.  While the international 
death-penalty community’s opinion supports the firing squad’s viability, those who 
constitute that community may detract from the political potency of that consensus.   
b.  Professional and Religious Organizations 
Some professional organizations oppose the use of the firing squad.  But then, 
these organizations readily admit that their opposition does not stem from a concern 
for the firing squad as a means, rather they object to the death penalty as an end.  For 
example, John Albert Taylor’s execution drew fire from such groups as Amnesty 
International, the American Civil Liberties Union, and the Utah Catholic Diocese.  
The ACLU and Amnesty International, however, ridiculed the firing squad ban 
introduced at that time.  Executive Director William F. Schulz of Amnesty 
International commented that: 
In this country, death by electrocution or lethal injection or even hanging 
is considered ‘acceptable’ forms of execution while death by shooting is 
not.  Why is that?  The results are exactly the same. . . . The truth is that 
death by firing squad-bloody, unsanitary, untidy--forces us to come face 
to face with the sheer brutality of what we judiciously call ‘capital 
punishment.’411 
Amnesty International’s official stance on execution methods mirror that 
statement: “Amnesty International opposes the death penalty unconditionally, no 
matter how heinous the crime, and regardless of the method the State chooses to kill 
the prisoner.  Every death sentence is an affront to human dignity, every execution a 
symptom of a culture of violence rather than a solution to it.”412  
Also, the National Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty objected to Taylor’s 
execution because of the heightened chance for error.  That organization, however, 
admitted that “[t]he bottom line is, one method of execution is just as brutal and 
                                                                
411Brian Maffly & Dan Harrie, Firing-Squad Execution Draws International Fire, S. L. 
TRIB., Jan. 25, 1996, at A4.  
412This response is common.  A group of Catholic Bishops expressed similar objections to 
Florida’s use of the electric chair: “It is the killing of persons to which we object, thus the 
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Era Execution Sends Prison Scrambling, S. L. TRIB., Dec. 9, 1995, at E1.   
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barbaric as the next.”413  While the locally-influential Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-day Saints refrains from adopting a position on a particular method of 
execution, it has signaled that it has no objection to the elimination of the firing 
squad.414 
Concerns by professional organizations over Utah’s death penalty laws are not 
new.  Recent years have seen national interest in the death penalty, particularly over 
the possibility that innocent people may be confined on death row and ultimately 
executed.415  This national interest spawned unrest, and resulted in governmental 
accommodation.  Illinois, for instance, placed a moratorium on executions and 
enhanced the availability of clemency.  Like an earthquake, these issues shake the 
very foundations of capital punishment administration–but only small tremors and 
aftershocks have been felt in Utah.  Those most active in condemning Utah’s capital 
punishment system have chosen their battles well.  Rather than seeking small gains 
and incremental alterations, as curtailing the use of the firing squad, they seek to 
entirely dismantle all mechanisms of death.  This chosen strategy tells us little about 
the use of the firing squad, but informs us well of broader death penalty concerns.  In 
sum, the position of professional and religious organizations contributes little to the 
firing squad inquiry.   
c.  Prosecutorial Discretion 
Little information is available regarding whether prosecutorial discretion 
influences Utah’s use of the firing squad.  Prosecutorial discretion acts as a filter, 
carefully selecting those defendants whose crimes most merit the death penalty.  In 
Utah, input from the victim’s family strongly contributes to the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion.416  There is no objective data about the influence of the 
firing squad on the decisions made by the victim’s family or the State. 
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TRIB., Sept. 30, 2002. at A1  
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d.  Polls 
Utahns support the death penalty in general, and the firing squad in particular.  
Nationally, support for the death penalty fluctuates from year to year, often in 
response to public awareness of particular issues.  In 1965, for example, only 38% of 
the nation population supported the death penalty.417  In those years immediately 
before Furman, support for capital punishment could not command a majority of the 
population.418  The legislative changes in the wake of Furman, however, drove death 
penalty support to new heights.  In the last two decades, national support for the 
death penalty generally hovered between two-thirds and three-fourths.419  Statistics, 
however, can be unreliable.  Current numbers show either a recent decrease in 
support, a slight increase, or an enormous leap.  Often “[i]t’s all in how the question 
is asked.”420  Most estimates place current death penalty support at around 67%. 
Western states generally favor the death penalty more than other geographical 
areas, often by double-digit margins.421  Surprisingly, Western states even out rank 
the execution-happy South.  Yet even in the death-penalty-friendly west, Utah stands 
out as a strong supporter of capital punishment.  In 1992, 87% of Utahns favored 
capital punishment.422  While only 75% of Utahns supported the death penalty when 
John Albert Taylor was executed,423 current support now rests at an all-time high.  
Recent polls indicate that 90% of all Utahns support the death penalty.424  This 
number contrasts sharply with the nation’s leader in executions, Texas, where “only” 
73% of its population supports the death penalty.425   
As previously discussed, support or opposition to the death penalty does not 
necessarily correlate to an opinion on the firing squad.  There are few indications of 
the nation’s tolerance of the firing squad.  71% of Americans supported Gary 
Gilmore’s execution by firing squad.426  In one 1985 poll, only 3% of the national 
                                                                
417See Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics at 142 (2000).  
418See id.  
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“Public opinion in favor of the death penalty for convicted murderers in the United 
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population felt that the firing squad was the most humane method in comparison to 
the other modes of death.427  By way of comparison, 56% of people considered lethal 
injection to be the most humane method, followed by the electric chair at 16 percent 
and the gas chamber at 8 percent.428  In 1985, lethal injection was a relatively new 
mechanism of death, only six men died by that method.  Undoubtedly, a modern 
survey would more strongly endorse lethal injection. Apparently, the nation does not 
consider the firing squad the most humane method.  However, this does not mean the 
population considers its use cruel and unusual. 
When a state legislator introduced a bill that would terminate Utah’s use of the 
firing squad in 1996, 59% of Utahns supported the continued use of the firing squad, 
with 10% expressing some degree of apathy on the issue.429  While nearly a third of 
Utahns expressed displeasure with the firing squad’s use, the bill lacked the 
necessary political support to pass, or even substantially progress, in the state 
legislature.  Even the support of the governor could not improve the viability of the 
1996 bill.  That is not surprising.  Utah’s strong support for the death penalty resists 
any change that would not be viewed as “tough on crime.”  Recent polls, however, 
show a decrease in support for the firing squad among Utahns.  A poll taken in July 
2003 showed that 51% of Utahns expressed concern with the continued use of the 
firing squad.  Of those, 35% felt that it definitely should not continue.  Only 45% of 
those polled felt that the firing squad “probably should” or “definitely should” 
continue.430  Public support seems to be shifting away from the past overwhelming 
support for the firing squad, most likely due to the intense scrutiny the State received 
when planning two firing-squad executions recently.  
4.  Synthesis of the Evolving Standards 
Reviewing those objective standards that aid in discerning a national consensus, 
it is not clear that the nation opposes the use of the firing squad.  America, more now 
than ever in its history, is concerned with the humane and appropriate use of the 
death penalty.  These concerns resulted in the lethal injection being the predominant 
choice, if not the only choice, in nearly every executing jurisdiction.  But little 
objective data would suggest that the nation would not tolerate the continued use of 
the firing squad.  Indeed, a broad view of objective indicia would indicate that 
Utah’s firing squad use only mirrors an acceptance of that method in the 
international death penalty community.  Recognizing that such trends may change 
with public interest and public awareness, there is no evidence of progression away 
from the firing squad. 
The infrequency with which Utah executes by firing squad unquestionably 
creates a dearth of objective data concerning the nation’s collective response.  It is 
anticipated that Utah’s continued use of this method will add significant objective 
information. 
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The objective indicia of evolving standards, however, is not the only inquiry in 
modern Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.  Any review of the firing squad must also 
address the underlying concern of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause: 
dignity.  As will be seen, it is likely that the amorphous ideas that shape our value 
judgments in the realm of dignity will by far play a greater role than those palpable 
and scientifically-ascertainable factors already discussed. 
B.  Dignity 
Death is a dignitary who when he comes announced is to be received with 
formal manifestations of respect, even by those most familiar with him.431 
The ultimate inquiry in the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause involves that 
principle that saturates the Eighth Amendment: human dignity.  Even though the 
Eighth Amendment does not explicitly employ the term, the Supreme Court’s 
modern review of that provision focuses on “nothing less than the dignity of man.”432  
The dignity of man is a noble sounding phrase, implying philosophical foundations 
beyond that normally considered in the legal world.  By invoking dignity, the 
Supreme Court entered into a less objective arena full of debate and discussion.  The 
Supreme Court has not defined “dignity” as a specific legal term of art; the Eighth 
Amendment’s enshrinement of that quality has not been precisely explained.  The 
Supreme Court, however, has suggested two important considerations: (1) the 
excessiveness of the punishment (pain and proportionality); and (2) the purpose of 
the punishment.  Taking these factors account the Supreme Court ultimately allows 
its own understanding of dignity to color its review. 
1.  Excessiveness 
[W]hen the heart is ripped out by bullets, who can say what passes 
through the victim’s mind?  What appears to us a pleasant death, because 
apparently instantaneous, may be extremely tortuous.433 
Pain guides an inquiry into the excessiveness of a firing-squad death.  Common 
sense dictates, gunshot wounds hurt.  Utah’s history confirms that some executions 
have been tainted with an intolerable amount of pain.  Wilkerson’s execution stands 
out for the sheer brutality of the pain involved.  Undeniably, the chance of a botched 
execution is nightmarish.  As in the case of China and Vietnam, the chance of a 
painfully brutal death recently encouraged other nations to consider abandoning the 
firing squad.  
During Great Britain’s long transition to abolition, the Royal Commission on 
Capital Punishment dismissed out of hand the use of the firing squad.434  The Royal 
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to consider and report whether liability under the criminal law in Great Britain to 
suffer capital punishment for murder should be limited or modified, and if so, to what 
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Commission reported “The firing squad is open to obvious objections as a standard 
method of civil execution: it needs a multiplicity of executioners and does not 
possess even the first requisite of an efficient method, the certainty of causing 
immediate death.”435  The tragedy of error in a firing squad has been seen at least 
twice in Utah’s history.  Wilkerson slowly bled to death.  Mare’s execution defies 
belief.  No firing squad in America should even be presented with the need to 
perform a “coup de grace.”436 
Yet these incidents are aberrations.  The anomalies resulting in excessive pain 
are, at least partially, mitigated by modern firing squad procedure.  The current 
firing-squad chair’s leather straps prevent the shifting of the target that maimed the 
unrestrained Wilkerson.  Careful selection of the marksmen from the State’s peace 
officers hopefully replaces the misplaced mercy which tortured Mares.  The question 
is not whether these two incidents have so stained the process as to render it 
constitutionally excessive.  The focus should be on whether a firing squad, 
performed consistent with established procedure, causes “unnecessary and wanton” 
pain.   
To pass constitutional muster, an execution method must not be designed to 
inflict unnecessary pain, or have pain be the raison d’etre of its existence.437  Indeed, 
a punishment is cruel and unusual when it is “inhumane and barbaric” when it 
involves “something more than the mere extinguishment of life.”438  No one is sure 
how painful a firing squad execution may be.  History shows these killings to be 
quick, most lives being extinguished in minutes, if not seconds.  While gunshot 
wounds may be bloody, scientific research indicates that the initial pain felt by the 
victim may be comparable to being punched in the chest.  There is some indication 
that the pain may also be hampered by an “adrenaline surge.”439  And if his heart is 
obliterated completely by four high-caliber bullets, a prisoner dies quickly.  Most 
likely, the sudden loss of blood results in unconsciousness as the blood flow to the 
brain stops.440  This unconscious state may reduce the sensation of pain even in the 
                                                          
extent and by what means, for how long and under what conditions persons who 
would otherwise have been liable to suffer capital punishment should be detained, and 
what changes in the existing law and the prison system would be required; and to 
inquire into and take account of the position in those countries whose experience and 
practice may throw light on these questions. 
Royal Commission on Capital Punishment 1949-53 Report, CMD. No. 8932, at 249 (1949-
53).  The Royal Commission ultimately found no advantage to using the gas chamber or 
electric chair instead of hanging.  Id.  The Commission reserved consideration of lethal 
injection until after advances in its use.  Id.  Great Britain ultimately abolished the death 
penalty.  
435Id. 
436Known as “tiros de gracia” in Latin American countries, firing squad procedures in 
some parts of the world require the commander to deliver one final shot to the head with a 
pistol after the firing squad has already shot the condemned=s heart.  
437Resweber, 329 U.S. at 464.  
438Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 447.  
439GILLESPIE, supra note 21, at 172.  
440JACOB WEISBERG, THIS IS YOUR DEATH, NEW REPUBLIC (1991).  
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case of a botched execution, as in Mares’ death.  A properly-executed shooting 
seems to cause an efficient, nearly painless, death.441  “It is not certain whether death 
by firing squad causes physical pain.”442  Yet one newspaper reported after Peter 
Mortensen’s execution that “[h]is life was snuffed out instantly, and physicians say 
his death was absolutely painless.”443 
But we cannot be entirely sure.  Due to the circumstances of a firing-squad death, 
“there is no language for pain . . . [i]t (more than any other phenomenon) resists 
verbal objectivity.”444  The hood placed over the condemned’s head may mask facial 
expressions of pain.  The thick straps may hold back pain-induced movements.  No 
one know how painful a firing squad death actually is.  Nonetheless, the speed of 
past executions and the few physical signals given by the condemned suggest that the 
pain felt after the shots are fired is not wanton or long-lasting.445 
2.  Nexus 
The Supreme Court’s dignity analysis also considers whether a given punishment 
relates to a recognized and defensible corrective aim.  In the case of the death 
penalty, the Supreme Court recognized two valid reasons to maintain the death 
penalty: retribution and deterrence.446  An attempt to legitimatize the firing squad on 
these two theories is uncomfortable, at best.  To claim that the firing squad 
specifically, rather than the death penalty in general, promotes a more stringent 
shade of retribution is akin to vengeance.  To call for the firing squad on that ground 
presupposes that the firing squad imposes a more repugnant death.  Concomitantly, it 
                                                                
441One prominent anesthesiologist and death penalty opponent, for example, has opined 
that the firing squad is more humane method of death than lethal injection.  See Many Lethal 
Injection Executions are Bungled, THE BALTIMORE SUN, May 6, 2001, at 4C.  
442Gardner, supra note 118, at 123.  
443Met Death Bravely, THE WASATCH WAVE, Nov. 27, 1903, at 6. 
444ELAIN SCARRY, THE BODY IN PAIN 12 (1985).  
445The Supreme Court=s review of pain focuses not only on how much pain is felt, but also 
on whether the punishment imposed by the pain is proportional to the crime itself.  This 
proportionality review does not readily lend itself to a consideration of execution methods.  So 
long as an execution method otherwise complies with the Constitution, it would be difficult to 
say that one method of execution is disproportionally painful compared to the offense, rather 
than in the abstract.  The simple fact that death is the end punishment, by whatever means that 
may be accomplished, provides the general context for a proportionality analysis.  Otherwise, 
we would be faced with the untenable result of providing lethal injection, for example, for the 
less vile, but still death worthy, crimes.  While the past has recognized a difference in the 
dignity of kinds of death, for instance the preference to shoot soldiers not guilty of espionage 
or treason, modern constitutional principles would not allow an undignified death to match an 
equally undignified crime.  Three members of the Supreme Court have refused to recognize 
any “proportionality” principle in the Eighth Amendment that would operate independent 
from a national consensus. See Stanford, 492 U.S. at 379; but see Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312 
(finding the proportionality rule to be governed by objective factors).  At any rate, any effort 
to match proportionally the method with the crime is stymied by Utah’s choice-of-execution 
statute.  An inmate can decide his own method of death, regardless of abstract proportionality.   
446See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319-20; Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183.  
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recognizes that “[d]eep inside every civilized being there lurks a tiny Stone Age 
man, dangling a club to rob and rape, and screaming an eye for an eye.  But we 
would rather not have that little fur-clad figure dictate the law of the land.”447  The 
idea that we should prefer the firing squad over other options because it gives the 
violent criminal what he deserves arguably injects a measure of vengeance into an 
otherwise disimpassioned system.  Reliance on retribution alone cannot support the 
firing squad’s use. 
Likewise, searching for a deterrent basis for the use of the firing squad’s use is 
impracticable.  To say that the firing squad itself deters more crime than other 
methods ignores Utah history.  Until the last four years, Utah capital convicts 
overwhelmingly elected to die by bullet, even when now given the seemingly-
humane needle as an option.448  There is little indication that the use of the firing 
squad instead of lethal injection results in a greater deterrent effect. 
The fact that no nexus can be conclusively drawn between the firing squad and a 
recognized theory of punishment does not condemn its use.  Rather, the 
uncomfortable fit accentuates the fact that such an analysis is better reserved for the 
broad question of a punishment’s propriety, not a focus on the particular mode of 
punishment.  There exists little evidence to suggest that any method of execution 
contributes more to a punishment theory than any other.  Dignity is best understood 
in this case as a subjective question. 
3.  Individual View of Dignity 
In the end, and after plenary consideration of the carefully-crafted objective 
indicia, the ultimate destiny of the firing squad may rest on one’s own understanding 
of human dignity.  By focusing on the dignity of man, the Supreme Court opened a 
conduit through which the predilections of the individual can ultimately shape 
constitutional law.  However precisely structured a review of the objective and 
calculable factors may be, opinions may most directly influence the end result.  This 
is not necessarily a bad thing; in fact, it is rather honest to admit that we rarely enter 
into a discourse on such weighty matters as a logically-driven blank slate.  But this 
review also bases constitutional review on ideas which may be difficult to articulate, 
and even more difficult for others to accept.  This section will try to identify those 
concepts most likely to contribute to the firing squad’s dignity.449 
                                                                
447ARTHUR KOESTLER, REFLECTIONS ON HANGING 100 (1997) (quoted in Gardner, supra 
note 118, at 124).  
448Indeed, those seeking to die by the firing squad in recent years have been those wanting 
an expedited death.  Suicide by firing squad may be an encouragement for the likes of Gary 
Gilmore and Roberto Arguelles.   
449As a threshold matter, it is again essential to remember that one=s opinion of the dignity 
or indignity of the death penalty directly impacts on one=s opinion of the firing squad.  If an 
individual felt that the death penalty strips human dignity from man, we cannot expect the 
method by which that penalty is imposed to somehow restore it.  This does not impute an 
inability to be impartial, but rather recognizes that distaste for the death penalty would flavor 
one=s view of the firing squad.  Conversely, ardent death penalty supporters would most likely 
be more inclined to support the firing squad.  This only recognizes that the dignity of the firing 
squad is to a degree intermeshed with the broad question of capital punishment.  
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What is dignity?  A precise definition for human dignity has proven illusive to 
all.  The Constitution does not explicitly mention the concept, yet the principle of 
dignity seems to permeate the document.450  Indeed, “[t]he basic value in the United 
States Constitution, broadly considered, has become a concern for human dignity.”451  
The Supreme Court’s recognition of this inherent value can be seen in many areas, 
most notably in free speech, cruel and unusual punishment, and civil rights cases.  
Yet in acknowledging the role of human dignity, the Supreme Court made no effort 
to define that concept’s parameters.  A testament to the indistinct nature of dignity, 
the Supreme Court has left nearly invisible dignity’s gravitational hold that both 
binds the Constitution together and regulates the operation of its individual 
components.   
Philosophy grapples with human dignity.  Faced with defining the indefinite, 
philosophers have long debated what constitutes human dignity.  Some are content to 
allow the idea to remain undefined, focusing instead on its effect on the mind and 
hearts of men.  For example, one author recently challenged: “It is difficult to define 
what human dignity is.  It is not an organ to be discovered in our body; it is not an 
empirical notion, but without it we would be unable to answer the simple question: 
what is wrong with slavery?”452  Others, discontent with such vagaries, have 
attempted to create a workable definition.  These are deep waters; a comprehensive 
review of the philosophical debate and conclusions are beyond the scope of this 
article.  It is worthwhile, however, to address some prominent ideas on point.  
The word dignity comes from the Latin word dignitas, its root signifying “worthy 
of esteem and honor, due a certain respect, of weighty importance”453 or simply 
“worthy.”454  Early use of the term carried no universal application to humanity.  
Instead, “it referred to an acquired social and political status, implying, generally, 
important personal achievements in the public sphere and moral integrity.  It was a 
manifestation of personal authority, majesty, greatness, magnanimity, gravity, 
decorum, and moral qualities.”455  Cicero first expanded the word beyond an 
expression of social standing.  Rather than myopically defining dignity in terms of 
man’s place in society, Cicero applied the term to man’s inherent value in the 
world.456  Judeo-Christian teaching mirrored this acceptance of man’s inherent 
                                                                
450See generally, Charles Robert Tremper, Respect for the Human Dignity of Minors: 
What the Constitution Requires, 39 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1293, 1301-04 (1988); Fletcher, Human 
Dignity as a Constitutional Value, 22 U.W. ONTARIO L. REV. 171 (1984); Walter Murphy, An 
Ordering of Constitutional Values, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 703 (1980).  
451Murphy, supra note 450, at 745.  
452Leszek Kolakowski, What Is Left of Socialism, FIRST THINGS, Oct. 2002, at 45.  
453Michael Novak, The Gift of Dignity, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, Dec. 06, 1999, at 50.  
454E. Rae Harcum, et. al, Popular Versus Skinnerian Views on the Relation Between 
Human Freedom and Dignity, THE JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY, 123(3), 258 (1988).  
455Izhak England, Human Dignity: From Antiquity to Modern Israel=s Constitutional 
Framework, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1903, 1904 (2000).  
456See England, supra note 455, at 1905.  Cicero stated:  “And if we will only bear in mind 
the superiority and dignity of our nature, we shall realize how wrong it is to abandon ourselves 
to excess and to live in luxury and voluptuousness, and how right is in thrift, self-denial, 
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dignity.  Creation in God’s image imbues man with divine worth.457  These ideas 
suggest a definition for dignity that take into account the honored status that all 
human beings possess.   
Many recognize Immanuel Kant’s writings on dignity as the most substantial 
modern contribution to the debate: “Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your 
own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only.”458  
Kant tied this moral statement to the concept of dignity in noting “that which 
constitutes the condition under which alone something can be an end in itself does 
not have mere relative worth, i.e., a price, but an intrinsic worth, i.e., dignity.”459  
Autonomy is indispensable to Kant’s dignity.  One commentator sums up Kant’s 
view as follows: “man leads a dignified existence worthy of moral respect because 
(and only insofar as) he is self-legislating, overcoming natural necessity and willing 
his own actions.”460 
Kant’s philosophy influenced Justice Brennan’s views on capital punishment.  
Justice Brennan objected to the use of the death penalty as a means to treat 
“members of the human races as nonhumans, as objects to be toyed with and 
discarded.”461  This duty to treat the condemned as humans not only requires that we 
not deal with them as objects (or “means”), but that society affirmatively consider 
their equality an intrinsic dignity.  Justice Brennan challenged the death penalty 
when employed in a manner “inconsistent with the fundamental premise . . . that 
even the vilest criminal remains a human being possessed of common human 
dignity.”462  In other words, “[e]ven the most loathsome criminal, justly convicted of 
a heinous offense by due process of law, has a moral claim upon the society which 
                                                          
simplicity, and sobriety.”  Id. (quoting Cicero, De Officiis pt. I 106, 109 (W. Miller trans. 
1956)).  
457
“So God created man in his image, in the image of God created he him, male and 
female created he them.”  Genesis 1:27 (King James).  The belief that God’s image is 
somehow reflected in created man underlies Christ’s teachings about man=s relationship with 
man.  “Love thy neighbor” recognizes that all men have inherent worth.  In other words, 
Christianity is based, at least partially, on dignifying others because God dignifies man.  
458IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 39 (Lewis White 
Beck trans., 2d ed. 1959) (1785).  It is interesting to note that Kant supported the death 
penalty.  He reasoned: “The undeserved evil which any one commits on another, is to be 
regarded as perpetrated on himself. Hence it may be said: “If you slander another, you slander 
yourself; if you steal from another, you steal from yourself; if you strike another, you strike 
yourself; if you kill another, you kill yourself.”  IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 
196 (W. Hastie trans., 1887).  
459IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 63 (Lewis White 
Beck trans., 1959) (1785).  One author has clarified man=s intrinsic dignity as follows: 
“Human dignity consists in our recognizing that each human being . . . has intrinsic value and 
is a value in his own right.”  STERN, ON VALUE AND HUMAN DIGNITY 83 (1975) (quoted in 
Gardner, supra note 119, at 107).  
460Daryl Pullman, Universalism, Particularism, and the Ethics of Dignity, CHRISTIAN 
BIOETHICS 333-58 (2001).   
461Furman, 408 U.S. at 273.  
462See id.  
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has condemned him: his humanity must be respected even while he is being 
punished.  The state must not deny what is undeniable: that this man, though 
condemned, is still unalienably a man.”463 
Under this construct, dignity inherently separates man from the rest of the 
universe.464  Dignity defines our existence in the world, at least in comparison with 
the rest of nature.  These concepts of dignity seem to focus on “a state of mind that 
can be achieved or lost depending on how I feel about myself.”465  By treating others 
as a “means” does not rape them of their inherent dignity; rather he who uses others 
as a means only does so at the diminishment of his own dignity.  So, in one sense, 
“[t]he essence of this conception is not that people have a right to be treated with 
dignity, but rather that people have rights because they have dignity.”466 
For this reason, when we speak of “death with dignity,” we do not consider the 
external elements that play upon the demise.  Dignity has two related, but imprecise, 
opposites: “undignified” and “indignity.”467  Neither of these words is a perfect 
antonym of “dignity.”468  But the use of these terms more fully captures the affront 
that results when a person is treated as a non-human.  The dignity of the actor is 
called into question and the individual treated as a means suffers “death with 
indignity.”469  The inherent dignity of man can remain intact, even when suffering 
personal humiliation resulting in an undignified death. 
The idea of “death with indignity” seems to encapsulate the more popular 
concept of dignity than that espoused by philosophers.  Popular thought, however, 
also seems to recognize that dignity is not immutable by others–the actions of others 
can detract from and diminish that quality we call dignity.  In Wilkerson, the 
Supreme Court condemned those executions laden with “terror, pain, or disgrace.”470  
In this statement, vestiges of the Latin dignitas remain.  At least in popular thought, 
the individuals can be so humiliated or degraded as to lessen the social worth in the 
perception of others.  Societal perception still popularly plays a role in human 
dignity.  This “personal dignity” may be impacted by other’s actions.  Indeed, 
                                                                
463CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, 294 (Hugh Bedau ed. 1975).  
464Kant’s inherent dignity, however, is not universally accepted.  B. F. Skinner, for 
instance, propounded a polar opposite view of dignity.  Skinner’s dignity admittedly stripped 
man of his inherent worth—rather than being autonomous, Skinner’s man is a biological 
machine conditioned to respond to stimuli.  
465John F. Kavanaugh, Death=s Dignity, AMERICA, March 8, 1997.  
466Pullman, supra note 460, at 342.  “Dignity cannot be lost, given up, or taken away.  We 
may talk about offenses against the dignity of a person, or ‘indignities’ that a person may 
suffer, but such offenses or indignities do not cause a person to lose dignity; rather, they show 
an improper lack of respect on the part of the offender for the dignity of another human 
being.”  Lois Sheppard, Dignity And Autonomy After Washington v. Glucksberg: An Essay 
About Abortion, Death, And Crime 7 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 431, 456-57 (1998).  
467Peter Allmark, Death With Dignity, J. MED. ETHICS, 2002:28:255-57 (2002).  
468See id.  
469See id.  
470Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 136.  
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something in the repulsive nature of a tortuous execution seems to extinguish a 
portion of the executed’s dignity.  Simply “[i]t is about how others perceive us.”471 
The author does not provide the discussion above to settle on a concrete 
definition of dignity.  Debate will continue on the subject.  No matter what 
conclusion this article may arrive at, philosophers will not cease to debate the 
meaning of dignity.  The exploration of dignity, however, demonstrates those 
interests affected by Utah’s use of the firing squad.  Man is dignified.  An inmate’s 
perception of that dignity may change with respect to the circumstances of his death.  
A State may challenge an inmate’s perception of his own dignity through an 
undignified death or may encumber his death with indignity.  By treating the 
condemned as a means, society’s dignity wanes; society bears any stain created by 
the State.  Three interests are at play in considering the dignity of man with respect 
to an execution method: that of the executed, that of the executioner, and that of the 
society that enables the execution. 
a.  Of the Executed 
Death is the only inescapable, unavoidable, sure thing.  We are sentenced 
to die the day we’re born.472 
The most that human law can do to anyone in the matter of death is to 
hasten it; the man would have died at any rate; no so much later, and on 
the average, I fear, with a considerably greater amount of bodily 
suffering.473 
The condemned may maintain some modicum of dignity in his execution.  But, 
dignity under such circumstances is difficult.  Obviously, most capital prisoners do 
not wish to die.  Their actions may have required that consequence, but few find 
themselves on death row from suicidal ideation.  Assuredly, some must feel like the 
old Woody Allen joke: “Its not that I’m afraid to die.  I just don’t want to be there 
when it happens.”474 
The loss of autonomy that accompanies executions may be the reason that some 
death row inmates volunteer to forgo judicial review.  Faced with little or no ability 
to control the outcome of their lives, they find autonomy in what some call state-
sponsored suicide.  By casting aside appeals, the volunteer finds himself about to 
control his destiny–rejecting being treated as a “means”–and in his own eyes 
reclaims or reaffirms his human dignity.  Gary Gilmore’s bravado apparently 
allowed him to maintain his self-worth, even though society may have found his 
posturing distasteful. 
Utah’s statute also preserves the dignity of man by guarding autonomy through 
its choice-of-execution provision.  The inclusion of the firing squad as a sentencing 
                                                                
471Sheppard, supra note 466, at 448; see also Pullman, supra note 460, at 342.  
472Encounter with Death Changes Life, U-WIRE, Mar. 13, 2001, available at 2001 WL 
15555362 (quoting Gary Gilmore). 
473John Stuart Mill, Speech in Favor of Capital Punishment (April 21, 1868).  
474WOODY ALLEN, “DEATH (A PLAY”), WITHOUT FEATHERS, 106 (1975).  
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option protects the dignity of the condemned.  Ronnie Lee Gardener captured his 
feeling in opposing a firing-squad ban: “We have no other decisions on our own, 
basically, and that’s one I’d like to keep.”475  The choice between two methods of 
execution is apparently meaningful to many inmates.  Kay Kirkham saw his choice 
of hanging as a way of defying the state.  John Albert Taylor explicitly found the 
firing squad to affirm his masculinity and dignity.  Thomas Ferguson complained in 
his lengthy gallows soliloquy because he had been deprived of his choice.  While a 
spirit of vengeance may argue that such monsters forfeited their right to choose their 
own death when they summarily chose their victim’s method of death, and the 
argument is undeniably compelling, in practical reality the preservation of the 
condemn’s dignity through a choice-of-execution statute validates the dignity of all. 
This only punctuates the fact that dignity may often be an uncompromisingly 
individual consideration.  Recent acknowledgment of that can be found in the 
physician-assisted suicide movement.  One active group lobbying for “death, liberty, 
and the pursuit of happiness” defines “death with dignity” as follows: “A death that 
is consistent with an individual’s personal values and sense of integrity.  This may 
vary considerably between individuals and clinical circumstances.  What is tolerable 
and meaningful for one individual may be unacceptable to another.”476  The firing 
squad may allow some to feel a greater sense of dignity, while lethal injection may 
do the same for others. 
The inherently personal nature of an individual’s choice of execution method can 
be seen in the motivation in electing a choice of death.  One would assume that 
modern inmates would prefer lethal injection because of the lessened chance of pain 
or error.  Yet several inmates have sharply criticized the surgical-like operation of 
that method.  Fear of “flopping around like a fish” seems common.  Gillespie, Utah’s 
prominent death penalty observer, witnessed executions both by firing squad and 
lethal injection.  His examination of the lethal injection process seems to echo that of 
the inmates.  He comments that lethal injection has become “clinical, distant, sterile, 
medicalized.”477  Recognizing that “[t]here is no humane way to punish, but we 
pretend there is,” Gillespie contends that execution by lethal injection “sounds more 
like an operation than an execution, more like a surgical procedure than a sentence of 
the justice system.”478 
This clinical death apparently does not reflect the personal dignity of some.  One 
strong argument against the firing squad is the method’s violence.  Bullets fired, 
blood spilling, body maimed–violence drives the firing squad.  Yet this same 
                                                                
475Donaldson, Execution by Bullet, supra note 119.  
476The Death With Dignity National Center supports physician-assisted suicide.  See 
Death With Dignity, at www.deathwithdignity.org/resources/glossary.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 
2003).  
477GILLSEPIE, supra note 21, at 6.  Gillespie has commented: “I like the option; it’s like 
sending a kid out to get the switch to be spanked with.  Firing squads keep the punishment in 
the justice system rather than in the medical field.  There has to be some sense of paying for 
your crime beyond being put to sleep.”  Louis Sahagun, Utah is Under Fire Over Firing 
Squads, L. A. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1996, at 1.  
478See id. at 172.  
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violence seems attractive to some inmates.479  John Albert Taylor did not want to die 
“[f]acing murder in a laying down fashion,”480 instead preferring to “die like a man.”  
Thus, Roberto Arguelles chose to die without the traditional hood, so he can stare 
down the barrels of the killing rifles.481  This bravura led Joe Hill to command his 
own death.  On some level, firing squads have been romanticized.  It is a martyr’s 
death, a revolutionary demise.  If not banned by institutional policy, one envisions a 
cigarette dangling from the condemned’s lips.  To some, death by that method 
reaffirms masculinity and dignity.482 
Also, as pointed out by Taylor, the firing squad option may be chosen to 
emphasize the State’s taking of life.  Firing squads emphasize the State’s killing in a 
manner that lethal injection cannot convey.  As the ultimate objection to their own 
execution, some inmates apparently revel in the shock value a firing squad forces on 
society.  As related by Taylor, “people will notice . . . when four or five bullets hit 
his chest . . . his life will virtually be ripped away from him. . . . [T]his is murder.”483 
Surely, some inmates find the firing squad an undignified and distasteful death.  
The firing squad’s mutilation of the human body and heightened chance for human 
error certainly provides a basis to object to its use.  But Utah forces its firing squad 
on no one.  The individual nature of dignity is fully expressed in the individual 
choice presented to a capital inmate.  If an inmate feels that the firing squad violates 
his dignity, he can choose lethal injection.484  In sum, Utah’s choice-of-method 
statute insures that an inmate will not be subjected to an undignified death, or at least 
that the inmate’s perception will be that his death is dignified. 
b.  Of the Executioner 
----O what are these, 
Death’s Ministers, not Men, who thus deal Death 
Inhumanly to men, and multiply  
Ten thousandfold the sin of him who slew 
His Brother, for of who such massacher 
Make they but of thir Brethren, men of men?485 
 
 
                                                                
479For instance, when Gary Gilmore was asked if he did not find death by firing squad to 
be “grotesque,” he answered “What’s grotesque is the fact that you have to be strapped in the 
chair with the hood, and all that horseshit.”  Mailer, supra note 128, at 844.  
480Amy Donaldson, Killer Gives Sole Interview to 2 Teens, DESERET NEWS, Jan. 26, 1996, 
at A5.  
481See Cantera, supra note 166, at B1. 
482History affirms that the firing squad has been viewed as a comparatively dignified 
method of death.  For example, the Russians campaigned vigorously for the Nuremberg 
defendants to be hung, thus preventing them from enjoying the legitimacy of a military death.  
483Donaldson, Execution by Bullet, supra note 119.  
484Granted, this may require an inmate to choose the lesser of two evils.  But it is the 
existence of the choice, not particularly the value of the options, that preserves dignity.  
485JOHN MILTON, PARADISE LOST, Book XI (1674 ed.)  
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Insofar as the State guarantees an inmate can pick his own poison 
(metaphorically perhaps), Utah conducts its executions in a dignified manner.  After 
all, one may ask with his tongue firmly planed in cheek, are we not giving the 
condemned exactly what they asked for?  But the State’s use of the firing squad, 
even when requested, raises broader questions about dignity.  Even if an inmate 
begged to be drawn and quartered, the State’s involvement in that archaic and 
tortuous process would blaspheme its institutional dignity.  The integrity of the State 
depends on its treatment of its citizens, however flawed those individuals may be.  
The collective dignity of the State is impacted by the way in which the State kills. 
Utah worries about public image.  Especially in light of the recent Olympic 
games, Utah is concerned about national and international perception of the State.  
Some have raised concerns that the peculiar use of the firing squad brings negative 
publicity to Utah.  By endorsing an unusual method of death, and, unlike Idaho and 
Oklahoma, by actively employing that method, Utah opens itself to censure.  Each 
firing squad execution is punctuated by national headlines.  The firing squad’s 
violence draws attention to the Beehive State in a way that the “routine” lethal 
injection never would.  As noted by Governor Leavitt, “Utah’s image could be hurt if 
we did not conduct ourselves in an orderly and dignified way, and we will meet that 
standard.”486 
The attention Utah draws with each firing squad is accompanied by an inherently 
subjective value judgment.  Utah’s notoriety as the “best place to be executed” can 
either be cutting sarcasm or sincere respect.  The firing squad either bloodies Utah’s 
hands or satisfies the demands of justice.  But one’s own thoughts, biases, and 
opinions shape their perception of Utah’s dignity in the manner it carries out its 
death sentences.  In the end, Utah’s collective dignity is left to personal opinion. 
c.  Of the Enabler 
It must be remembered that after the saber thrust, the withdrawal of the 
saber still leaves the wound.487 
The real problem is the criminal you cannot reform: the human mad dog 
or cobra.  The answer is, kill him kindly and apologetically, if possibly 
without consciousness on his part.  Let him go comfortably to bed 
expecting to wake up in the morning as usual, and not wake up.  His 
general consciousness that this may happen to him should be shared by 
every citizen as part of his moral civic responsibility.488 
Society recognizes that “no man is an island, entire of itself; every man is a piece 
of the continent, a part of the main . . . .”489  If the Supreme Court’s “evolving 
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society” language holds 
any validity, the actor most responsible for the firing squad’s use is not the 
                                                                
486See Spangler, supra note 385.  
487United States v. Rudolph, 403 F.2d 805, 807 (6th Cir. 1968).  
488George Bernard Shaw, Capital Punishment, THE ATLANTIC, June 1948.  
489JOHN DONNE, DEVOTIONS: XVII MEDITATIONS 108 (Univ of MI Press 1959).  
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condemned or the State, but society itself.  The collective value judgment of the 
Utah, and American, population ultimately bears strongly on the firing squad’s use.  
If the firing squad bloodies the hands of the State, it is only because society lets it 
happen.  Collectively, we all share in the stain. 
Again, this calls into play an individual’s own value judgments.  We all may 
differ in our opinion of how dignified a firing squad execution may be.  The 
collective impact of these individual judgments determines the firing squad’s use.  If 
a significant portion of the Utah population felt like the firing squad stripped them of 
dignity, this outrage would find a voice in the legislature or the jury box.  From the 
failure of the firing squad abolition bill in 1996, and the strong public opposition to 
that bill, it appears that Utah society in the past tolerated the firing squad.490   
The tide may be turning.  From recent polls and public opinion, it seems that 
Utah society is maturing, and doing so in a direction against the continued use of the 
firing squad.  Future events, most likely during the State’s next legislative session, 
will determine how Utah views the dignity of man.  Each of us bears the burden of 
grappling with the demands of justice.  Each of us must decide the role of human 
dignity.  And each of us shares the result of the criminal justice experiment. 
V.  CONCLUSIONS AND REFLECTIONS 
The Moving Finger writes and having writ Moves on.  Nor all of your 
Piety or Wit shall lure it back to cancel half a Line, Nor all of your Tears 
wash out a Word of it.491 
Having explored the history, application, controversy, and imminent execution of 
the firing squad, its seems logical that this article then explore the writer’s opinion of 
the current situation, offering either a stinging critique of the amoral application of 
such despotic discipline or praising the virtues of such a principled process that 
exacts a proper punishment.492  This pattern is an approach replicated in a myriad of 
contexts.  The ultimate result, however, rarely accomplishes more than intellectual 
narcissism and self-soothing.  Often those who have been exposed to such material, 
and share the same opinion, leave with their conscious placated and opinions 
cemented further in the firm bedrock from which they originally sprung.493  Those of 
                                                                
490National tolerance may or may not be otherwise.  As previously noted, international 
opinion seems to favor the use of the firing squad.  
491THE RUBAIYAT OF OMAR KHAYYAM (Fitzgerald, trans.) Stanza 71.  
492[L]ong before capital punishment was abolished in [Wisconsin] and in most 
western democracies save the United States, scholars, journalists, philosophers, 
playwrights and others began writing about the death penalty, against it or for it, and 
they continue today. . . .  Fundamentally, almost all have written as moralists; a few as 
statisticians, too.  That is unremarkable; capital punishment is a moral question, 
whatever one=s answer. 
See Dean A. Strang, The Rhetoric of Death, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 841, 841-42 (1998).  
493As one commentator noted years ago “The voluminous literature on [the death penalty] 
is devoted to arguments pro and con.  The arguments have been essentially the same during 
the last century and the evidence on one side makes little impression upon the other side.”  
EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINOLOGY 562 (4th ed. 1924).  
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a differing mindset may instead approach the subject seeking further ammunition for 
a heady assault on the perceived opposition.  This does not mean to infer a general 
inability to maintain objectivity in discussing capital punishment; rather, it 
recognizes the deep-rooted feelings the topic invokes, and the combative position 
assumed by the extreme of either side of the argument.   
Like all politically-charged legislation, the future of the firing squad is uncertain.  
Plato reasoned that “arguments derived from probabilities are idle.”494  Yet there is 
innate value in the continuing drama the death penalty provides, whether it be on the 
protest line outside the prison fence at Point-of-the-Mountain, inside the dusty pages 
of long-cited legal authority, or resounding throughout the legislative chambers.  
Each of these events, from the execution of a killer to the polling of the common 
man, cumulatively affects the future of this form of punishment.  “The importance of 
the death penalty lies not so much in the number of persons upon whom it is inflicted 
as the emotions aroused in those who discuss it.”495 
The discussion of the firing squad shapes and forms the opinions of the populace. 
As noted by George Bernard Shaw, the “general consciousness” of capital 
punishment “should be shared by every citizen as part of his moral civic duty.”496  
The true future of the firing squad does not rest only in the courts, the legislature, or 
in the executive branch--each heart and mind controls its destiny.  Society’s ultimate 
punishment shirks no responsibility.  We all are obliged to arrive at a consensus 
regarding the firing squad’s use.  Until the question is ultimately decided, each firing 
squad bullet will tear through society, forcing us to grasp for an understanding of 
what it means to be a maturing society.  We each must determine for ourselves 
whether society will tolerate death by firing squad. 
                                                                
494PLATO, PHAEDO (4th Century B.C.).  
495SUTHERLAND, supra note 493, at 562.  
496Shaw, supra note 488.  
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